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Enormous amounts of data are collected by hospitals, social networking systems,
government agencies, and other organizations. There are huge social benefits in
analyzing this data, but we must protect the privacy of the individuals in the data.
The current standard definition of data privacy is differential privacy [22, 19].
In this thesis, we introduce new definitions of data privacy that can be bet-
ter than differential privacy in certain ways. We first argue that differential pri-
vacy might not be strong enough in social network settings. We then introduce
a zero-knowledge based definition of privacy called zero-knowledge privacy, which
is strictly stronger than differential privacy and is particularly attractive when
modeling privacy in social networks.
Both differential privacy and zero-knowledge privacy provide strong privacy
guarantees. However, for certain tasks, mechanisms satisfying these privacy defi-
nitions have to add a lot of “noise”, thus lowering the utility of the released data.
Thus, we introduce a new definition of privacy called crowd-blending privacy that
strictly relaxes the notion of differential privacy. We demonstrate crowd-blending
private mechanisms for histograms and for releasing synthetic data points, achiev-
ing strictly better utility than what is possible using differentially private mecha-
nisms.
Differential privacy guarantees the same level of privacy protection for all indi-
viduals. However, we demonstrate that some individuals may need more privacy
than others. Thus, we introduce a generalization of differential privacy called tai-
lored differential privacy, where an individual’s privacy parameter is “tailored”
for the individual based on the individual’s data and the data set. We focus on
a natural instance of tailored differential privacy, which we call outlier privacy :
an individual’s privacy parameter is determined by how much of an “outlier” the
individual is.
In this thesis, we also study the problem of strategy-proof voting, which is
plagued by impossibility results. We take a bounded-rationality approach to this
problem and consider a setting where voters have “coarse” beliefs (a notion that
has gained popularity in the behavioral economics literature). In particular, we
construct good voting rules that satisfy a notion of strategy-proofness with respect
to coarse i.i.d. beliefs, thus circumventing the existing impossibility results.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Data Privacy
Data privacy is a fundamental problem in today’s information age. Large amounts
of data are collected from people by government agencies, search engines, social net-
working systems, hospitals, financial institutions, and other organizations. There
are huge social benefits in analyzing this data. However, it is important to pro-
tect the privacy of the people that contributed their data; organizations need to
make sure that sensitive information about individuals is not leaked to the people
analyzing the data.
Many privacy definitions and schemes for releasing data have been proposed in
the past (see [13] and [30] for surveys). However, many of them have been shown
to be insufficient due to realistic attacks on such schemes (e.g., see [46]). The
notion of differential privacy [22, 19], however, has remained strong and resilient
to these attacks. Differential privacy requires that when one person’s data is added
or removed from the database, the output distribution of the database access
mechanism changes very little (by at most an  amount, where a specific notion
of closeness of distributions is used). Differential privacy has quickly become the
standard definition of privacy, and mechanisms for releasing a variety of functions
(including histogram queries, principal component analysis, learning, and many
more; see [18, 20] for a survey) have been developed.
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1.1.1 Zero-Knowledge Privacy
As we shall argue, however, although differential privacy provides a strong privacy
guarantee, there are realistic social network settings where these guarantees might
not be strong enough. Roughly speaking, differential privacy says that whether
you’re in the database or not is inconsequential for your privacy (i.e., the output
of the database mechanism is essentially the same). But this does not mean your
privacy is protected; the information provided by your friends might already breach
your privacy.
Alternatively, differential privacy can be rephrased as requiring that an adver-
sary does not learn much more about an individual from the mechanism than what
she could learn from knowing everyone else in the database (see the appendix of
[22] for a formalization of this statement). Such a privacy guarantee is not suffi-
ciently strong in the setting of social networks where an individual’s friends are
strongly correlated with the individual; in essence, “If I know your friends, I know
you.” (Indeed, a recent study [42] indicates that an individual’s sexual orientation
can be accurately predicted just by looking at the person’s Facebook friends.) We
now give a concrete example to illustrate how a differentially private mechanism
can violate the privacy of individuals in a social network setting.
Example 1 (Democrats vs. Republicans). Consider a social network of n people
that are grouped into cliques of size 200. In each clique, either at least 80% of the
people are Democrats, or at least 80% are Republicans. However, assume that the
number of Democrats overall is roughly the same as the number of Republicans.
Now, consider a mechanism that computes the proportion (in [0, 1]) of Democrats
in each clique and adds just enough Laplacian noise to satisfy -differential privacy
for a small , say  = 0.1. For example, to achieve -differential privacy, it suffices to
2
add Lap( 1
200
) noise1 to each clique independently, since if a single person changes
his or her political preference, the proportion for the person’s clique changes by
1
200
(see Proposition 1 in [22]).
Since the mechanism satisfies -differential privacy for a small , one may think
that it is safe to release such information without violating the privacy of any par-
ticular person. That is, the released data should not allow us to guess correctly
with probability significantly greater than 1
2
whether a particular person is a Demo-
crat or a Republican. However, this is not the case. With  = 0.1, Lap( 1
200
) is a
small amount of noise, so with high probability, the data released will tell us the
main political preference for any particular clique. An adversary that knows which
clique a person is in will be able to correctly guess the political preference of that
person with probability close to 80%.
For a more detailed explanation and analysis of the above example, see Ap-
pendix A.
Remark. In the above example, we assume that the graph structure of the social
network is known and that the adversary can identify which clique an individual
is in. Such information is commonly available: Graph structures of (anonymized)
social networks are often released; these may include a predefined or natural clus-
tering of the people (nodes) into cliques. Furthermore, an adversary may often
also figure out the identity of various nodes in the graph (e.g., see [2, 39]); in fact,
by participating in the social network before the anonymized graph is published,
an adversary can even target specific individuals of his or her choice (see [2]).
Differential privacy says that the output of the mechanism does not depend
1Lap(λ) is the Laplace distribution with mean 0 and scale λ, whose associated pdf is fλ(x) =
1
2λ exp(− |x|λ ).
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much on any particular individual’s data in the database. Thus, in the above ex-
ample, a person has little reason not to truthfully report his political preference.
However, this does not necessarily imply that the mechanism does not violate the
person’s privacy. In situations where a social network provides auxiliary informa-
tion about an individual, that person’s privacy can be violated even if he decides
to not have his information included.
It is already known that differential privacy may not provide a strong enough
privacy guarantee when an adversary has specific auxiliary information about an
individual. For example, it was pointed out in [19] that if an adversary knows the
auxiliary information “person A is two inches shorter than the average American
woman”, and if a differentially private mechanism accurately releases the average
height of American women, then the adversary learns person A’s height (which
is assumed to be sensitive information in this example). In this example, the
adversary has very specific auxiliary information about an individual that is usually
hard to obtain. However, in the Democrats vs. Republicans example, the auxiliary
information (the graph and clique structure) about individuals is more general
and more easily accessible. Since social network settings contain large amounts of
auxiliary information and correlation between individuals, differential privacy is
usually not strong enough in such settings.
One may argue that there are versions of differential privacy that protect the
privacy of groups of individuals, and that the mechanism in the Democrats vs. Re-
publicans example does not satisfy these stronger definitions of privacy. While
this is true, the main point here is that differential privacy will not protect the pri-
vacy of an individual, even though the definition is designed for individual privacy.
Furthermore, even if we had used a differentially private mechanism that ensures
4
privacy for groups of size 200 (i.e., the size of each clique), it might still be possible
to deduce information about an individual by looking at the friends of the friends
of the individual; this includes a significantly larger number of individuals.2
Towards a Zero-Knowledge Definition of Privacy
In 1977, Dalenius [16] stated a privacy goal for statistical databases: anything
about an individual that can be learned from the database can also be learned
without access to the database. This would be a very desirable notion of privacy.
Unfortunately, Dwork and Naor [19, 23] demonstrated a general impossibility result
showing that a formalization of Dalenius’s goal along the lines of semantic security
for cryptosystems cannot be achieved, assuming that the database gives any non-
trivial utility.
Our aim is to provide a privacy definition along the lines of Dalenius, and
more precisely, relying on the notion of zero-knowledge from cryptography. In this
context, the traditional notion of zero-knowledge says that an adversary gains es-
sentially “zero additional knowledge” by accessing the mechanism. More precisely,
whatever an adversary can compute by accessing the mechanism can essentially
also be computed without accessing the mechanism. A mechanism satisfying this
property would be private but utterly useless, since the mechanism provides es-
sentially no information. The whole point of releasing data is to provide utility;
thus, this extreme notion of zero-knowledge, which we now call “complete zero-
knowledge”, is not very applicable in this setting.
Intuitively, we want the mechanism to not release any additional information
2The number of “friends of friends” is usually larger than the square of the number of friends
(see [64]).
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beyond some “aggregate information” that is considered acceptable to release. To
capture this requirement, we use the notion of a “simulator” from zero-knowledge,
and we require that a simulator with the acceptable aggregate information can
essentially compute whatever an adversary can compute by accessing the mecha-
nism. Our zero-knowledge privacy definition is thus stated relative to some class
of algorithms providing acceptable aggregate information.
Aggregate Information
The question is how to define appropriate classes of aggregate information. We
focus on the case where the aggregate information is any information that can be
obtained from k random samples/rows (each of which corresponds to one individ-
ual’s data) of the database, where the data of the person the adversary wants to
attack has been concealed. The value of k can be carefully chosen so that the aggre-
gate information obtained does not allow one to infer (much) information about
the concealed data. The simulator is given this aggregate information and has
to compute what the adversary essentially computes, even though the adversary
has access to the mechanism. This ensures that the mechanism does not release
any additional information beyond this “k random sample” aggregate information
given to the simulator.
Differential privacy can be described using our zero-knowledge privacy defini-
tion by considering simulators that are given aggregate information consisting of
the data of all but one individual in the database; this is the same as aggregate
information consisting of “k random samples” with k = n, where n is the number
of rows in the database (recall that the data of the individual the adversary wants
to attack is concealed), which we formally prove later. For k less than n, such as
6
k =
√
n, we obtain notions of privacy that are stronger than differential privacy.
For example, we later show that the mechanism in the Democrats vs. Republicans
example does not satisfy our zero-knowledge privacy definition when k = o(n) and
n is sufficiently large.
We may also consider more general models of aggregate information that are
specific to graphs representing social networks; in this context we focus on random
samples with some exploration of the neighborhood of each sample.
In Chapter 2, we define and investigate zero-knowledge privacy, and demon-
strate that it can be meaningfully achieved for tasks such as computing averages,
fractions, histograms, and a variety of graph parameters and properties, such as
average degree and distance to connectivity. Our results are obtained by establish-
ing a connection between zero-knowledge privacy and sample complexity, and by
leveraging recent sublinear time algorithms. Chapter 2 is based on the following
work: [32].
1.1.2 Crowd-Blending Privacy
Privacy from Random Sampling of Data. Both differential privacy and zero-
knowledge privacy provide strong privacy guarantees. However, for certain tasks,
mechanisms satisfying these privacy definitions have to add a lot of “noise”, thus
lowering the utility of the released data. Also, many of these mechanisms run in
exponential time (e.g., [25, 6]), so efficiency is also an issue. This leaves open the
question of whether there exists a practical approach to sanitizing data, without
harming utility too much.
One approach for circumventing the above-mentioned issues is to rely on the
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fact that in many cases of interest, the data to be sanitized has been collected
via random sampling from some underlying population. Intuitively, this initial
random sampling already provides some basic privacy guarantees, and may thus
help us in decreasing the amount of noise added during sanitization. Indeed,
there are several results in the literature indicating that random sampling helps in
providing privacy: In [10] the authors quantify the level of the privacy that may be
obtained from just random sampling of data (without any further sanitization); in
[65] the authors consider a certain type of “sample-and-aggregate” mechanism for
achieving differential privacy (but the sampling technique here is more elaborate
than just random sampling from a population); a result in [43] shows that random
pre-sampling can be used to amplify the privacy level of a differentially private
mechanism; finally, in a manuscript [51], the authors demonstrate that a random
pre-sampling step applied to a particular mechanism leads to a differentially private
mechanism.
In this thesis, we continue the investigation of using random sampling as a
means to achieve privacy. In particular, our goal is to provide a general definition
of privacy that allows us to achieve both differential and zero-knowledge privacy in
situations where the data is collected using random sampling from some popula-
tion. In order to be realistic, we allow the random sampling during data collection
to be biased, and an adversary may even know whether certain individuals were
sampled or not. (Although the mechanisms in the earlier papers rely on random
sampling, the random sampling is usually thought of as being part of the sanitiza-
tion procedure and thus the mechanisms are only analyzed under the assumption
that the sampling has been done “ideally”.) Additionally, we will require that the
privacy notion is meaningful in its own right, also without any pre-sampling; we
believe this requirement is crucial for guaranteeing a strong fall-back guarantee
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even in case the result of the pre-sampling is leaked (and thus the attacker knows
exactly who was sampled).
Towards a Weaker Notion of Privacy
We aim to develop a new privacy definition that allows us to design mechanisms
that have greater utility or efficiency than differentially private mechanisms, but
still provide a meaningful notion of privacy; furthermore, we want mechanisms
satisfying the new definition to achieve differential and zero-knowledge privacy
when the underlying data was collected via biased random sampling from some
population. To this end, we begin by reconsidering some older notions of privacy.
k-Anonymity and Blending in a Crowd. k-anonymity [75] is a privacy defi-
nition specifically for releasing data tables, where a data table is simply a table of
records (rows), each of which has values for the attributes (columns) of the table.
Roughly speaking, a released data table satisfies k-anonymity if every record in
the table is the same as k − 1 other records in the table with respect to certain
“identifying” attributes (chosen beforehand). k-anonymity imposes constraints
on the syntax of the released data table, but does not consider the way the re-
leased data table was computed from the underlying database; this issue has led to
several practical attacks against the notion of k-anonymity (e.g., see [78, 80]). k-
anonymity can be viewed as being based on the intuition of “blending in a crowd”,
since the records in the released output are required to “blend” with other records.
Intuitively, in many cases, if an individual blends in a crowd of many people in
the database, then the individual’s privacy is sufficiently protected. However, as
demonstrated by known attacks, k-anonymity does not properly capture this in-
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tuition as it does not impose any restrictions on the algorithm/mechanism used
to generate the released output. Indeed, one of the key insights behind the notion
of differential privacy was that privacy should be a property of the sanitization
mechanism and not just the output of it.
Relying on this insight, we aim to develop a privacy notion that captures what it
means for a mechanism to guarantee that individuals “blend in a crowd”. (Another
definition partly based on the intuition of blending in a crowd is (c, t)-isolation
[11], which requires adversaries to be unable to isolate an individual, represented
by a data point in Rd, by roughly determining the individual’s location in Rd; we
formalize the intuition of blending in a crowd in a very different way.)
In Chapter 3, we introduce a new definition of privacy called crowd-blending
privacy that strictly relaxes the notion of differential privacy. Roughly speaking,
k-crowd blending private sanitization of a database requires that each individual i
in the database “blends” with k other individuals j in the database, in the sense
that the output of the sanitizer is “indistinguishable” if i’s data is replaced by j’s.
We demonstrate crowd-blending private mechanisms for histograms and for
releasing synthetic data points, achieving strictly better utility than what is pos-
sible using differentially private mechanisms. Additionally, we demonstrate that
if a crowd-blending private mechanism is combined with a “pre-sampling” step,
where the individuals in the database are randomly drawn from some underly-
ing population (as is often the case during data collection), then the combined
mechanism satisfies not only differential privacy, but also the stronger notion of
zero-knowledge privacy. This holds even if the pre-sampling is slightly biased and
an adversary knows whether certain individuals were sampled or not. Taken to-
gether, our results yield a practical approach for collecting and privately releasing
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data while ensuring higher utility than previous approaches. Chapter 3 is based
on the following work: [31].
1.1.3 Tailored Differential Privacy and Outlier Privacy
Currently, the standard notion of differential privacy guarantees the same level of
privacy protection for all individuals. More precisely, in -differential privacy, every
individual has the same “-differential privacy protection”, which guarantees that
the algorithm’s output distribution changes by at most  when adding or removing
the individual’s data from the data set. While this is a strong privacy guarantee
if  is very small (we elaborate more on this below), it clearly also does result in
a non-trivial privacy loss for moderate values of . Additionally, it has also been
established that to achieve non-trivial utility,  cannot be too small—in particular,
  1/n where n is the number of individuals in the data set. Furthermore, to
answer a counting query with -differential privacy and with error at most α, we
must have  ≥ Ω(1/α).
An alternative idea is to provide different levels of privacy protection to dif-
ferent individuals—intuitively, some individuals require more privacy than others,
and the algorithm should accommodate this. This general idea, which first ap-
peared in the work of Ghosh and Roth [33], has been partly investigated in a
mechanism design setting (e.g., see [33, 27, 52, 70, 67]), where individuals are re-
quested to not only submit their data, but also their “privacy valuation”. The
mechanism then tries to accommodate each individual’s privacy valuation, while
at the same time releasing data that is useful. Unfortunately, however, in the most
realistic setting—where an individual’s privacy valuation may be correlated with
her data and thus also needs to be protected—the literature is plagued by strong
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impossibility results.
Tailored Differential Privacy: Protecting Outliers. In this thesis, we con-
sider a different approach to deal with the issue that different individuals may
have different privacy needs. Instead of having the individuals specify their own
privacy valuation/parameter, an individual’s privacy parameter will be determined
based on the individual’s data and the data set. In other words, an individual’s
privacy parameter will be tailored for the individual based on the data set—we
refer to such a notion as tailored differential privacy. In this thesis, we focus on a
natural instance of tailored differential privacy: an individual’s privacy parameter
will be determined by how much of an “outlier” the individual is (w.r.t. the data
set). Roughly speaking, “outliers”—intuitively, individuals that are “far away”,
or “vastly different” from most other individuals—will be granted higher privacy
protection than individuals that “mix” with lots of other individuals. One reason
for providing higher privacy protection to outliers is that we may want to limit the
amount of information leaked about a group of outliers. Let us present an example
to illustrate what we mean.
Example 2 (Salaries of a Company’s Employees). Consider the standard -
differentially private algorithm for releasing a histogram, which simply adds
(Laplace) Lap(1/) noise to each bin independently. Suppose such an algorithm is
used to release a histogram of the salaries of a large company’s employees, where
the range of possible salaries is partitioned into intervals, which correspond to the
bins of the histogram. Assume there exists a (small, but non-trivial) group of,
say, 100 managers, and all these managers have similar salaries that belong to the
same bin; assume further that the other employees in the company have much
lower salaries. Since the group of managers is relatively small, we consider them
12
to be outliers and would like to prevent their (approximate) salary from being
revealed. But, if  is not small enough, by choosing the highest-salary bin with a
noisy count of at least 50, the bin containing the managers can be predicted with
“high” probability (roughly 1− exp(−50)).
Leaking the salary information of a small group of managers may perhaps not
be considered a serious “breach” of their privacy. However, the same argument
still holds if we further partition each salary bin into two sub-bins corresponding
to HIV positive and HIV negative individuals. If the fraction of HIV positive
managers is significantly higher than what is usual, this fact would be released by
the -differentially private algorithm (assuming  is not too small).
In contrast, if we could provide sufficiently higher privacy protection (i.e., a
sufficiently smaller privacy parameter) to each of the managers, then the amount
of information leaked about the group of managers would be significantly less,
and thus the managers’ salary, or information about their HIV status, will not be
(significantly) revealed.
In the above example, the managers are considered “outliers”—the group of
outliers is “small” and other individuals in the data set are “far” from them;
thus we consider it a violation of their privacy that sensitive information about
them is leaked. In contrast, if the group of managers was “huge”, we would no
longer consider them outliers, and releasing aggregate information about a huge
group of people should not be considered a violation of privacy. Indeed, note
that in the above example, the sensitive information that is leaked is not about a
single individual, it is about the group of managers; this clarifies why traditional
differential privacy (which is only meant to mask a single individual’s information)
does not suffice to protect this information.
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The notion of (k, )-group differential privacy (which in particular is implied by
/k-differential privacy), on the other hand, could be used to protect information
about the group of managers (if we let k = 100). But using such a strong notion
of privacy would require adding noise proportional to 100/ to all the bins in the
above example, and would render the released data useless. On the other hand, if
we tailor the level of privacy required by an individual to whether the individual is
an outlier or not (which, looking forward, will be enabled by our notion of outlier
privacy), we could make sure to guarantee (/100)-differential privacy for only the
managers (and thus any information about the group of managers is protected),
and only -differential privacy for everyone else.
In Chapter 4, we introduce our generalization of differential privacy called tai-
lored differential privacy, where an individual’s privacy parameter is “tailored” for
the individual based on the individual’s data and the data set. In this thesis, we
focus on a natural instance of tailored differential privacy, which we call outlier
privacy : an individual’s privacy parameter is determined by how much of an “out-
lier” the individual is. We provide a new definition of an outlier and use it to
introduce our notion of outlier privacy. Roughly speaking, (·)-outlier privacy re-
quires that each individual in the data set is guaranteed “(k)-differential privacy
protection”, where k is a number quantifying the “outlierness” of the individual.
We demonstrate how to release accurate histograms that satisfy (·)-outlier pri-
vacy for various natural choices of (·). Additionally, we show that (·)-outlier
privacy with our weakest choice of (·)—which offers no explicit privacy protection
for “non-outliers”—already implies a “distributional” notion of differential privacy
w.r.t. a large and natural class of distributions. Chapter 4 is based on the following
work: [53].
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1.2 Voting
So far, this thesis has investigated the problem of data privacy. A related problem
is how to get people to honestly report their data to begin with. In this thesis, we
will focus on the specific problem of voting, which we now discuss.
People have long desired to have a good voting rule that is strategy-proof —that
is, the voters would not want to lie about their true preferences. Unfortunately, the
celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [34, 71] shows that if there are at least
three possible candidates, then any deterministic strategy-proof voting rule has to
be dictatorial—that is, there exists a fixed voter whose top choice is always the
winner. Although the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem only applies to determinis-
tic voting rules, Gibbard later generalized the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem to
randomized voting rules [35]. In particular, Gibbard showed that any randomized
strategy-proof voting rule has to be a probability distribution over unilateral rules
and duple rules, where a unilateral rule depends only on a single voter, and a du-
ple rule chooses only between two possible candidates; furthermore, if the voting
rule satisfies the natural condition of Pareto efficiency—that is, the voting rule
never chooses a candidate y that is dominated by some other candidate x by ev-
ery voter—then the voting rule must be a probability distribution over dictatorial
voting rules.
The notion of strategy-proofness, however, is quite strong. It requires voters
to truthfully report their preferences, no matter what preferences the other voters
have (and in particular, even if the voter knows exactly the preferences of every-
one else). One may thus hope that these impossibility results can be circumvented
by relaxing this requirement. For instance, for the case of “large-scale” voting, it
makes sense to assume that each voter has some belief about the preferences of the
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other voters, and additionally that these preferences are independent and identi-
cally distributed (i.i.d.)—we refer to such a notion as strategy-proofness w.r.t. (with
respect to) i.i.d. beliefs. Unfortunately, this weakening does not make things much
better: A result by McLennan [57] shows that if an anonymous3 voting rule (with
at least three candidates) is strategy-proof w.r.t. all i.i.d. beliefs and is also Pareto
efficient, then the voting rule must be a random dictatorship—that is, a uniformly
random voter’s top choice is chosen as the winner. Furthermore, in [49], Leung, Lui,
and Pass strengthen McLennan’s result by showing that relaxing Pareto efficiency
to -Pareto efficiency (where Pareto efficiency can be violated with probability )
does not help, even for rather large values of , and even for a significantly weaker
notion of -Pareto efficiency. Thus, even for an extremely weak notion of what it
means to be a “reasonable” voting rule, strategy-proofness w.r.t. all i.i.d. beliefs
cannot be achieved.
Can bounded-rationality help? In this thesis, we consider using notions of
“bounded-rationality” (see e.g., [74]) to overcome the above impossibility results.
An initial approach in this direction was considered by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick
[3], who suggested that although voting manipulations exist, they may be “hard to
find”. However, a more recent line of research [45, 15, 69, 28, 29, 79, 17, 41, 59, 58]
has demonstrated that instances where manipulation is possible are relatively com-
mon and furthermore, successful manipulation can be efficiently computed (if the
manipulator has complete knowledge of everyone else’s preferences). Nevertheless,
it may still be conceivable that such computational approaches may be applicable
if we restrict to strategy-proofness w.r.t. i.i.d. beliefs. However, we do not pursue
this path here.
3A voting rule is anonymous if it does not depend on the identity of the voters.
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A different approach suggested by Birrell and Pass [5] relaxes strategy-proofness
to approximate strategy-proofness, where a voting rule is -strategy-proof if no
voter can gain more than  in expected utility by lying. However, although Birrell
and Pass [5] present positive results for the case where  = O(1/n), they also show
that Gibbard’s result [35] extends when  = o(1/n2). While it may be reasonable
to assume that (bounded-rational) voters do not care about “small” differences in
expected utility, in some settings a gain of 1/n2 may be too much. Additionally,
Carroll [7] demonstrates that a variant of McLennan’s result [57] holds even if we
just consider o(1/n3/2)-strategy-proofness w.r.t. i.i.d beliefs, as long as we restrict
to deterministic voting rules.
In Chapter 5, we take a bounded-rationality approach to this problem and con-
sider a setting where voters have “coarse” beliefs. A belief is said to be α-coarse
if the probabilities in the belief are restricted to lie on a uniform discretization
of [0, 1] with “mesh size” at least α. We consider strategy-proofness w.r.t. coarse
i.i.d. beliefs, and we focus on “large-scale” voting where the number of voters n
is sufficiently large but is still polynomially-related to 1/α, where α is the coarse-
ness parameter. A voting rule is said to be large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse
i.i.d. beliefs if there exists a polynomial p(·) such that for every coarseness param-
eter α > 0, and every n ≥ p(1/α), no voter having an α-coarse i.i.d. belief can
improve her expected utility by lying about her preferences.
We construct good voting rules that are large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse
i.i.d. beliefs, thus circumventing the above impossibility results. In particular, we
construct anonymous -Pareto efficient voting rules that are large-scale strategy-
proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where  is exponentially small in the number of
voters. One of our voting rules is a variant of the well-known instant-runoff voting
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rule, which is used in many elections throughout the world. Chapter 5 is based on
the following work: [50].
1.3 Outline
Chapter 2 contains our work on zero-knowledge privacy. Chapter 3 contains our
work on crowd-blending privacy. Chapter 4 contains our work on tailored differ-
ential privacy and outlier privacy. Finally, Chapter 5 contains our work on voting.
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CHAPTER 2
ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PRIVACY
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present our work on zero-knowledge privacy.
2.1.1 Our Results
We consider two different settings for releasing information. In the first setting,
we consider statistical (row) databases in a setting where an adversary might have
auxiliary information, such as from a social network, and we focus on releasing
traditional statistics (e.g., averages, fractions, histograms, etc.) from a database.
As explained earlier, differential privacy may not be strong enough in such a setting,
so we use our zero-knowledge privacy definition instead. In the second setting, we
consider graphs with personal data that represent social networks, and we focus
on releasing information directly related to a social network, such as properties of
the graph structure.
Setting #1. Computing functions on databases with zero-knowledge
privacy: In this setting, we focus on computing functions mapping databases
to Rm. We give a characterization of the functions that can be released with
zero-knowledge privacy in terms of their sample complexity—i.e., how accurate
the function can be approximated using random samples from the input database.
More precisely, functions with low sample complexity can be computed accurately
by a zero-knowledge private mechanism, and vice versa. (It is already known that
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functions with low sample complexity can be computed with differential privacy
(see [22]), but here we show that the stronger notion of zero-knowledge privacy can
be achieved.) In this result, the zero-knowledge private mechanism we construct
simply adds Laplacian noise appropriately calibrated to the sample complexity of
the function.
Many common queries on statistical databases have low sample complexity,
including averages, fraction queries, counting queries, and coarse histogram queries.
(In general, it would seem that any “meaningful” query function for statistical
databases should have relatively low sample complexity if we think of the rows
of the database as random samples from some large underlying population.) We
also show that for functions with low sample complexity, we can use differentially
private mechanisms to construct zero-knowledge private mechanisms. Using this
result, we construct zero-knowledge private mechanisms for such functions while
providing decent utility guarantees. All of these results can be found in Section
2.3.
We also consider mechanisms that answer a class of queries simultaneously, and
we generalize the notion of sample complexity to classes of query functions. By
showing that a class of fraction queries with low VC dimension has low sample
complexity, we are able to use existing differentially private mechanisms for classes
of fraction queries to construct zero-knowledge private mechanisms, resulting in
improved accuracy for fraction queries. These results can be found in Section 2.4.
Setting #2. Releasing graph structure information with zero-knowledge
privacy: In this setting, we consider a graph representing a social network, and
we focus on privately releasing information about the structure of the graph. We
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use our zero-knowledge privacy definition, since the released information can be
combined with auxiliary information such as an adversary’s knowledge and/or
previously released data (e.g., graph structure information) to breach the privacy
of individuals.
The connection between sample complexity and zero-knowledge privacy high-
lights an interesting connection between sublinear time algorithms and privacy. As
it turns out, many of the recently developed sublinear algorithms on graphs pro-
ceed by picking random samples (vertices) and performing some local exploration;
we are able to leverage these algorithms to privately release graph structure in-
formation, such as average degree and distance to properties such as connectivity
and cycle-freeness. We discuss these results in Section 2.5.
2.2 Zero-Knowledge Privacy
2.2.1 Definitions
Let D be the collection of all databases whose rows are elements (e.g., tuples)
from some data universe X. For convenience, we will assume that X contains an
element ⊥, which can be used to conceal the true value of a row. Given a database
D, let |D| denote the number of rows in D. For any integer n, let [n] denote the
set {1, . . . , n}. For any database D ∈ D, any integer i ∈ [|D|], and any element
v ∈ X, let (D−i, v) denote the database D with row i replaced by the element v.
In this chapter, mechanisms, adversaries, and simulators are simply randomized
algorithms that play certain roles in our definitions. Let San be a mechanism that
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operates on databases in D. For any database D ∈ D, any adversary A, and any
z ∈ B∗, let OutA(A(z) ↔ San(D)) denote the random variable representing the
output of A on input z after interacting with the mechanism San operating on
the database D. Note that San can be interactive or non-interactive. If San is
non-interactive, then San(D) sends information (e.g., a sanitized database) to A
and then halts immediately; the adversary A then tries to breach the privacy of
some individual in the database D.
Let agg be any class of randomized algorithms that provide aggregate infor-
mation to simulators, as described in Section 1.1.1. We refer to agg as a model of
aggregate information.
Definition 1. We say that San is -zero-knowledge private with respect
to agg if there exists a T ∈ agg such that for every adversary A, there exists a
simulator S such that for every database D ∈ Xn, every z ∈ B∗, every integer
i ∈ [n], and every W ⊆ B∗, the following hold:
• Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D)) ∈ W ] ≤ e · Pr[S(z, T (D−i,⊥), i, n) ∈ W ]
• Pr[S(z, T (D−i,⊥), i, n) ∈ W ] ≤ e · Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D)) ∈ W ]
The probabilities are over the random coins of San and A, and T and S, respec-
tively.
Intuitively, the above definition says that whatever an adversary can compute
by accessing the mechanism can essentially also be computed without accessing
the mechanism but with certain aggregate information (specified by agg). The
adversary in the latter scenario is represented by the simulator S. The definition
requires that the adversary’s output distribution is close to that of the simulator.
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This ensures that the mechanism essentially does not release any additional infor-
mation beyond what is allowed by agg. When the algorithm T provides aggregate
information to the simulator S, the data of individual i is concealed so that the
aggregate information does not depend directly on individual i’s data. However,
in the setting of social networks, the aggregate information may still depend on
people’s data that are correlated with individual i in reality, such as the data of
individual i’s friends. Thus, the role played by agg is very important in the context
of social networks.
To measure the closeness of the adversary’s output and the simulator’s out-
put, we use the same closeness measure as in differential privacy (as opposed to,
say, statistical difference) for the same reasons. As explained in [22], consider a
mechanism that outputs the contents of a randomly chosen row. Suppose agg is
defined so that it includes the algorithm that simply outputs its input (D−i,⊥) to
the simulator (which is the case of differential privacy; see Section 1.1.1 and 2.2.2).
Then, a simulator can also choose a random row and then simulate the adversary
with the chosen row sent to the simulated adversary. The real adversary’s out-
put will be very close to the simulator’s output in statistical difference (1/n to be
precise); however, it is clear that the mechanism always leaks private information
about some individual.
Remark. Our -zero-knowledge privacy definition can be easily extended to (, δ)-
zero-knowledge privacy, where we also allow an additive error of δ on the RHS of
the inequalities. We can further extend our definition to (c, , δ)-zero-knowledge
privacy to protect the privacy of any group of c individuals simultaneously. To
obtain this more general definition, we would change “i ∈ [n]” to “I ⊆ [n] with
1 ≤ |I| ≤ c”, and “S(z, (D−i,⊥), i, n)” to “S(z, (D−I , ~⊥), I, n)”, where (D−I , ~⊥)
denotes the database D with the rows at positions I replaced by ⊥. We use this
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more general definition when we consider group privacy.
Remark. In our zero-knowledge privacy definition, we consider computationally
unbounded simulators. We can also consider PPT simulators by requiring that
the mechanism San and the adversary A are PPT algorithms, and agg is a class
of PPT algorithms. All of these algorithms would be PPT in n, the size of the
database. With minor modifications, the results of this chapter would still hold in
this case.
The choice of agg determines the type and amount of aggregate information
given to the simulator, and should be decided based on the context in which the
zero-knowledge privacy definition is used. The aggregate information should not
depend much on data that is highly correlated with the data of a single person,
since such aggregate information may be used to breach the privacy of that person.
For example, in the context of social networks, such aggregate information should
not depend much on any person and the people closely connected to that person,
such as his or her friends. By choosing agg carefully, we ensure that the mechanism
essentially does not release any additional information beyond what is considered
acceptable. We first consider the model of aggregate information where T in the
definition of zero-knowledge privacy chooses k(n) random samples. Let k : N→ N
be any function.
• RS(k(·)) = k(·) random samples: the class of algorithms T such that on
input a database D ∈ Xn, T chooses k(n) random samples (rows) from D
uniformly without replacement, and then performs any computation on these
samples without reading any of the other rows of D. Note that with such
samples, T can emulate choosing k(n) random samples with replacement, or
a combination of without replacement and with replacement.
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k(n) should be carefully chosen so that the aggregate information obtained does
not allow one to infer (much) information about the concealed data. For k(n) = 0,
the simulator is given no aggregate information at all, which is the case of complete
zero-knowledge. For k(n) = n, the simulator is given all the rows of the original
database except for the target individual i, which is the case of differential privacy
(as we prove later). For k(n) strictly in between 0 and n, we obtain notions of
privacy that are stronger than differential privacy. For example, one can consider
k(n) = o(n), such as k(n) =
√
n.
In the setting of a social network, k(n) can be chosen so that when k(n) ran-
dom samples are chosen from (D−i,⊥), with very high probability, for (almost) all
individuals j, very few of the k(n) chosen samples will be in individual j’s local
neighborhood in the social network graph. This way, the aggregate information
released by the mechanism depends very little on data that is highly correlated
with the data of a single individual. The choice of k(n) would depend on various
properties of the graph structure, such as clustering coefficient, edge density, and
degree distribution. The choice of k(n) would also depend on the amount of cor-
relation between the data of adjacent or close vertices (individuals) in the graph,
and the type of information released by the mechanism. In this model of aggre-
gate information, vertices (individuals) in the graph with more adjacent vertices
(e.g., representing friends) may have less privacy than those with fewer adjacent
vertices. However, this is often the case in social networks, where having more
links/connections to other people may result in less privacy.
One can also consider other models of aggregate information, such as the class
of algorithms T such that on input a database D ∈ Xn, T reads each row with at
most a certain probability, say k(n)
n
. This class of algorithms, which we call “k(·)
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adaptive samples” and denote by AS(k(·)), is more general and contains RS(k(·)).
However, there are some “bad” mechanisms that are zero-knowledge private with
respect to AS(k(·)) but intuitively violate the privacy of individuals. We now give
an example of such a mechanism.
Example 3. Recall the Democrats vs. Republicans example in the introduction.
Now, consider a new mechanism that chooses a clique uniformly at random, com-
putes the proportion of Democrats in the chosen clique, adds Lap( 1
200
) noise to the
computed proportion, and then outputs the clique number/identifier and the noisy
proportion. For the same reasons as in the Democrats vs. Republicans example,
this mechanism clearly violates the privacy of the individuals in the chosen clique.
However, this mechanism is still -zero-knowledge private with respect to AS(k(·))
as long as k(n) isn’t too small.
Intuitively, a simulator with T ∈ AS(k(·)) providing aggregate information
can simulate the mechanism by doing the same thing the mechanism does, since
the mechanism reads each row with probability 200
n
(each clique is chosen with
probability 200
n
, since there are n
200
cliques). This works as long as 200
n
≤ k(n)
n
, since
T is only allowed to read each row with probability at most k(n)
n
. We assume that
T can easily determine which rows belong to a particular clique; for example, the
rows of the database can be ordered so that individuals belonging to the same
clique appear consecutively in the database, or the nodes in the published social
network graph can have distinct labels in {1, . . . , n}, and the political preference
for node i is stored in row i of the database.
In Section 2.5, we consider other models of aggregate information that take
more into consideration the graph structure of a social network. Note that zero-
knowledge privacy does not necessarily guarantee that the privacy of every indi-
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vidual is completely protected. Zero-knowledge privacy is defined with respect to
a model of aggregate information, and such aggregate information may still leak
some sensitive information about an individual in certain scenarios.
Composition: Just as for differentially private mechanisms, mechanisms that
are -zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)) also compose nicely.
Proposition 2. Suppose San1 is 1-zero-knowledge private with respect to
RS(k1(·)) and San2 is 2-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k2(·)). Then,
the mechanism San obtained by (sequentially) composing San1 with San2 is
(1 + 2)-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS((k1 + k2)(·)).
Proof. Let k(n) = k1(n) + k2(n), and let T1 ∈ RS(k1(·)) and T2 ∈ RS(k2(·)) be
the aggregate information algorithms guaranteed by the zero-knowledge privacy of
San1 and San2, respectively. Let T be an algorithm in RS(k(·)) that, on input a
database D ∈ Xn, chooses k1(n) random samples as in T1, chooses k2(n) random
samples as in T2, runs T1 and T2 on D separately using the chosen samples, and
then outputs (T1(D), T2(D)). Let A be any adversary. It is easy to decompose
A into two adversaries A1 and A2, where Aj is the part of A that interacts with
Sanj. The output of A1 contains information describing the state (including the
work tape) of A after finishing its interaction with San1. A2 expects its input
z to be the output of A1 so that it can start interacting with San2 with the
same information A would have at this point of the interaction. Let Sj be the
(guaranteed) simulator for Sanj and Aj.
Let S be a simulator that, on input (z, T (D−i,⊥), i, n) = (z, (T1(D−i,⊥), T2(D−i,⊥)), i, n),
first runs the simulator S1 on input (z, T1(D−i,⊥), i, n) to get z′ :=
S1(z, T1(D−i,⊥), i, n), and then runs the simulator S2 on input (z′, T2(D−i,⊥), i, n).
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Let D ∈ Xn, z ∈ B∗, i ∈ [n], and W ⊆ B∗. Let Y = Supp(S1(z, T1(D−i,⊥), i, n)).
We note that Y = Supp(OutA1(A1(z)↔ San1(D))). Now, observe that∣∣∣∣ln(Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D)) ∈ W ]Pr[S(z, T (D−i,⊥), i, n) ∈ W ]
)∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣ln(∑z′∈Y Pr[OutA2(A2(z′)↔ San2(D)) ∈ W ] Pr[OutA1(A1(z)↔ San1(D)) = z′]∑
z′∈Y Pr[S2(z
′, T2(D−i,⊥), i, n) ∈ W ] Pr[S1(z, T1(D−i,⊥), i, n) = z′]
)∣∣∣∣
≤ 1 + 2.
Group Privacy: A nice feature of differential privacy is that -differential pri-
vacy implies (c, c)-differential privacy for groups of size c (see [19] and the appendix
in [22]). We have a similar group privacy guarantee for -zero-knowledge privacy.
Proposition 3. Suppose San is -zero-knowledge private with respect to agg.
Then, for every c ≥ 1, San is also (c, (2c−1))-zero-knowledge private with respect
to agg.
Proof. Let T be the algorithm in agg guaranteed by the -zero-knowledge privacy
of San. Let c ≥ 1. Consider any adversary A, and let S be the simulator for A
and San. Let D ∈ Xn, z ∈ B∗, I ⊆ [n] with 1 ≤ |I| ≤ c, and W ⊆ B∗. Let i be
any integer in I. Then, by the -zero-knowledge privacy of San, we have∣∣∣∣∣ln
(
Pr[S(z, T (D−I , ~⊥), i, n) ∈ W ]
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D−(I\{i}), ~⊥)) ∈ W ]
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ . (1)
We later show that -zero-knowledge privacy implies 2-differential privacy (Propo-
sition 7), so San is 2-differentially private and thus (c− 1, 2(c− 1))-differentially
private. As a result, we have∣∣∣∣∣ln
(
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D−(I\{i}), ~⊥)) ∈ W ]
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D)) ∈ W ]
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2(c− 1). (2)
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Combining (1) and (2) from above, we get∣∣∣∣∣ln
(
Pr[S(z, T (D−I , ~⊥), i, n) ∈ W ]
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D)) ∈ W ]
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ (2c− 1).
It can be easily shown that (, δ)-differential privacy implies (0, e − 1 + δ)-
differential privacy (see [21] or Section 2.2.2 for the definition of (, δ)-differential
privacy), which implies (c, 0, c(e − 1 + δ))-differential privacy for groups of size c.
We have a similar group privacy guarantee for (, δ)-zero-knowledge privacy.
Proposition 4. Suppose San is (, δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to agg.
Then, for every c ≥ 1, San is also (c, 0, (2c−1)(e−1+δ))-zero-knowledge private
with respect to agg.
Proof. Let T be the algorithm in agg guaranteed by the (, δ)-zero-knowledge pri-
vacy of San. Let c ≥ 1. Consider any adversary A, and let S be the simulator for
A and San. Then, for every database D ∈ Xn, z ∈ B∗, i ∈ [n], and W ⊆ B∗, we
have
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D)) ∈ W ] ≤ e · Pr[S(z, T (D−i,⊥), i, n) ∈ W ] + δ
≤Pr[S(z, T (D−i,⊥), i, n) ∈ W ] + (e − 1) + δ, and
Pr[S(z, T (D−i,⊥), i, n) ∈ W ] ≤ e · Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D)) ∈ W ] + δ
≤Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D)) ∈ W ] + (e − 1) + δ, so
|Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D)) ∈ W ]− Pr[S(z, T (D−i,⊥), i, n) ∈ W ]| ≤ e − 1 + δ.
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Let D ∈ Xn, z ∈ B∗, I ⊆ [n] with 1 ≤ |I| ≤ c, and W ⊆ B∗. Let i be any integer
in I. Then, we have
|Pr[S(z, T (D−I , ~⊥), i, n) ∈ W ]− Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D−(I\{i}), ~⊥)) ∈ W ]| ≤ e − 1 + δ.
(1)
Also, for every pair of databases D′, D′′ ∈ Xn differing in one row, say row j, we
have
|Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D′)) ∈ W ]− Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D′′)) ∈ W ]|
≤ |Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D′)) ∈ W ]− Pr[S(z, T (D−j,⊥), j, n) ∈ W ]|
+ |Pr[S(z, T (D−j,⊥), j, n) ∈ W ]− Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D′′)) ∈ W ]|
≤ 2(e − 1 + δ).
Now, we note that the database (D−(I\{i}), ~⊥) differs from the database D in at
most c− 1 rows. By considering a sequence of at most c databases where the first
database is (D−(I\{i}), ~⊥), the last database is D, and adjacent databases differ in
only one row (and thus are “2(e − 1 + δ)-close” to one another), we have
|Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D−(I\{i}), ~⊥)) ∈ W ]− Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D)) ∈ W ]|
≤ 2(c− 1)(e − 1 + δ). (2)
Combining (1) and (2) from above yields the result.
For agg = RS(k(·)), we also have the following group privacy guarantee for
(, δ)-zero-knowledge privacy.
Proposition 5. Suppose San is (, δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to
RS(k(·)). Then, for every c ≥ 1, San is also (c, , δ+e(c−1)k(n)
n
)-zero-knowledge
private with respect to RS(k(·)).
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Intuitively, for k(n) sufficiently smaller than n, (, δ)-zero-knowledge privacy
with respect to RS(k(·)) actually implies some notion of group privacy, since the
algorithm T (in the privacy definition) chooses each row with probability k(n)/n.
Thus, T chooses any row of a fixed group of c rows with probability at most
ck(n)/n. If this probability is very small, then the output of T and thus the
simulator S does not depend much on any group of c rows.
Proof. Fix c ≥ 1. Since San is (, δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to
RS(k(·)), there exists a T ∈ RS(k(·)) such that for every adversary A, there
exists a simulator S such that for every D ∈ Xn, z ∈ B∗, i ∈ [n], and W ⊆ B∗, we
have
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D)) ∈ W ] ≤ e Pr[S(z, T (D−i,⊥), i, n) ∈ W ] + δ and
Pr[S(z, T (D−i,⊥), i, n) ∈ W ] ≤ e Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D)) ∈ W ] + δ.
Let A be any adversary, and let S be the simulator guaranteed by the zero-
knowledge privacy of San. Let S ′ be a simulator that, on input (z, T (D−I , ~⊥), I, n),
outputs S(z, T (D−I , ~⊥), i, n), where i is the smallest integer in I. Let D ∈ Xn,
z ∈ B∗, I ⊆ [n] with 1 ≤ |I| ≤ c, and W ⊆ B∗. Let i be the smallest integer in I.
Let E be the event that T reads a row at any of the positions specified by
I \ {i} (the input of T is inferred from context). We note that conditioned on E,
T (D−i,⊥) and T (D−I , ~⊥) have the same distribution. Since T ∈ RS(k(·)) and
|I \ {i}| ≤ c − 1, we have Pr[E] ≤ (c − 1) · k(n)
n
when T is run on any database
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D′ ∈ Xn. Now, observe that
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D)) ∈W ]
≤ e · Pr[S(z, T (D−i,⊥), i, n) ∈W ] + δ
= e · (Pr[S(z, T (D−i,⊥), i, n) ∈W | E] · Pr[E] + Pr[S(z, T (D−i,⊥), i, n) ∈W | E] · Pr[E]) + δ
≤ e · (Pr[S′(z, T (D−I , ~⊥), I, n) ∈W | E] · Pr[E] + Pr[E]) + δ
≤ e ·
(
Pr[S′(z, T (D−I , ~⊥), I, n) ∈W ] + (c− 1) · k(n)
n
)
+ δ
= e · Pr[S′(z, T (D−I , ~⊥), I, n) ∈W ] + e(c− 1) · k(n)
n
+ δ.
We also have
Pr[S ′(z, T (D−I , ~⊥), I, n) ∈ W ]
= Pr[S ′(z, T (D−I , ~⊥), I, n) ∈ W | E] · Pr[E] + Pr[S ′(z, T (D−I , ~⊥), I, n) ∈ W | E] · Pr[E]
≤ Pr[S(z, T (D−i,⊥), i, n) ∈ W | E] · Pr[E] + Pr[E]
≤ Pr[S(z, T (D−i,⊥), i, n) ∈ W ] + (c− 1) · k(n)
n
≤ e · Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D)) ∈ W ] + δ + e(c− 1) · k(n)
n
.
2.2.2 Differential Privacy vs. Zero-Knowledge Privacy
In this section, we compare differential privacy to our zero-knowledge privacy def-
inition. We first state the definition of differential privacy in a form similar to our
zero-knowledge privacy definition in order to more easily compare the two. For any
pair of databases D,D′ ∈ Xn, let H(D,D′) denote the number of rows in which
D and D′ differ, comparing row-wise.
Definition 6. We say that San is -differentially private if for every adversary
A, every z ∈ B∗, every pair of databases D,D′ ∈ Xn with H(D,D′) ≤ 1, and
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every W ⊆ B∗, we have
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D)) ∈ W ] ≤ e · Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D′)) ∈ W ],
where the probabilities are over the random coins of San and A. For (c, )-
differential privacy (for groups of size c), the “H(D,D′) ≤ 1” is changed to
“H(D,D′) ≤ c”. For (, δ)-differential privacy, we allow an additive error of δ
on the RHS of the inequality in the definition.
Proposition 7. Suppose San is -zero-knowledge private with respect to any class
agg. Then, San is 2-differentially private.
Proof. Let A be any adversary, let z ∈ B∗, let D′, D′′ ∈ Xn with H(D′, D′′) ≤ 1,
and let W ⊆ B∗. Since H(D′, D′′) ≤ 1, there exists an integer i ∈ [n] such that
D′−i = D
′′
−i. Since San is -zero-knowledge private with respect to agg, there exists
a T ∈ agg and a simulator S such that for every database D ∈ Xn, we have∣∣∣∣ln(Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D)) ∈ W ]Pr[S(z, T (D−i,⊥), i, n) ∈ W ]
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ .
Now, observe that∣∣∣∣ln(Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D′)) ∈ W ]Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D′′)) ∈ W ]
)∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣ln(Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D′)) ∈ W ]Pr[S(z, T (D′−i,⊥), i, n) ∈ W ]
)∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ln( Pr[S(z, T (D′−i,⊥), i, n) ∈ W ]Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D′′)) ∈ W ]
)∣∣∣∣
≤ +
∣∣∣∣ln( Pr[S(z, T (D′′−i,⊥), i, n) ∈ W ]Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D′′)) ∈ W ]
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2.
Proposition 8. Suppose San is -differentially private. Then, San is -zero-
knowledge private with respect to RS(n).
Proof. Let T be an algorithm in RS(n) that, on input a database D′ ∈ Xn, chooses
n “random” samples from D′ without replacement (i.e., chooses all the rows of the
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database), and then outputs the whole database D′. Let A be any adversary.
Let S be the simulator that, on input (z, (D−i,⊥), i, n), simulates the interaction
between A(z) and San(D−i,⊥), and outputs whatever A outputs in the simulated
interaction. Thus, we have S(z, T (D−i,⊥), i, n) = OutA(A(z) ↔ San(D−i,⊥)).
Let D ∈ Xn, z ∈ B∗, i ∈ [n], and W ⊆ B∗. Since San is -differentially private
and H(D, (D−i,⊥)) ≤ 1, we have∣∣∣∣ln(Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D)) ∈ W ]Pr[S(z, T (D−i,⊥), i, n) ∈ W ]
)∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ln( Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D)) ∈ W ]Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D−i,⊥)) ∈ W ]
)∣∣∣∣
≤ .
Remark. If we consider PPT simulators in the definition of zero-knowledge pri-
vacy instead of computationally unbounded simulators, then we require San in
Proposition 8 to be PPT as well.
Combining Propositions 7 and 8, we see that our zero-knowledge privacy defi-
nition includes differential privacy as a special case (up to a factor of 2 for ).
2.2.3 Revisiting the Democrats vs. Republicans Example
Recall the Democrats vs. Republicans example in the introduction. The mechanism
in the example is -differentially private for some small , even though the privacy
of individuals is clearly violated. However, the mechanism is not zero-knowledge
private in general. Suppose that the people’s political preferences are stored in a
database D ∈ Xn.
Proposition 9. Fix  > 0, c ≥ 1, and any function k(·) such that k(n) = o(n). Let
San be a mechanism that on input D ∈ Xn computes the proportion of Democrats
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in each clique and adds Lap( c
200
) noise to each proportion independently. Then,
San is (c, )-differentially private, but for every constant ′ > 0 and every suffi-
ciently large n, San is not ′-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)).
Intuitively, San is not ′-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)) be-
cause for sufficiently large n, an adversary having only k(n) = o(n) random samples
would not have any samples in many of the cliques, so the adversary would know
nothing about many of the cliques. Therefore, the adversary does gain knowledge
by accessing the mechanism, which gives some information about every clique since
the amount of noise added to each clique is constant.
Proof. We note that when a single person changes his or her political preference,
the vector of proportions of Democrats changes by 1
200
in L1 distance. Thus, by
Proposition 1 in [22], San is (/c)-differentially private, which implies that San is
(c, )-differential private (see [19] and the appendix in [22]), as required.
Let ′ > 0. Let A be the adversary that simply outputs whatever the mechanism
releases. To obtain a contradiction, suppose there exists a T ∈ RS(k(·)) and a
simulator S for A satisfying the required condition in the definition of ′-zero-
knowledge privacy. Recall that there are 200 people in each clique. Let λ = c
200
,
let K ≥ 600′λ be a constant such that 200 divides K, and let n ≥ K such that
200 divides n. Let W = (R≤0)K/200×Rn/200−K/200, and let z ∈ B∗. Then, for every
D ∈ Xn, we have ∣∣∣∣ln(Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D)) ∈ W ]Pr[S(z, T (D−1,⊥), 1, n) ∈ W ]
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ′.
Without loss of generality, suppose that the rows of a database in Xn are
ordered so that the first 200 rows correspond to 200 people in the same clique, and
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the next 200 rows correspond to 200 people in the same clique, and so on. Let D1 be
the database (0, . . . , 0) of size n, and let D2 be the database (1
K , 0, . . . , 0) of size n,
where 1K = (1, . . . , 1) is of size K. Let X1, . . . , Xn/200 ∼ Lap(λ) (independently),
and let X = (X1, . . . , Xn/200). Now, observe the following:
ln
(
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D1)) ∈ W ]
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D2)) ∈ W ]
)
= ln
(
Pr[(0n/200) +X ∈ W ]
Pr[(1K/200, 0, . . . , 0) +X ∈ W ]
)
= ln
( ∏K/200
j=1 Pr[Xj ∈ R≤0]∏K/200
j=1 Pr[Xj ∈ (−∞,−1]]
)
= ln
(
(1
2
)K/200∏K/200
j=1 Fλ(−1)
)
= ln
(
(1
2
)K/200∏K/200
j=1 (
1
2
e−1/λ)
)
= ln(e
K
200·λ ) =
K
200 · λ ≥
600′λ
200 · λ ≥ 3
′, (1)
where Fλ(x) =
1
2
ex/λ is the cumulative distribution function of Lap(λ) for x ≤ 0.
Let EK denote the event that T does not read any of the first K rows of its input
(the input of T is inferred from context). Now, observe that
ln
(
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D1)) ∈W ]
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D2)) ∈W ]
)
= ln
(
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D1)) ∈W ]
Pr[S(z, T ((D1)−1,⊥), 1, n) ∈W ]
)
+ ln
(
Pr[S(z, T ((D1)−1,⊥), 1, n) ∈W ]
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D2)) ∈W ]
)
≤ ′ + ln
(
Pr[S(z, T ((D1)−1,⊥), 1, n) ∈W | EK ] Pr[EK ] + Pr[S(z, T ((D1)−1,⊥), 1, n) ∈W | EK ] Pr[EK ]
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D2)) ∈W ]
)
≤ ′ + ln
(
Pr[S(z, T ((D2)−1,⊥), 1, n) ∈W | EK ] · Pr[EK ]
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D2)) ∈W ] +
Pr[EK ]
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D2)) ∈W ]
)
≤ ′ + ln
(
Pr[S(z, T ((D2)−1,⊥), 1, n) ∈W ]
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D2)) ∈W ] +
Pr[EK ]
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D2)) ∈W ]
)
Since T ∈ RS(k(·)) and k(n) = o(n), we have the numerator Pr[EK ] → 0
as n → ∞. However, the denominator Pr[OutA(A(z) ↔ San(D2)) ∈ W ] =
(1
2
)K/200e−K/(200λ) (partly computed earlier) is a constant. Since ln is continuous
and Pr[S(z,T ((D2)−1,⊥),1,n)∈W ]
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔San(D2))∈W ] ∈ [e−
′
, e
′
] for all n, we have that for sufficiently large
n,
′ + ln
(
Pr[S(z, T ((D2)−1,⊥), 1, n) ∈ W ]
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D2)) ∈ W ] +
Pr[EK ]
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D2)) ∈ W ]
)
≤ ′ + ln
(
Pr[S(z, T ((D2)−1,⊥), 1, n) ∈ W ]
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D2)) ∈ W ]
)
+
′
2
≤ ′ + ′ + 
′
2
≤ 5
′
2
.
Thus, for sufficiently large n, we have ln
(
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔San(D1))∈W ]
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔San(D2))∈W ]
)
≤ 5′
2
, which
contradicts (1) above.
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Remark. In the Democrats vs. Republicans example, even if San adds Lap(1

)
noise to achieve (200, )-differential privacy so that the privacy of each clique
(and thus each person) is protected, the mechanism would still fail to be ′-zero-
knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)) for any constant ′ > 0 when n is
sufficiently large (see Proposition 9). Thus, zero-knowledge privacy with respect
to RS(k(·)) with k(n) = o(n) seems to provide an unnecessarily strong privacy
guarantee in this particular example. However, this is mainly because the clique
size is fixed and known to be 200, and we have assumed that the only correlation
between people’s political preferences that exists is within a clique. In a more
realistic social network, there would be cliques of various sizes, and the correlation
between people’s data would be more complicated. For example, an adversary
knowing your friends’ friends may still be able to infer a lot of information about
you.
2.3 Characterizing Zero-Knowledge Privacy
In this section, we focus on constructing zero-knowledge private mechanisms that
compute a function mapping databases in Xn to Rm, and we characterize the set of
functions that can be computed with zero-knowledge privacy. These are precisely
the functions with low sample complexity, i.e., can be approximated (accurately)
using only limited information from the database, such as k random samples.
We quantify the error in approximating a function g : Xn → Rm using L1
distance. Let the L1-sensitivity of g be defined by ∆(g) = max{||g(D′)−g(D′′)||1 :
D′, D′′ ∈ Xn s.t. H(D′, D′′) ≤ 1}. Let C be any class of randomized algorithms.
Definition 10. A function g : Xn → Rm is said to have (δ, β)-sample complex-
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ity with respect to C if there exists an algorithm T ∈ C such that for every
database D ∈ Xn, we have T (D) ∈ Rm and
Pr[||T (D)− g(D)||1 ≤ δ] ≥ 1− β.
T is said to be a (δ, β)-sampler for g with respect to C.
Remark. If we consider PPT simulators in the definition of zero-knowledge pri-
vacy instead of computationally unbounded simulators, then we would require here
that C is a class of PPT algorithms (PPT in n, the size of the database). Thus, in
the definition of (δ, β)-sample complexity, we would consider a family of functions
(one for each value of n) that can be computed in PPT, and the sampler T would
be PPT in n.
It was shown in [22] that functions with low sample complexity with respect to
RS(k(·)) have low sensitivity as well.
Lemma 11 ([22]). Suppose g : Xn → Rm has (δ, β)-sample complexity with respect
to RS(k(·)) for some β < 1−k(n)/n
2
. Then, ∆(g) ≤ 2δ.
As mentioned in [22], the converse of the above lemma is not true, i.e., not
all functions with low sensitivity have low sample complexity (see [22] for an ex-
ample). This should be no surprise, since functions with low sensitivity have
accurate differentially private mechanisms, while functions with low sample com-
plexity have accurate zero-knowledge private mechanisms. We already know that
zero-knowledge privacy is stronger than differential privacy, as illustrated by the
Democrats vs. Republicans example.
We now state how the sample complexity of a function is related to the amount
of noise a mechanism needs to add to the function value in order to achieve a certain
level of zero-knowledge privacy.
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Proposition 12. Suppose g : Xn → [a, b]m has (δ, β)-sample complexity with
respect to some C. Then, the mechanism San(D) = g(D) + (X1, . . . , Xm), where
Xj ∼ Lap(λ) for j = 1, . . . ,m independently, is ln((1− β)e∆(g)+δλ + βe (b−a)mλ )-zero-
knowledge private with respect to C.
Intuitively, San should be zero-knowledge private because a simulator can sim-
ulate San by first approximating g(D) by running a sampler T ∈ C for g, and
then adding the same amount of noise as San; the error in approximating g(D) is
blurred by the added noise so that the simulator’s output distribution is close to
San’s output distribution.
Proof. Let T be a (δ, β)-sampler for g with respect to C. Let A be any ad-
versary. Let S be a simulator that, on input (z, T (D−i,⊥), i, n), first checks
whether T (D−i,⊥) is in [a, b]m; if not, S projects T (D−i,⊥) onto the set [a, b]m
(with respect to L1 distance) so that the accuracy of T (D−i,⊥) is improved and
||g(D)− T (D−i,⊥)||1 ≤ (b− a)m always holds, which we use later. From here on,
T (D−i,⊥) is treated as a random variable that reflects the possible modification S
may perform. The simulator S computes T (D−i,⊥) + (X1, . . . , Xm), which we will
denote using the random variable S ′(z, T (D−i,⊥), i, n). S then simulates the com-
putation of A(z) with S ′(z, T (D−i,⊥), i, n) sent to A as a message, and outputs
whatever A outputs.
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Let D ∈ Xn, z ∈ B∗, i ∈ [n]. Fix x ∈ T (D−i,⊥) and s ∈ Rm. Then, we have
max
{
fλ(s− g(D))
fλ(s− x) ,
fλ(s− x)
fλ(s− g(D))
}
= max
{
e(
1
λ
·(||s−x||1−||s−g(D)||1)), e(
1
λ
·(||s−g(D)||1−||s−x||1))
}
≤ e( 1λ ·||g(D)−x||1) ≤ e( 1λ ·(||g(D)−g(D−i,⊥)||1+||g(D−i,⊥)−x||1)) ≤ e( 1λ ·(∆(g)+||g(D−i,⊥)−x||1)).
(1)
Since ||g(D)− x||1 ≤ (b− a)m always holds, we also have
max
{
fλ(s− g(D))
fλ(s− x) ,
fλ(s− x)
fλ(s− g(D))
}
≤ e( 1λ ·||g(D)−x||1) ≤ e (b−a)mλ . (2)
Since T is a (δ, β)-sampler for g, we have Pr[||g(D−i,⊥)−T (D−i,⊥)||1 ≤ δ] ≥ 1−β.
Thus, using (1) and (2) above, we have
ln
(∑
x∈T (D−i,⊥) fλ(s− x) · Pr[T (D−i,⊥) = x]
fλ(s− g(D))
)
≤ ln((1− β)e∆(g)+δλ + βe (b−a)mλ ).
Now, using (1) and (2) again, we also have
ln
(
fλ(s− g(D))∑
x∈T (D−i,⊥) fλ(s− x) · Pr[T (D−i,⊥) = x]
)
= − ln
(∑
x∈T (D−i,⊥) fλ(s− x) · Pr[T (D−i,⊥) = x]
fλ(s− g(D))
)
≤ − ln((1− β)e−∆(g)+δλ + βe− (b−a)mλ ) = ln(((1− β)e−∆(g)+δλ + βe− (b−a)mλ )−1)
≤ ln((1− β)e∆(g)+δλ + βe (b−a)mλ ),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the function f(x) = x−1 is
convex for x > 0. Then, for every s ∈ Rn, we have∣∣∣∣ln( Pr[San(D) = s]Pr[S ′(z, T (D−i,⊥), i, n) = s]
)∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ln
(
fλ(s− g(D))∑
x∈T (D−i,⊥) fλ(s− x) · Pr[T (D−i,⊥) = x]
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ln((1− β)e∆(g)+δλ + βe (b−a)mλ ).
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Thus, for every W ⊆ B∗, we have
∣∣∣ln(Pr[OutA(A(z)↔San(D))∈W ]Pr[S(z,T (D−i,⊥),i,n)∈W ] )∣∣∣ ≤ ln((1 −
β)e
∆(g)+δ
λ + βe
(b−a)m
λ ).
Corollary 13. Suppose g : Xn → [a, b]m has (δ, β)-sample complexity with respect
to RS(k(·)) for some β < 1−k(n)/n
2
. Then, the mechanism San(D) = g(D) +
(X1, . . . , Xm), where Xj ∼ Lap(λ) for j = 1, . . . ,m independently, is ln((1 −
β)e
3δ
λ + βe
(b−a)m
λ )-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)).
Proof. This follows from combining Proposition 12 and Lemma 11.
Using Proposition 12, we can recover the basic mechanism in [22] that is -
differentially private.
Corollary 14. Let g : Xn → [a, b]m and  > 0. A mechanism San for g that adds
Lap(∆(g)

) noise to g(D) is -zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(n).
Proof. We note that every function g : Xn → Rm has (0, 0)-sample complexity
with respect to RS(n). The corollary follows by applying Proposition 12.
We now show how the zero-knowledge privacy and utility properties of a mech-
anism computing a function is related to the sample complexity of the function. A
class of algorithms agg is said to be closed under postprocessing if for any T ∈ agg
and any algorithm M , the composition of M and T (i.e., the algorithm that first
runs T on the input and then runs M on the output of T ) is also in agg. We note
that RS(k(·)) is closed under postprocessing.
Proposition 15. Let agg be any class of algorithms that is closed under postpro-
cessing, and suppose a function g : Xn → Rm has a mechanism San such that the
following hold:
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• Utility: Pr[||San(D)− g(D)||1 ≤ δ] ≥ 1− β for every D ∈ Xn
• Privacy: San is -zero-knowledge private with respect to agg.
Then, g has (δ, β+(e
−1)
e
)-sample complexity with respect to agg.
The intuition is that the zero-knowledge privacy of San guarantees that San
can be simulated by a simulator S that is given aggregate information provided by
some algorithm T ∈ agg. Thus, an algorithm that runs T and then S will be able
to approximate g with accuracy similar to that of San.
Proof. Let A be an adversary that simply outputs whatever San releases. Since
San is -zero-knowledge private with respect to agg, there exists a B ∈ agg and a
simulator S such that for every D ∈ Xn, z ∈ B∗, and t ∈ B∗, we have∣∣∣∣ln(Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D)) = t]Pr[S(z, B(D−1,⊥), 1, n) = t]
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ . (2.1)
Fix z ∈ B∗. Let T be an algorithm that, on input D ∈ Xn, first runs B on (D−1,⊥),
then runs S on (z, B(D−1,⊥), 1, n), and then outputs S(z,B(D−1,⊥), 1, n). Since
B ∈ agg, S is an algorithm, and agg is closed under postprocessing, we have that
T is in agg. Let D ∈ Xn. We have
Pr[||T (D)− g(D)||1 ≤ δ] = Pr[||S(z,B(D−1,⊥), 1, n)− g(D)||1 ≤ δ]
=
∑
t∈Supp(S(z,B(D−1,⊥),1,n))
Pr[||t− g(D)||1 ≤ δ] · Pr[S(z,B(D−1,⊥), 1, n) = t]
≥
∑
t∈Supp(OutA(A(z)↔San(D)))
Pr[||t− g(D)||1 ≤ δ] · 1
e
Pr[OutA(A(z)↔ San(D)) = t]
=
1
e
Pr[||OutA(A(z)↔ San(D))− g(D)||1 ≤ δ] = 1
e
Pr[||San(D)− g(D)||1 ≤ δ]
≥ 1
e
(1− β) = 1− β + (e
 − 1)
e
,
where the first inequality is due to (2.1). Thus, T is a (δ, β+(e
−1)
e
)-sampler for g
with respect to agg.
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2.3.1 Simple Examples of Zero-Knowledge Private Mech-
anisms
In this section, we show how to construct some simple examples of zero-knowledge
private mechanisms with respect to RS(k(·)).
Example 4 (Averages). Let n ≥ 1, k = k(n). Let avg : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] be
defined by avg(D) =
∑n
i=1Di
n
, and let San(D) = avg(D) + Lap(λ), where λ > 0.
Let T be an algorithm that, on input a database D ∈ [0, 1]n, chooses k random
samples from D uniformly, and then outputs the average of the k random samples.
By Hoeffding’s inequality, we have Pr [|T (D)− avg(D)| ≤ δ] ≥ 1− 2e−2kδ2 . Thus,
avg has (δ, 2e−2kδ
2
)-sample complexity with respect to RS(k(·)). By Proposition
12, San is ln(e
1
λ
( 1
n
+δ) + 2e
1
λ
−2kδ2)-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)).
Let  ∈ (0, 1]. We choose δ = 1
k1/3
and λ = 1

( 1
n
+ δ) = 1

( 1
n
+ 1
k1/3
) so that
ln(e
1
λ
( 1
n
+δ) + 2e
1
λ
−2kδ2) = ln(e + 2e

1/n+k−1/3−2k
1/3
) ≤ ln(e + 2e−k1/3) ≤ + 2e−k1/3 .
Thus, we have the following result:
• By adding Lap(1

( 1
n
+ 1
k1/3
)) = Lap(O( 1
k1/3
)) noise to avg(D), San is ( +
2e−k
1/3
)-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)).
Our example mechanism for computing averages comes from the general con-
nection between sample complexity and zero-knowledge privacy (Proposition 12),
which holds for any model agg of aggregate information. For computing aver-
ages, we can actually construct a mechanism with better utility by choosing k(n)
random samples without replacement from the input database D ∈ Xn and then
running a differentially private mechanism on the chosen samples. We will show
that such a mechanism is zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)) and has
43
even better privacy parameters than the differentially private mechanism, due to
the initial sampling step.
In general, this “Sample and DP-Sanitize” method works for query functions
that can be approximated using random samples (e.g., averages, fractions, and
histograms), and allows us to convert differentially private mechanisms to zero-
knowledge private mechanisms with respect to RS(k(·)). We now show what pri-
vacy guarantees are obtained by the Sample and DP-Sanitize method.
Proposition 16 (Sample and DP-Sanitize). Let SanDP be any (, δ)-differentially
private mechanism. Let San be any mechanism that, on input D ∈ Xn, chooses
k = k(n) random samples without replacement, runs SanDP on the chosen sam-
ples, and then performs any computation on the output of SanDP without reading
the input database D again. Then, the following hold:
• San is (, δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)).
• San is (2 ln(1 + k
n
(e − 1)), (2 + k
n
(e − 1)) k
n
δ)-zero-knowledge private with
respect to RS(k(·)).
• If  ≤ 1, then San is (4k
n
, 4k
n
δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to
RS(k(·)).
Intuitively, San is zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)) because
SanDP is differentially private and is only run on k random samples; also, San has
better privacy parameters than those of SanDP because of the extra noise added
from choosing only k random samples.
Proof. We observe that the mechanism San itself is in RS(k(·)). Thus, let T =
San. Let n ≥ 1, D ∈ Xn, and i ∈ [n].
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We first show that San is (, δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect toRS(k(·)).
Consider San(D) and T (D−i,⊥) = San(D−i,⊥). We note that San(D) and
San(D−i,⊥) have the same output distribution when both San’s choose the same
k random samples and the samples do not contain row i. When both San’s choose
the same k random samples and the samples do contain row i, the two databases
formed by the chosen samples of the two San’s (respectively) will differ in ex-
actly one row. Since both San’s run an (, δ)-differentially private mechanism,
namely SanDP , on the chosen samples, and since San does not use the original
input database in its computation afterwards, it is easy to see that the output
distribution of the two San’s satisfy the closeness condition in the (, δ)-zero-
knowledge privacy definition. Since the simulator S in the privacy definition gets
T (D−i,⊥) = San(D−i,⊥) as one of its inputs, it is easy to show that San is
(, δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)).
We now show that San is (2 ln(1+ k
n
(e−1)), (2+ k
n
(e−1)) k
n
δ)-zero-knowledge
private with respect to RS(k(·)). If k = n, then this follows from the fact that San
is (, δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)). Thus, we now assume
that k ≤ n − 1. We will show that San(D) and T (D−i,⊥) = San(D−i,⊥) are
“(2 ln(1 + k
n
(e − 1)), (2 + k
n
(e − 1)) k
n
δ)”-close. Abusing notation, let San(D−i)
denote the output of San on input D−i but San chooses k = k(n) random sam-
ples (without replacement) instead of k(|D−i|) = k(n − 1) random samples. Our
strategy is to show that San(D) is close to San(D−i) and San(D−i) is close to
San(D−i,⊥). Let W ⊆ {0, 1}∗, and let E be the event that row i is chosen when
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San chooses k random samples. Observe that
Pr[San(D) ∈ W ] = Pr[San(D) ∈ W | E] Pr[E] + Pr[San(D) ∈ W | E] Pr[E]
≤ (e Pr[San(D−i) ∈ W ] + δ) Pr[E] + Pr[San(D−i) ∈ W ](1− Pr[E])
= (1 + Pr[E](e − 1)) Pr[San(D−i) ∈ W ] + Pr[E]δ.
We also have
Pr[San(D) ∈ W ] = Pr[San(D) ∈ W | E] Pr[E] + Pr[San(D) ∈ W | E] Pr[E]
≥ e−(Pr[San(D−i) ∈ W ]− δ) Pr[E] + Pr[San(D−i) ∈ W ](1− Pr[E])
= Pr[San(D−i) ∈ W ](Pr[E]e− + (1− Pr[E]))− e− Pr[E]δ
=⇒ Pr[San(D−i) ∈ W ]
≤ 1
Pr[E]e− + (1− Pr[E]) Pr[San(D) ∈ W ] +
1
Pr[E] + (1− Pr[E])e Pr[E]δ
≤ (Pr[E]e + (1− Pr[E])) Pr[San(D) ∈ W ] + Pr[E]δ
≤ (1 + Pr[E](e − 1)) Pr[San(D) ∈ W ] + Pr[E]δ,
where the second last inequality follows from the fact that the function f(x) = 1
x
is convex for x > 0. Thus, we have the following:
• Pr[San(D) ∈ W ] ≤ (1 + Pr[E](e − 1)) Pr[San(D−i) ∈ W ] + Pr[E]δ
• Pr[San(D−i) ∈ W ] ≤ (1 + Pr[E](e − 1)) Pr[San(D) ∈ W ] + Pr[E]δ
Using the same argument as above but with (D−i,⊥) in place of D, we get the
following:
• Pr[San(D−i,⊥) ∈ W ] ≤ (1 + Pr[E](e − 1)) Pr[San(D−i) ∈ W ] + Pr[E]δ
• Pr[San(D−i) ∈ W ] ≤ (1 + Pr[E](e − 1)) Pr[San(D−i,⊥) ∈ W ] + Pr[E]δ
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Combining the results above and noting that Pr[E] = k
n
, we have the following:
• Pr[San(D) ∈ W ] ≤ (1+ k
n
(e−1))2 Pr[San(D−i,⊥) ∈ W ]+(2+ kn(e−1)) knδ
• Pr[San(D−i,⊥) ∈ W ] ≤ (1+ kn(e−1))2 Pr[San(D) ∈ W ]+(2+ kn(e−1)) knδ
It easily follows that San is (2 ln(1 + k
n
(e− 1)), (2 + k
n
(e− 1)) k
n
δ)-zero-knowledge
private with respect to RS(k(·)). Now, suppose that  ≤ 1. Then, one can easily
verify that e − 1 ≤ 2, so 1 + k
n
(e − 1) ≤ e 2kn  and 2 + k
n
(e − 1) ≤ 4. Thus, San
is (4k
n
, 4k
n
δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)).
We now use the Sample and DP-Sanitize method (Proposition 16) to construct
some zero-knowledge private mechanisms.
In the examples below, let n ≥ 1, k = k(n), and , β ∈ (0, 1]. If D ∈ Xn is a
database, let D̂ be a random variable representing a database formed by choosing
k random samples from D uniformly without replacement.
Example 5 (Improved Accuracy for Averages). Let X = [0, 1], and let
avg(D) =
∑|D|
i=1 Di
|D| . Let San(D) = avg(D̂) + Lap(
1
k
) for D ∈ Xn. Then, by
Proposition 16, San is 4k
n
-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)).
Also, by Hoeffding’s inequality (which still holds when the sampling is done
without replacement as opposed to with replacement (e.g., see [40])), we have
Pr[|avg(D̂) − avg(D)| ≥ α] ≤ 2e−2kα2 , and the RHS is ≤ β
2
if α ≥ 1√
k
√
1
2
ln( 4
β
);
thus, we have Pr[|avg(D̂) − avg(D)| ≥ 1√
k
√
1
2
ln( 4
β
)] ≤ β
2
. One can also easily
verify that for Y ∼ Lap( 1
k
), we have Pr[|Y | ≥ α] = e−kα, and the RHS is ≤ β
2
if
α ≥ 1
k
ln( 2
β
); thus, we have Pr[|Y | ≥ 1
k
ln( 2
β
)] ≤ β
2
. Thus, by the union bound, we
have the following result:
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• For D ∈ Xn, San(D) = avg(D̂) + Lap( 1
k
) approximates avg(D) to within
an additive error of 1√
k
√
1
2
ln( 4
β
) + 1
k
ln( 2
β
) with probability at least 1 − β,
and is 4k
n
-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)).
This mechanism is usually more accurate than the mechanism in the earlier ex-
ample for averages, which adds at least Lap( 1
k1/3
) noise and thus is accurate to
within an additive error of 1
k1/3
ln( 2
β
) with probability at most 1− β.
Example 6 (Fraction Queries: Fraction of rows satisfying some property
P ). Let P : X → B be the predicate representing some property of a row. Let
fracP (D) =
∑|D|
i=1 P (Di)
|D| , which is the fraction of rows satisfying property P . Since
fracP (D) can be viewed as the average of the numbers {P (Di)}ni=1, we can get
the same result as in the example for averages:
• For D ∈ Xn, San(D) = frac(D̂) +Lap( 1
k
) approximates frac(D) to within
an additive error of 1√
k
√
1
2
ln( 4
β
) + 1
k
ln( 2
β
) with probability at least 1 − β,
and is 4k
n
-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)).
Example 7 (Counting Queries: Number of rows satisfying some property
P ). Let P : X → B be the predicate representing some property of a row. Let
count(D) =
∑n
i=1 P (Di), which is the number of rows satisfying property P . Since
g(D) is simply a fraction query but scaled by a factor of n, we can get the same
result as in the example for fraction queries except that the error is scaled by a
factor of n:
• For D ∈ Xn, San(D) = n · (frac(D̂) + Lap( 1
k
)) approximates count(D) =
n · fracP (D) to within an additive error of n√k
√
1
2
ln( 4
β
) + n
k
ln( 2
β
) with prob-
ability at least 1 − β, and is 4k
n
-zero-knowledge private with respect to
RS(k(·)).
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Example 8 (Histograms). Let B1, . . . , Bm be any partition of X with m blocks.
We refer to each Bi as a bin. Let hist(D) = (b1, . . . , bn), where bi = |{j ∈ [n] :
Dj ∈ Bi}| is the number of rows of D that belong to bin Bi. Given a database D,
let D˜1, . . . , D˜m be independent random variables representing databases formed by
choosing k
m
random samples from the database D uniformly without replacement.
We can construct a zero-knowledge private mechanism (with respect to
RS(k(·))) that computes the histogram with respect to the bins B1, . . . , Bm, by
composing Sani for i = 1, . . . ,m, where Sani is any zero-knowledge private mecha-
nism (with respect to RS( 1
m
k(·))) for estimating the number of rows in the ith bin,
and then applying our composition result (Propsition 2). Using our mechanism for
counting queries, we can define Sani so that it approximates the number of rows
in the ith bin to within an additive error of n
√
m√
k
√
1
2
ln(4m
β
)+ nm
k
ln(2m
β
) with proba-
bility at least 1− β
m
, and is 4k
nm
-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS( 1
m
k(·)).
Then, applying the union bound and our composition result (Propsition 2), we get
the following result:
• For D ∈ Xn, San(D) = (San1(D˜1), . . . , Sanm(D˜m)) approximates hist(D)
to within an error (with respect to L1 distance) of
nm3/2√
k
√
1
2
ln(4m
β
) +
nm2
k
ln(2m
β
) with probability at least 1 − β, and is 4k
n
-zero-knowledge pri-
vate with respect to RS(k(·)).
2.4 Answering a Class of Queries Simultaneously
In this section, we consider mechanisms that answer a class of query functions
simultaneously. We generalize the notion of sample complexity (with respect to
RS(k(·))) to classes of query functions and show a connection between differen-
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tial privacy and zero-knowledge privacy for any class of query functions with low
sample complexity. In particular, we show that for any class Q of query functions
that can be approximated simultaneously using random samples, any differentially
private mechanism that is “useful” for Q can be converted to a zero-knowledge
private mechanism that is useful for Q, similar to the Sample and DP-Sanitize
method. We also show that any class of fraction queries with low VC dimension
can be approximated simultaneously using random samples, so we can use ex-
isting differentially private mechanisms (e.g., the ones in [6] and [25]) to obtain
zero-knowledge private mechanisms for any class of fraction queries with low VC
dimension.
Let X∗ denote the set of all databases whose rows are elements from the data
universe X. In this section, a query is a function from X∗ to Rm for some m.
In this section, we consider mechanisms that answer a class Q of queries simu-
lataneously by outputting a “synopsis” (e.g., a synthetic database) that allows us
to answer all the queries in Q. A synopsis is a pair (D˜, R), where D˜ is any data
structure (containing data), and R is a description of any deterministic “query-
answering” algorithm that, on input a data structure D˜ and a query q : X∗ → Rm,
answers the query by reading D˜ and outputting some vector in Rm.
Let RDB be the usual query-answering algorithm for databases that, on input a
database D ∈ X∗ and a query q : X∗ → Rm, answers with q(D). If D is a database,
then (D,RDB) is an example of a synopsis. If D̂ is a database obtained by choosing
k random samples from D, then another example of a synopsis is (D̂, RD̂), where
RD̂ is a query-answering algorithm that approximates a given counting query q on
the larger database D by computing q(D̂) and then scaling the answer by |D|
k
(to
compensate for the fact that D̂ contained only k random samples from D).
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Let Q be any class of queries that map databases in X∗ to vectors in Rm for
some m. We now define what it means for two synopses to be close to one another
with respect to Q.
Definition 17. Two synopses (D˜, R) and (D˜′, R′) are said to be α-close with
respect to Q if sup
q∈Q
||R(D˜, q)−R′(D˜′, q)||1 ≤ α.
Intuitively, two synopses are α-close to one another with respect to Q if they
are “α-indistinguishable” by Q, i.e., no query in Q can be used to distinguish the
two synopses by more than α. Thus, if two synopses are close to one another with
respect to Q, then we can use one synopsis to approximate the other synopsis’s
answers to queries in Q. We want to construct mechanisms that, on input a
database D, outputs a synopsis that is close to the synopsis (D,RDB), so that we
can use the synopsis to accurately answer queries in Q on the database D. We
define the usefulness/utility of a mechanism from this perspective of closeness of
synopses.
Definition 18. A mechanism San is (α, β)-useful with respect to Q for
databases of size n if for every input database D ∈ Xn, with probability at
least 1 − β (over the random coins of San), San(D) outputs a synopsis (D˜, R)
that is α-close to (D,RDB) with respect to Q.
We now generalize the notion of sample complexity with respect to RS(k(·))
to classes of query functions. Intuitively, a class Q of queries has low sample
complexity if the queries can be approximated simultaneously using k random
samples from the input database.
Definition 19. A class Q of queries is said to have (k, α, β)-sample complexity
for databases of size n with converter f : Q×Rm → Rm if for every database
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D ∈ Xn, if we choose k random samples from the database D without replacement
and form a database D̂ consisting of the chosen samples, then with probability at
least 1− β, we have sup
q∈Q
||q(D)− f(q, q(D̂))||1 ≤ α.
The converter f in the above definition is used to convert the answer to a query
q on the database D̂ to an answer to the same query q on the original database D.
When Q is a class of queries computing averages or the fraction of rows satisfying
some predicate, f would normally be the function f(q, ~x) = ~x. When Q is a class
of queries computing sums, f would normally be the function f(q, ~x) = n
k
~x, since
the database D̂ consists of only k random samples from the original database D,
which has n rows.
We now show that for any class Q of queries with low sample complexity, we
can convert any useful differentially private mechanism to a useful zero-knowledge
private mechanism (with respect to RS(k(·))).
Proposition 20. Let n ≥ 1, k = k(n). Suppose a class Q of queries has (k, α1, β1)-
sample complexity for databases of size n with a converter f : Q×Xm → Xm such
that ||f(q, x) − f(q, y)||1 ≤ L||x − y||1 for every x, y ∈ Rm, q ∈ Q, where L is a
non-negative real constant. Let  ∈ (0, 1], and let SanDP be any (, δ)-differentially
private mechanism that is (α2, β2)-useful with respect to Q for databases of size k.
Then, using SanDP , we can construct a mechanism SanZK that is (
4k
n
, 4k
n
δ)-
zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)) and is (α1 + Lα2, β1 + β2)-useful
with respect to Q for databases of size n.
Proof. Let SanZK be the mechanism that, on input a database D ∈ Xn, first
chooses k random samples without replacement from D, and then forms the
database D̂ using the samples. Then, SanZK runs the mechanism SanDP on
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D̂ to get a synopsis (D˜, R) that is α-close to (D̂, RDB) with respect to Q. Then,
SanZK outputs the synopsis (D˜, R
′), where R′ is the algorithm that, on input the
data structure D˜ and a query q, first runs R on (D˜, q), then converts the answer
R(D˜, q) to an answer on the original database D by computing f(q, R(D˜, q)), and
then outputs f(q, R(D˜, q)).
By Proposition 16, SanZK is (
4k
n
, 4k
n
δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to
RS(k(·)).
We now show that SanZK is (α1 + Lα2, β1 + β2)-useful with respect to Q for
databases of size n. Let D ∈ Xn. Since Q has (k, α1, β1)-sample complexity
for databases of size n with the converter f , we have that with probability at
least 1 − β1, SanZK(D) forms a database D̂ ∈ Xk such that supq∈Q ||q(D) −
f(q, q(D̂))||1 ≤ α1. Since SanDP is (α2, β2)-useful with respect to Q for databases
of size k, we also have that for every database D̂ ∈ Xk, with probability at least
1 − β2, the mechanism SanDP (D̂) run by SanZK(D) outputs a synopsis (D˜, R)
such that supq∈Q ||q(D̂)−R(D˜, q)||1 ≤ α2.
Thus, with probability at least 1 − (β1 + β2), the synopsis (D˜, R′)
that SanZK(D) outputs satisfies supq∈Q ||q(D) − R′(D˜, q)||1 = supq∈Q ||q(D) −
f(q, R(D˜, q))||1 ≤ supq∈Q(||q(D)−f(q, q(D̂))||1 + ||f(q, q(D̂))−f(q, R(D˜, q))||1) ≤
α1 + supq∈Q(L||q(D̂) − R(D˜, q)||1) ≤ α1 + Lα2. Thus, with probability at least
1−(β1+β2), SanZK outputs a synopsis (D˜, R′) that is (α1+Lα2)-close to (D,RDB)
with respect to Q, as required.
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2.4.1 Sample Complexity of a Class of Fraction Queries
There already exist differentially private mechanisms for classes of fraction queries
(e.g., the ones in [6] and [25]). To use these mechanisms in Proposition 20, we
will show that any class of fraction queries with low VC dimension has low sample
complexity.
If the sampling in the definition of sample complexity were done with replace-
ment as opposed to without replacement, then we could use known learning theory
results to show that any class of fraction queries with low VC dimension has low
sample complexity. However, the privacy guarantees of the above proposition rely
on the fact that the sampling is done without replacement, since the proof uses
Proposition 16, which needs this requirement. If the sampling is done with re-
placement, we are unable to achieve as good privacy parameters.
Our strategy is still to use known learning theory results, but we will adapt
known proofs of the results as necessary so that we can use the results to show that
any class of fraction queries with low VC dimension has low sample complexity,
where the sampling is done without replacement.
A fraction query is a query q of the form q(D) = |{Di : i∈[|D|], φ(Di)=1||D| , where Di
is the ith row of the database D, and φ : X → {0, 1} is some predicate. Thus,
a fraction query corresponds to some predicate, and for any class Q of fraction
queries, we can consider the class Q̂ of predicates that correspond to the fraction
queries in Q.
We now review some terminology from learning theory. Let Q̂ be any class
of predicates, and let S be any finite subset of X. The restriction of Q̂ to S,
denoted Q̂|S, is the set {φ|S : S → {0, 1} | φ ∈ Q̂}, i.e., the set of restrictions
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to S of all predicates in Q̂. The growth function ΠQ̂ : N → N of Q̂ is defined by
ΠQ̂(m) = maxS′⊆X,|S′|=m |Q̂|S′|. We note that ΠQ̂(m) ≤ 2m for every m ∈ N, since
for any finite S ′ ⊆ X, there are only 2|S′| functions from S ′ to {0, 1}.
We say that Q̂ shatters S if |Q̂|S| = 2|S|, i.e., for every predicate φ : S → {0, 1},
there exists a predicate φ′ ∈ Q̂ such that φ′|S = φ. The Vapnik-Chervonenkis
dimension (VC dimension) of Q̂ is the size of the largest finite set S ⊆ X shattered
by Q̂, or∞ if the largest doesn’t exist. Equivalently, the VC dimension of Q̂ is the
largest non-negative integer m such that ΠQ̂(m) = 2
m, or ∞ if the largest doesn’t
exist. We note that if Q̂ is finite, then the VC dimension of Q̂ is at most log2 |Q̂|,
since if a finite set S ⊆ X is shattered by Q̂, then |Q̂|S| = 2|S|, so Q̂ must contain
at least 2|S| predicates.
For convenience, when we refer to the VC dimension of a class Q of fraction
queries, we are actually referring to the VC dimension of the class Q̂ of predicates
that corresponds to Q. We now prove a lemma that describes how well k random
samples chosen without replacement can simultaneously approximate a class of
fraction queries. This lemma is similar to a known result in learning theory (e.g.,
see Theorem 4.3 in [1]).
Lemma 21. Let Q be any class of fraction queries, and let Q̂ be the corresponding
class of predicates. Then, for every database D ∈ Xn, α > 0, and k ≥ 0, we have
Pr[|q(D)− q(D̂)| ≥ α for some q ∈ Q] ≤ 4ΠQ̂(2k)e−
kα2
8 ,
where the probability is over the choice of the database D̂ formed by choosing k
random samples without replacement from the database D.
Proof. Fix D ∈ Xn, α > 0, k ≥ 0. Let B be the event that |q(D)− q(D̂)| ≥ α for
some q ∈ Q, where D̂ is formed by choosing k random samples without replacement
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from the database D. Now, consider choosing another set of k random samples
without replacement from the database D, and denote the samples by D˜. D˜ is
chosen independently of D̂, so D˜ and D̂ may contain overlapping samples.
Let B′ be the event that |q(D̂) − q(D˜)| ≥ α
2
for some q ∈ Q, where D̂ and
D˜ are chosen as above. Our goal is to bound Pr[B], and we do so by showing
Pr[B] ≤ 2 Pr[B′] and bounding Pr[B′] instead. We first note that if k < 4
α2
, then
the RHS of the inequality in the lemma is ≥ 1, and so the lemma holds trivially.
Thus, we can assume that k ≥ 4
α2
.
We now show that Pr[B] ≤ 2 Pr[B′]. To do this, we first show that Pr[B′ |
B] ≥ 1
2
. Suppose event B occurs so that |q(D)− q(D̂)| ≥ α for some fixed D̂ and
q ∈ Q. We will show that Pr[|q(D˜)− q(D)| ≤ α
2
] ≥ 1
2
, so with probability ≥ 1
2
, the
event B′ also occurs, since |q(D˜) − q(D)| ≤ α
2
and |q(D) − q(D̂)| ≥ α imply that
|q(D̂) − q(D˜)| ≥ α
2
. Now, by Hoeffding’s inequality, we have Pr[|q(D˜) − q(D)| ≤
α
2
] ≥ 1− 2e−2k(α2 )2 , and the RHS is ≥ 1
2
if and only if k ≥ 2 ln 4
α2
, which holds since
k ≥ 4
α2
. We have shown that Pr[B′ | B] ≥ 1
2
. Thus, Pr[B
′]
Pr[B]
≥ Pr[B′ and B]
Pr[B]
= Pr[B′ |
B] ≥ 1
2
, so Pr[B] ≤ 2 Pr[B′].
We will now bound Pr[B′]. Consider the following process. Choose D̂ and D˜
as before, and then perform the following swapping process. Let Y be the set of
samples ofD that were chosen to be in both D̂ and D˜. Regarding D̂ and D˜ as sets as
samples, we arbitrarily pair (using any fixed deterministic algorithm) each sample
in D̂ \ Y with a sample in D˜ \ Y so that we have a (perfect) matching between
D̂ \ Y and D˜ \ Y ; we also pair each sample in D̂ ∩ Y with the corresponding
(equal) sample in D˜ ∩ Y . Then, for each matched pair x, y, we swap x and y
with probability 1
2
. Let D̂′ and D˜′ denote the resulting D̂ and D˜. It is easy to
see that the sets D̂′ and D˜′ are identically distributed to D̂ and D˜. (The main
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difference between this proof and classic proofs (e.g., see [1]) of the corresponding
learning theory result is in this swapping procedure, where we do the swapping in
a particular way to ensure that D̂′ and D˜′ are identically distributed to D̂ and D˜
even though our sampling is done without replacement.)
Let B′′ be the event that |q(D̂′)− q(D˜′)| ≥ α
2
for some q ∈ Q. Then Pr[B′] =
Pr[B′′], so it suffices to bound Pr[B′′]. We will show that Pr[B′′] ≤ 2ΠQ(2k)e− kα
2
8
by showing that Pr[B′′ | D̂, D˜] ≤ 2ΠQ̂(2k)e−
kα2
8 for every fixed D̂ and D˜ that can
be sampled while generating D̂′ and D˜′.
To this end, fix D̂ and D˜. Let t = |(Q̂|D̂′∪D˜′)|, where D̂′ ∪ D˜′ is regarded
as a set of elements in X. We note that t ≤ ΠQ̂(2k), since |D̂′ ∪ D˜′| ≤ 2k.
Since |(Q̂|D̂′∪D˜′)| = t, we can choose t predicates φ1, . . . , φt ∈ Q̂ such that for any
predicate φ ∈ Q̂, there exists an i ∈ {1, . . . , t} such that φ|D̂′∪D˜′ = φi|D̂′∪D˜′ , i.e.,
φ(x) = φi(x) for every x ∈ D̂′ ∪ D˜′.
Let q1, . . . , qt be the fraction queries in Q that correspond to the predicates
φ1, . . . , φt. Then, for any fraction query q ∈ Q, there exists an i ∈ {1, . . . , t}
such that q(D̂′) = qi(D̂′) and q(D˜′) = qi(D˜′). Thus, B′′ occurs if and only if
|qi(D̂′)− qi(D˜′)| ≥ α2 for some i ∈ {1, . . . , t}. Then, by the union bound, we have
the following:
Pr[B′′ | D̂, D˜] ≤ t max
1≤i≤t
Pr[|qi(D̂′)− qi(D˜′)| ≥ α
2
| D̂, D˜]
≤ ΠQ(2k) max
1≤i≤t
Pr[|qi(D̂′)− qi(D˜′)| ≥ α
2
| D̂, D˜].
Fix an i ∈ {1, . . . , t}. For convenience, we order the elements in D̂, D˜, D̂′, and D˜′
as D̂1, . . . , D̂k, D˜1, . . . , D˜k, D̂
′
1, . . . , D̂
′
k, and D˜
′
1, . . . , D˜
′
k, respectively, so that for
every j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, D̂j is matched with D˜j, and D̂′j is matched with D˜′j according
57
to the pairing scheme described above. Now, observe that
Pr[|qi(D̂′)− qi(D˜′)| ≥ α
2
| D̂, D˜]
= Pr[|1
k
k∑
j=1
φi(D̂
′
j)−
1
k
k∑
j=1
φi(D˜
′
j)| ≥
α
2
| D̂, D˜]
= Pr[|1
k
k∑
j=1
(φi(D̂
′
j)− φi(D˜′j))| ≥
α
2
| D̂, D˜]
= Pr[|1
k
k∑
j=1
(|φi(D̂j)− φi(D˜j)| · zj)| ≥ α
2
| D̂, D˜], zj ← {−1, 1}
≤ 2e− kα
2
8 ,
where zj ← {−1, 1} means that zj is sampled uniformly from {−1, 1}, and
the last inequality follows from Hoeffding’s inequality. Thus, Pr[B′′ | D̂, D˜] ≤
2ΠQ̂(2k)e
− kα2
8 , so Pr[B′′] ≤ 2ΠQ̂(2k)e−
kα2
8 . Therefore, Pr[B] ≤ 2 Pr[B′] =
2 Pr[B′′] ≤ 4ΠQ̂(2k)e−
kα2
8 , as required.
The above lemma gives an upper bound on the probability that k random
samples (chosen without replacement) does not simultaneously approximate a class
Q of fraction queries well, and the upper bound involves ΠQ̂(2k). The following
lemma gives an upper bound on ΠQ̂(2k) in terms of the VC dimension of Q̂.
Lemma 22. Let Q̂ be any class of predicates with finite VC dimension d ≥ 1.
Then, for every integer m ≥ d, we have ΠQ̂(m) ≤ ( emd )d.
Proof. This lemma is a well-known result in learning theory and is a corollary of
“Sauer’s lemma”, which states that for any class Q̂ of predicates with finite VC
dimension d, ΠQ̂(m) ≤
∑d
i=0
(
m
i
)
for all nonnegative integers m (e.g., see [72]). A
proof of Sauer’s lemma, as well as this lemma, can be found in [1].
We can now combine Lemmas 21 and 22 to get the following proposition.
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Proposition 23. Let Q be any class of fraction queries with finite VC dimension
d ≥ 1. Then, for every n ≥ 1, k ≥ d/2, and β ∈ (0, 1], Q has (k, α, β)-sample
complexity for databases of size n with the converter f(q, x) = x, where α =
2
√
2√
k
√
d ln(2ek
d
) + ln( 4
β
).
Also, for every n ≥ 1 and α, β ∈ (0, 1], Q has (k, α, β)-sample complexity for
databases of size n with converter f(q, x) = x, where k is any non-negative integer
satisfying k ≥ 16
α2
(2d ln( 6
α
) + ln( 4
β
)).
Proof. Let Q̂ be the class of predicates that corresponds to the class Q of fraction
queries. Let n ≥ 1, k ≥ d/2, α > 0, β ∈ (0, 1], and D ∈ Xn. By Lemma
21, we have Pr[|q(D) − q(D̂)| ≥ α for some q ∈ Q] ≤ 4ΠQ̂(2k)e−
kα2
8 , where D̂ is
a database formed by choosing k random samples without replacement from the
database D. Thus, Q has (k, α, 4ΠQ̂(2k)e−
kα2
8 )-sample complexity for databases
of size n with converter f(q, x) = x.
Rearranging the inequality 4ΠQ̂(2k)e
− kα2
8 ≤ β, we get α ≥
√
8
k
(ln(ΠQ̂(2k)) + ln(
4
β
)).
We have ΠQ̂(2k) ≤ (2ekd )d by Lemma 22, so α ≥ 2
√
2√
k
√
d ln(2ek
d
) + ln( 4
β
) implies that
4ΠQ̂(2k)e
− kα2
8 ≤ β. Thus, Q has (k, α′, β)-sample complexity for databases of size
n with converter f(q, x) = x, where α′ = 2
√
2√
k
√
d ln(2ek
d
) + ln( 4
β
), as required.
Now, let α ∈ (0, 1] and k be any non-negative integer satisfying k ≥
16
α2
(2d ln( 6
α
) + ln( 4
β
)). We note that k ≥ d/2 still holds. Thus, from the argument
above, to show that Q has (k, α, β)-sample complexity for databases of size n with
converter f(q, x) = x, it suffices to show that α ≥ 2
√
2√
k
√
d ln(2ek
d
) + ln( 4
β
) holds.
Rearranging α ≥ 2
√
2√
k
√
d ln(2ek
d
) + ln( 4
β
), we get k ≥ 8
α2
(d ln(k) + d ln(2e
d
) + ln( 4
β
)).
We now use the inequality ln a ≤ ab + ln 1
b
− 1, which holds for all a, b > 0;
this can be easily shown by using the inequality 1 + x ≤ ex (which holds for all
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x ∈ R), setting x to ab−1, and rearranging the inequality. Applying the inequality
ln a ≤ ab + ln 1
b
− 1 with a = k and b = α2
16d
, we have ln k ≤ α2
16d
k + ln(16d
α2
) − 1 =
α2
16d
k + ln( 16d
eα2
).
Thus, it suffices to show that k ≥ 8
α2
(d α
2
16d
k + d ln( 16d
eα2
) + d ln(2e
d
) + ln( 4
β
)).
Rearranging this inequality, we get k ≥ 16
α2
(2d ln(4
√
2
α
) + ln( 4
β
)), which holds by
definition of k.
2.4.2 Constructing Zero-Knowledge Private Mechanisms
for a Class of Fraction Queries
Proposition 23 gives us a bound on the sample complexity of any classQ of fraction
queries in terms of its VC dimension. Proposition 20 allows us to convert differ-
entially private mechanism to zero-knowledge private mechanisms for any class of
queries with low sample complexity. Thus, we now combine these two propositions
with existing differentially private mechanisms for classes of fraction queries with
low VC dimension.
The following proposition is obtained by using the differentially private mech-
anism in [6].
Proposition 24. Let Q be any class of fraction queries with finite VC dimension
d ≥ 1, and suppose the data universe X is finite. Let n ≥ 1 and , α, β ∈ (0, 1].
Then, for every integer k = k(n) satisfying k ≥ O( (log |X|)d log(1/α)+log(1/β)
α3
), there
exists a mechanism San that is (α, β)-useful with respect to Q for databases of size
n, and is 4k
n
-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)).
Proof. By Proposition 23, Q has (k′, α
2
, β
2
)-sample complexity for databases of size
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n with the converter f(q, x) = x, where k′ is any non-negative integer satisfying
k′ ≥ 64
α2
(2d ln(12
α
)+ln( 8
β
)). We note that |f(q, x)−f(q, y)| ≤ 1·|x−y| for every x, y ∈
R, q ∈ Q. Let SanDP be the -differentially private mechanism in [6] that is (α2 , β2 )-
useful with respect to Q for databases of size k′′ ≥ O( (log |X|)d log(1/α)
α3
+ log(1/β)
α
).
(This result in [6] actually assumes that X = {0, 1}d′ for some d′, but as mentioned
in the paper, the result can be easily extended to any finite set X.)
Let k ≥ max{ 64
α2
(2d ln(12
α
) + ln( 8
β
)), O( (log |X|)d log(1/α)
α3
+ log(1/β)
α
)} =
O( (log |X|)d log(1/α)+log(1/β)
α3
). Then, by Proposition 20, we can use SanDP to con-
struct a mechanism SanZK that is (
4k
n
, 4k
n
δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect
to RS(k(·)) and is (α, β)-useful with respect to Q for databases of size n.
We now use the differentially private mechanism in [25] to obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 25. Let Q be any finite class of fraction queries with finite VC di-
mension d ≥ 1, and suppose the data universe X is finite. Let n ≥ 1,  ∈ (0, 1],
and κ ≥ 1. Then, for every integer k = k(n) satisfying k ≥ d
2
, there exists a
mechanism San that is (O˜(
√
d+κ√
k
+
√
log |X|(log |Q|)κ3/2

√
k
), e−κ)-useful with respect to Q
for databases of size n, and is (4k
n
, 4k
n
e−κ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to
RS(k(·)).
Proof. Let k ≥ d
2
. Then, by Proposition 23, Q has (k, α, 1
2
e−κ)-sample com-
plexity for databases of size n with the converter f(q, x) = x, where α =
2
√
2√
k
√
d ln(2ek
d
) + ln(8eκ) = O˜(
√
d+κ√
k
). We note that |f(q, x)−f(q, y)| ≤ 1·|x−y| for
every x, y ∈ R, q ∈ Q. Let SanDP be the (, e−κ)-differentially private mechanism
in [25] that is (O˜(
√
log |X|(log |Q|)κ3/2

√
k
), 1
2
e−κ)-useful with respect to Q for databases
of size k.
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Then, by Proposition 20, we can use SanDP to construct a mechanism SanZK
that is (4k
n
, 4k
n
δ)-zero-knowledge private with respect to RS(k(·)) and is (O˜(
√
d+κ√
k
+√
log |X|(log |Q|)κ3/2

√
k
), e−κ)-useful with respect to Q for databases of size n.
In general, Propositions 23 and 20 can be used to convert useful differentially
private mechanisms to useful zero-knowledge private mechanisms for classes of
fraction queries with low VC dimension.
Recall that if Q is a finite class of fraction queries, then the VC dimension of Q
is at most log2 |Q|. Thus, we can replace the VC dimension d in Proposition 25 by
log |Q| (we can also do this in Proposition 24 if we assume Q is finite). However, it
is possible that the VC dimension of a class Q of fraction queries is substantially
smaller than log2 |Q| (e.g., see [1]), especially if Q is infinite.
2.5 Zero-Knowledge Private Release of Graph Properties
In this section, we first generalize statistical (row) databases to graphs with per-
sonal data so that we can model a social network and privately release information
that is dependent on the graph structure. We then discuss how to model privacy in
a social network, and we construct a sample of zero-knowledge private mechanisms
that release certain information about the graph structure of a social network.
We represent a social network using a graph whose vertices correspond to people
(or other social entities) and whose edges correspond to social links between them,
and a vertex can have certain personal data associated with it. There are various
types of information about a social network one may want to release, such as
information about the people’s data, information about the structure of the social
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network, and/or information that is dependent on both. In general, we want to
ensure privacy of each person’s personal data as well as the person’s links to other
people (i.e., the list of people the person is linked to via edges).
To formally model privacy in social networks, let Gn be a class of graphs on
n vertices where each vertex includes personal data. (When we refer to a graph
G ∈ Gn, the graph always includes the personal data of each vertex.) The graph
structure is represented by an adjacency matrix, and each vertex’s personal data
is represented by an element in X. For the privacy of individuals, we use our
zero-knowledge privacy definition with some minor modifications:
• -zero-knowledge privacy is defined as before except we change “database
D ∈ Xn” to “graph D ∈ Gn”, and we define (D−i,⊥) to be the graph
D except the personal data of vertex i is replaced by ⊥ and all the edges
incident to vertex i are removed (by setting the corresponding entries in the
adjacency matrix to 0); thus (D−i,⊥) is essentially D with person i’s personal
data and links removed.
We now consider functions g : Gn → Rm, and we redefine the L1-sensitivity
of g to be ∆(g) = max{||g(D′) − g(D′′)||1 : D′, D′′ ∈ Gn s.t. (D′−i,⊥) =
(D′′−i,⊥) for some i ∈ [n]}. We also redefine RS(k(·)) so that the algorithms in
RS(k(·)) are given a graph D ∈ Gn and are allowed to choose k(n) random ver-
tices without replacement and read their personal data; however, the algorithms
are not allowed to read the structure of the graph, i.e., the adjacency matrix. It
is easy to verify that all our previous results still hold when we consider functions
g : Gn → Rm on graphs and use the new definition of ∆(g) and RS(k(·)).
Since a social network has more structure than a statistical database containing
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a list of values, we now consider more general models of aggregate information that
allow us to release more information about social networks:
• RSE(k(·), s) = k(·) random samples with exploration of s vertices: the class
of algorithms T such that on input a graph D ∈ Gn, T chooses k(n) random
vertices uniformly with or without replacement (or a combination of both).
For each sampled vertex v, T is allowed to explore the graph locally at v
until s vertices (including the sampled vertex) have been visited. The data
of any visited vertex can be read. (RSE stands for “random samples with
exploration”.)
• RSN(k(·), d) = k(·) random samples with neighborhood of radius d: same as
RSE(k(·), s) except that while exploring locally, instead of exploring until s
vertices have been visited, T is allowed to explore up to a distance of d from
the sampled vertex. (RSN stands for “random samples with neighborhood”.)
Note that these models of aggregate information include RS(k(·)) as a special
case. We can also consider variants of these models where instead of allowing the
data of any visited vertex to be read, only the data of the k(n) randomly chosen
vertices can be read. (The data of the “explored” vertices cannot be read.)
Remark. In the above models, vertices (people) in the graph with high degree
may be visited with higher probability than those with low degree. Thus, the
privacy of these people may be less protected. However, this is often the case
in social networks, where people with very many friends will naturally have less
privacy than those with few friends.
We now show how to combine Proposition 12 (the connection between sample
complexity and zero-knowledge privacy) with recent sublinear time algorithms to
64
privately release information about the graph structure of a social network. For
simplicity, we assume that the degree of every vertex is bounded by some constant
dmax (which is often the case in a social network anyway).
1
Let Gn be the set of all graphs on n vertices where every vertex has degree
at most dmax. We assume that dmax is publicly known. Let M =
dmaxn
2
be an
upper bound on the number of edges of a graph in Gn. For any graph G ∈ G, the
(relative) distance from G to the some property Π, denoted dist(G,Π), is the least
number of edges that need to be modified (added/removed) in G in order to make
it satisfy property Π, divided by M .
Theorem 26. Let Conn, Eul, and CycF be the property of being connected,
Eulerian2, and cycle-free, respectively. Let d¯(G) denote the average degree of a
vertex in G. Let , δ > 0, and let K ∈ Z+. Then, for the class of graphs Gn, we
have the following results:
1. The mechanism San(G) = dist(G,Conn) +Lap(2/n+δ

) is + e−(K−/δ)-zero-
knowledge private with respect to RSE(k(·), s), where k(n) = O( K
(δdmax)2
) and
s = O( 1
δdmax
).
2. The mechanism San(G) = dist(G,Eul) + Lap(4/n+δ

) is  + e−(K−/δ)-zero-
knowledge private with respect to RSE(k(·), s), where k(n) = O( K
(δdmax)2
) and
s = O( 1
δdmax
).
3. The mechanism San(G) = dist(G,CycF ) +Lap(2/n+δ

) is + e−(K−/δ)-zero-
knowledge private with respect to RSE(k(·), s), where k(n) = O(K
δ2
) and
s = O( 1
δdmax
).
1Weaker results can still be established without this assumption.
2A graph G is Eulerian if there exists a path in G that traverses every edge of G exactly once.
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4. The mechanism San(G) = d¯(G) + Lap(2dmax/n+δL

) is  + e−(K−/δ)-zero-
knowledge private with respect to RSN(k(·), 2), where k(n) = O(K√n log2 n·
1
δ9/2
log(1
δ
)). Here, we further assume that δ ∈ (0, 1
2
) and every graph in G
has no isolated vertices and the average degree of a vertex is bounded by L.
The results of the above theorem are obtained by combining Proposition 12 (the
connection between sample complexity and zero-knowledge privacy) with sublinear
time algorithms from [56] (for results 1, 2, and 3) and [38] (for result 4). Intuitively,
the sublinear algorithms give bounds on the sample complexity of the functions
(dist(G,Conn), etc.) with respect to RSE(k(·), s) or RSN(k(·), d).
Proof.
Distance approximation to connectivity: Let San(G) = dist(G,Conn) + Lap(λ),
where λ = 2/n+δ

. In [56], Marko and Ron have given an algorithm that approxi-
mates the distance to connectivity to within an additive error δ with probability
at least 2
3
. The algorithm does this by randomly choosing O( 1
(δdmax)2
) vertices, and
for each chosen vertex, exploring the graph locally from the vertex until at most
O( 1
δdmax
) vertices have been reached. Here is the algorithm from [56] (modified
slightly to fit this context):
1. Uniformly and independently sample t = 32
(δdmax)2
vertices from G. Let S be
the multiset of the sampled vertices.
2. For every v ∈ S, perform a BFS starting from v until 4
δdmax
vertices have been
reached or v’s connected component has been found. Let n̂v be the number of
vertices in v’s connected component in case it was found. Otherwise n̂v =∞.
3. Let Ĉ = n
t
∑
v∈S(
1
n̂v
) and output 1
M
(Ĉ − 1).
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By running the above algorithm O(K) times and outputting the median value,
we can increase the success probability to 1−e−K . Thus, dist(G,Conn) has (δ, 1−
e−K) sample complexity with respect to RSE(k(·), s), where k(n) = O( K
(δdmax)2
)
and s = O( 1
δdmax
). By Proposition 12, San is ln(e
2/n+δ
λ + e
1
λ
−K)-zero-knowledge
private with respect to RSE(k(·), s).
Now, observe that ln(e
2/n+δ
λ + e
1
λ
−K) ≤ ln(e + e/δ−K) ≤  + e/δ−K =  +
e−(K−/δ). Thus, we have the following result:
• The mechanism San(G) = dist(G,Conn) +Lap(2/n+δ

) is + e−(K−/δ)-zero-
knowledge private with respect to RSE(k(·), s), where k(n) = O( K
(δdmax)2
)
and s = O( 1
δdmax
).
Distance approximation to being Eulerian: Let San(G) = dist(G,Eul) + Lap(λ),
where λ = 4/n+δ

. In [56], Marko and Ron have given an algorithm that approxi-
mates the distance to being Eulerian to within an additive error δ with probability
at least 2
3
. The algorithm does this by randomly choosing O( 1
(δdmax)2
) vertices, and
for each chosen vertex, exploring the graph locally from the vertex until at most
O( 1
δdmax
) vertices have been reached.
By a similar analysis as in the “distance approximation to connectivity” exam-
ple, we get the following result:
• The mechanism San(G) = dist(G,Eul) + Lap(4/n+δ

) is  + e−(K−/δ)-zero-
knowledge private with respect to RSE(k(·), s), where k(n) = O( K
(δdmax)2
)
and s = O( 1
δdmax
).
Distance approximation to cycle freeness: Let San(G) = dist(G,CycF ) +Lap(λ),
where λ = 2/n+δ

. In [56], Marko and Ron have given an algorithm that approxi-
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mates the distance to being cycle-free to within an additive error δ with probabil-
ity at least 2
3
. The algorithm does this by randomly choosing O( 1
δ2
) vertices, and
for each chosen vertex, exploring the graph locally from the vertex until at most
O( 1
δdmax
) vertices have been reached.
By a similar analysis as in the “distance approximation to connectivity” exam-
ple, we get the following result:
• The mechanism San(G) = dist(G,CycF ) +Lap(2/n+δ

) is + e−(K−/δ)-zero-
knowledge private with respect to RSE(k(·), s), where k(n) = O(K
δ2
) and
s = O( 1
δdmax
).
Approximating the average degree of a graph: Let San(G) = d¯(G) + Lap(λ),
where λ = 2dmax/n+δL

. In [38], Goldreich and Ron have shown that d¯(G) can
be approximated by an algorithm (which needs the extra assumptions stated in
the above theorem) to within a multiplicative error of (1 + δ) with probability
at least 2
3
, by randomly choosing O(
√
n log2 n · 1
δ9/2
log(1
δ
)) vertices, and for each
chosen vertex, exploring the graph locally from the vertex up to a distance of 2.
By running the approximation algorithm O(K) times and outputting the median
value, we can increase the success probability to 1− 2−K .
Such an algorithm is a (δL, 1 − 2−K)-sampler for d¯(G) with respect to
RSN(k(·), 2), where k(n) = O(K√n log2 n · 1
δ9/2
log(1
δ
)). By Proposition 12, San
is ln(e
2dmax/n+δL
λ + e
L
λ
−K)-zero-knowledge private with respect to RSN(k(·), 2).
Now, observe that ln(e
2dmax/n+δL
λ + e
L
λ
−K) ≤ ln(e + e/δ−K) ≤  + e−(K−/δ).
Thus, we have the following result:
• The mechanism San(G) = d¯(G) + Lap(2dmax/n+δL

) is  + e−(K−/δ)-
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zero-knowledge private with respect to RSN(k(·), 2), where k(n) =
O(K
√
n log2 n · 1
δ9/2
log(1
δ
)).
There are already many (non-private) sublinear time algorithms for computing
information about graphs whose accuracy is proved formally (e.g., see [38, 12, 56,
36, 44, 37, 68]) or demonstrated empirically (e.g, see [48, 47]). We leave for future
work to investigate whether these (or other) sublinear algorithms can be used to
get zero-knowledge private mechanisms.
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CHAPTER 3
CROWD-BLENDING PRIVACY
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present our work on crowd-blending privacy.
Crowd-Blending Privacy – A New Privacy Definition. Let us now turn to
describing our new privacy definition, which we call crowd-blending privacy. We say
that an individual blends with another individual with respect to a mechanism San
if the two individuals are indistinguishable by the mechanism San, i.e., whenever
we have a database containing either one or both of the individuals, we can replace
one of the individual’s data with the other individual’s data, and the mechanism’s
output distribution remains essentially the same. We say that an individual t
blends in a crowd of k people in the database D with respect to the mechanism San
if there exist at least k − 1 other individuals in the database D that blend with
individual t with respect to San. The intuition behind this notion is that if an
individual t blends in a crowd of k people in the database, then the mechanism
essentially does not release any information about individual t beyond the general
characteristics of the crowd of k people; in particular, the mechanism does not
release any personal information that is specific to individual t and no one else.
Roughly speaking, we say that a mechanism San is crowd-blending private
if the following property holds: For every database and every individual in the
database, either the individual blends in a crowd of k people in the database with
respect to San, or the mechanism San essentially ignores the individual’s data.
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We do not claim that crowd-blending privacy provides sufficiently strong pri-
vacy protection in all scenarios: the key weakening with respect to differential
privacy is that an attacker who knows the data of everyone in an individual i’s
crowd (except i) may learn information about individual i, as long as this infor-
mation is “general” in the sense that it applies to the entire crowd. For instance, if
the attacker knows everyone in the crowd of individual i, it may deduce that i has,
say, three children, as long as everyone in i’s crowd has three children. Although to
some extent, this may be viewed as a privacy violation (that would not be allowed
by the notion of differential privacy), we would argue that the attribute leaked
about individual i is “non-sensitive” as it is shared by a sufficiently large crowd.
Thus, we view this weakening as desirable in many contexts as it allows us to trade
privacy of “non-sensitive information” for improved utility.
A potentially more serious deficiency of the definition is that (in contrast to
differential and zero-knowledge privacy) crowd-blending privacy is not closed under
composition: San1 and San2 may both be crowd-blending private, but the crowds
for an individual with respect to San1 and San2 could be essentially disjoint,
making the individual’s crowd for the combination of San1 and San2 very small.
Although we view composition as an important property of a privacy definition, our
goal here is to study the weakest possible “meaningful” definition of “stand-alone”
privacy that when combined with pre-sampling leads to strong privacy notions
(such as differential and zero-knowledge privacy) that themselves are closed under
composition.
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3.1.1 New Database Mechanisms
As it turns out, achieving crowd-blending privacy is significantly easier than achiev-
ing differential privacy, and crowd-blending private mechanisms may yield signifi-
cantly higher utility than differentially private ones.
Privately Releasing Histograms with No Noise for Sufficiently Large
Counts. We show that we can release histograms with crowd-blending privacy
where no noise is added to bins with a sufficiently large count (and only a small
amount of noise is added to bins with a small count). Intuitively, individuals in
the same bin blend with each other; thus, the individuals that belong to a bin with
a sufficiently large count already blend in a crowd, so no noise needs to be added
to the bin. It is easy to see that it is impossible to release the exact count of a
bin in a histogram while satisfying differential privacy or zero-knowledge privacy.
Using crowd-blending privacy, we can overcome this limitation (for bins with a
sufficiently large count) and achieve better utility. These results can be found in
Section 3.3.1.
Privately Releasing Synthetic Data Points in Rd for Computing Smooth
Functions. Given a class C of counting queries whose size is not too large, it is
shown in [6] how to release a synthetic database for approximating all the queries
in C simultaneously while satisfying differential privacy; however, the mechanism
is not necessarily efficient. It is known that it is impossible (assuming the existence
of one-way functions) to efficiently and privately release a synthetic database for
approximating certain classes of counting queries, such as the class of all 2-way
marginals (see [76, 24]). However, these query functions are non-smooth in the
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sense that even slightly changing one row of the input database can affect the
output of the query functions quite a lot. Here, we focus on efficiently and privately
releasing synthetic data for approximating all “smooth” functions g : (Rd)∗ → Rm.
Roughly speaking, a function g : (Rd)∗ → Rm is smooth if the value of g does
not change much when we perturb the data points of the input slightly. We show
that we can efficiently release synthetic data points in Rd for approximating all
smooth functions simultaneously while satisfying crowd-blending privacy. On the
other hand, we show that there are smooth functions that cannot even be ap-
proximated with non-trivial utility from any synthetic data that has been released
with differential privacy (even if the differentially private mechanism is inefficient).
These results can be found in Section 3.4.
3.1.2 From Crowd-Blending Privacy to Zero-Knowledge
Privacy
Our main technical result shows that if we combine a crowd-blending private mech-
anism with a natural pre-sampling step, then the combined algorithm satisfies
zero-knowledge privacy (and thus differential privacy as well). We envision the
pre-sampling step as being part of the data collection process, where individu-
als in some population are sampled and asked for their data. Thus, if data is
collected using random sampling of individuals from some population, and next
sanitized using a crowd-blending private mechanism, then the resulting process
ensures zero-knowledge privacy.
We first prove our main theorem for the case where the pre-sampling step sam-
ples each individual in the population with probability p independently. In reality,
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the sampling performed during data collection may be slightly biased or done
slightly incorrectly, and an adversary may know whether certain individuals were
sampled or not. Thus, we next extend our main theorem to also handle the case
where the sampling probability is not necessarily the same for everybody, but the
sampling is still “robust” in the sense that most individuals are sampled indepen-
dently with probability in between p and p′ (this probability can even depend on
the individual’s data), where p and p′ are relatively close to one another, while the
remaining individuals are sampled independently with arbitrary probability. As a
result, we have that in scenarios where data has been collected using any robust
sampling, we may release data which both ensures strong utility guarantees and
satisfies very strong notions of privacy (i.e., zero-knowledge privacy and differential
privacy). In particular, this methodology can allow us to achieve zero-knowledge
privacy and differential privacy while guaranteeing utility that is better than that
of previous methods (such as for releasing histograms or synthetic data points as
described above). Our main theorems can be found in Section 3.5.
It is worthwhile to note that the particular mechanism considered in [51] (which
in fact is a particular mechanism for achieving k-anonymity) can easily be shown
to satisfy crowd-blending privacy; as a result, their main result can be derived (and
significantly strengthened) as a corollary of our main theorem.1 (See Section 3.3.1
and 3.5 for more details.)
1As mentioned, none of the earlier work using random pre-sampling focus on the case when
the sampling is biased; furthermore, even for the case of perfect random sampling, the authors of
[51] were not able to provide a closed form expression of the level of differential privacy achieved
by their mechanism, whereas a closed form expression can be directly obtained by applying our
main theorem.
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3.2 Preliminaries and Existing Privacy Definitions
A database is a finite multiset of data values, where a data value is simply an
element of some fixed set X, which we refer to as the data universe. Each data
value in a database belongs to an individual, so we also refer to a data value in
a database as an individual in the database. For convenience, we will sometimes
order the individuals in a database in an arbitrary way and think of the database
as an element of X∗, i.e., a vector with components in X (the components are
referred to as the rows of the database). Given a database D and a data value
v ∈ X, let (D, v) denote the database Dunionmulti{v}. A (database) mechanism is simply
an algorithm that operates on databases.
Given , δ ≥ 0 and two random variables (or distributions) Z and Z ′, we shall
write Z ≈,δ Z ′ to mean that for every Y ⊆ Supp(Z) ∪ Supp(Z ′) we have
Pr[Z ∈ Y ] ≤ e Pr[Z ′ ∈ Y ] + δ
and
Pr[Z ′ ∈ Y ] ≤ e Pr[Z ∈ Y ] + δ.
We shall also write Z ≈ Z ′ to mean Z ≈,0 Z ′. Differential privacy (see [22, 19])
can now be defined in the following manner:
Definition 27 ([22, 19]). A mechanism San is said to be -differentially private
if for every pair of databases D and D′ differing in only one data value, we have
San(D) ≈ San(D′).
There are two definitions in the literature for “a pair of databases D and D′
differing in only one data value”, leading to two slightly different definitions of
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differential privacy. In one definition, it is required that D contains D′ and has
exactly one more data value than D′. In the other definition, it is required that
|D| = |D′|, |D \D′| = 1, and |D′ \D| = 1. Intuitively, differential privacy protects
the privacy of an individual t by requiring the output distribution of the mechanism
to be essentially the same regardless of whether individual t’s data is included in
the database or not (or regardless of what data value individual t has).
We now begin describing zero-knowledge privacy, which is a privacy definition
introduced in [32] that is strictly stronger than differential privacy. In the defini-
tion of zero-knowledge privacy, adversaries and simulators are simply randomized
algorithms that play certain roles in the definition. Let San be any mechanism.
For any database D, any adversary A, and any auxiliary information z ∈ B∗, let
OutA(A(z) ↔ San(D)) denote the output of A on input z after interacting with
the mechanism San operating on the database D. San can be interactive or non-
interactive. If San is non-interactive, then San(D) simply sends its output (e.g.,
sanitized data) to A and then halts immediately.
Let agg be any class of randomized algorithms. agg is normally a class of ran-
domized aggregation functions that provide aggregate information to simulators,
as described in the introduction.
Definition 28 ([32]). A mechanism San is said to be (, δ)-zero-knowledge
private with respect to agg if there exists a T ∈ agg such that for every
adversary A, there exists a simulator S such that for every database D, every
individual t ∈ D, and every auxiliary information z ∈ B∗, we have
OutA(A(z)↔ San(D)) ≈,δ S(z, T (D \ {t}), |D|).
Intuitively, zero-knowledge privacy requires that whatever an adversary can
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compute about individual t by accessing (i.e., interacting with) the mechanism
can also be essentially computed without accessing the mechanism but with cer-
tain aggregate information about the remaining individuals; this aggregate infor-
mation is provided by an algorithm in agg. The adversary in the latter scenario
is represented by the simulator S. This ensures that the adversary essentially
does not learn any additional information about individual t beyond the aggregate
information provided by an algorithm in agg on the remaining individuals.
agg is normally some class of randomized aggregation functions, such as the
class of all functions T that draws r random samples from the input database
and performs any computation (e.g., computes the average or simply outputs the
samples) on the r random samples (note that in the definition, T is applied to
D \ {t} instead of D so that the aggregate information from T does not depend
directly on individual t’s data). Zero-knowledge privacy with respect to this class of
aggregation functions ensures that an adversary essentially does not learn anything
more about an individual beyond some “r random sample aggregate information”
of the other individuals. One can also consider zero-knowledge privacy with respect
to other classes of aggregation functions, such as the class of (randomized) functions
that first sample each row of the input database with probability p (or in between
p and p′) independently and then performs any computation on the samples. We
will actually use such classes of aggregation functions when we prove our main
theorems later. It can be easily shown that zero-knowledge privacy (with respect
to any class agg) implies differential privacy (see [32]).
In the original definition of zero-knowledge privacy in [32], T operates on (D \
{t},⊥) instead of D\{t}, where ⊥ is any arbitrary element of the data universe X.
The main point is that the database that T is applied to does not include individual
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t’s data value (otherwise, a lot of information about individual t could possibly be
leaked). Thus, using T (D \ {t}) in the definition also makes sense, and we choose
to use T (D \ {t}) in this chapter for convenience.2 This version of zero-knowledge
privacy still implies differential privacy (essentially the same “hybrid/transitivity”
proof from [32] works).
3.3 Crowd-Blending Privacy – A New Privacy Definition
We now begin to formally define our new privacy definition. Given t, t′ ∈ X,  ≥ 0,
and a mechanism San, we say that t and t′ are -indistinguishable by San, denoted
t ≈,San t′, if San(D, t) ≈ San(D, t′) for every database D. Intuitively, t and t′ are
indistinguishable by San if for any database containing t, we can replace the t by
t′ and the output distribution of San remains essentially the same. Usually, t and
t′ are the data values of two individuals, and if t and t′ are indistinguishable by
San, then this roughly means that San cannot distinguish these two individuals
regardless of who else is in the database. If t and t′ are -indistinguishable by San,
we also loosely say that t blends with t′ (with respect to San). We now describe
what it means for an individual to blend in a crowd of people in the database (with
respect to a mechanism).
Definition 29. Let D be any database. An individual t ∈ D -blends in a
crowd of k people in D with respect to the mechanism San if |{t′ ∈ D :
t′ ≈,San t}| ≥ k.
In the above definition, {t′ ∈ D : t′ ≈,San t} should be regarded as a multiset.
2Even if we used T (D \ {t},⊥) instead of T (D \ {t}), our results would still hold with only
minor modifications and slight differences in privacy parameters. Recall that differential privacy
also has two versions of its definition.
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When the mechanism San is clear from context, we shall simply omit the “with
respect to the mechanism San”. Intuitively, an individual t ∈ D blends in a crowd
of k people in D if t is indistinguishable by San from at least k−1 other individuals
in D. Note that by the definition of two individuals being indistinguishable by San,
t ∈ D must be indistinguishable by San from each of these k− 1 other individuals
regardless of what the database is, as opposed to only when the database is D. (A
weaker requirement would be that for each of these k−1 other individuals t′, t and
t′ only need to be “indistinguishable by San with respect to D”, i.e., if we take
D and replace t by t′ or vice versa, the output distributions of San on D and the
modified D are essentially the same; we leave investigating this and other possible
weaker requirements for future work.) We are now ready to state our new privacy
definition.
Definition 30 (Crowd-blending privacy). A mechanism San is (k, )-crowd-
blending private if for every database D and every individual t ∈ D, either
t -blends in a crowd of k people in D, or San(D) ≈ San(D \ {t}) (or both).
Crowd-blending privacy requires that for every individual t in the database,
either t blends in a crowd of k people in the database, or the mechanism essentially
ignores individual t’s data (the latter case is captured by San(D) ≈ San(D \
{t}) in the definition). When an individual t blends in a crowd of k people in
the database, the mechanism essentially does not release any information about
individual t beyond the general characteristics of the crowd of k people. This is
because the mechanism cannot distinguish individual t from the people in the crowd
of k people, i.e., individual t’s data can be changed to the data of another person
in the crowd of k people and the output distribution of the mechanism remains
essentially the same. A consequence is that the mechanism does not release any
personally identifying information about individual t.
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As mentioned in the introduction, crowd-blending privacy is not closed under
composition (we later give an example in Section 3.3.2); however, we note that the
privacy guarantee of blending in a crowd of k people in the database (described
above) holds regardless of the amount of auxiliary information the adversary has
(i.e., the definition is agnostic to the adversary’s auxiliary information). Addition-
ally, as mentioned previously, we show in Section 3.5 that when crowd-blending
privacy is combined with “robust pre-sampling”, we get zero-knowledge privacy
and thus differential privacy as well, both of which satisfy composition in a natural
way. Thus, as long as robust sampling is used during data collection before running
a crowd-blending private mechanism on the collected data, independent releases
from crowd-blending private mechanisms do compose and satisfy zero-knowledge
privacy and differential privacy. (We also mention that one can compose a crowd-
blending private mechanism with a differentially private mechanism to obtain a
crowd-blending private mechanism; see Section 3.3.2 for details.)
Relationship with Differential Privacy. Differential privacy implies crowd-
blending privacy.
Proposition 31 (Differential privacy =⇒ Crowd-blending privacy). Let San be
any -differentially private mechanism. Then, San is (k, )-crowd-blending private
for every integer k ≥ 1.
Proof. This immediately follows from the two privacy definitions.
(k, )-crowd-blending privacy for some integer k does not imply differential
privacy in general; this will be clear from the examples of crowd-blending private
mechanisms that we give later. Crowd-blending privacy requires that for every
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database D and every individual t ∈ D, at least one of two conditions hold. The
second condition San(D) ≈ San(D \ {t}) is similar to the condition required in
differential privacy. Thus, we can view crowd-blending privacy as a relaxation of
differential privacy. If we remove the first condition “t -blends in a crowd of k
people in D” from crowd-blending privacy, we clearly get the same definition as
differential privacy. If we remove the second condition instead, it turns out that
we also get differential privacy. (When we remove the second condition San(D) ≈
San(D \ {t}), we also change the definition to only consider databases of size at
least k, since otherwise it would be impossible for individual t to blend in a crowd
of k people in the database.)
Proposition 32 (Removing the condition San(D) ≈ San(D \ {t}) in
crowd-blending privacy results in differential privacy). Let San be any mechanism,
let  ≥ 0, and let k be any integer ≥ 2. Then, San is -differentially private3 if
and only if San satisfies the property that for every database D of size at least k
and every individual t ∈ D, t -blends in a crowd of k people in D with respect to
San.
Proof. If San is -differentially private, then for every database D of size at least
k and every individual t ∈ D, t is -indistinguishable by San from every individual
in D, so t -blends in a crowd of k people in D.
Now, suppose San is not -differentially private. Then, there exist a database
D and a pair of data values t, t′ ∈ X such that San(D, t) 6≈ San(D, t′). Now,
consider a database D′ consisting of an individual with data value t and k − 1
individuals with data value t′. Since San(D, t) 6≈ San(D, t′), t and t′ are not
3Here, we are using the version of differential privacy that considers a pair of databases of
equal size.
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-indistinguishable by San, so the individual t ∈ D′ does not -blend in a crowd
of k people in D′.
3.3.1 Examples of Crowd-Blending Private Mechanisms
Given a partition P of the data universe X, and given a database D, one can
compute the histogram with respect to the partition P using the database D; the
histogram specifies for each block of the partition (which we refer to as a “bin”)
the number of individuals in D that belong to the block (which we refer to as
the “count” of the bin). We first give an example of a crowd-blending private
mechanism that computes a histogram and suppresses (i.e., sets to 0) bin counts
that are considered too small.
Example 9 (Histogram with suppression of small counts). Let P be any partition
of X. Fix k ∈ Z≥0. Let San be a mechanism that, on input a database D,
computes the histogram with respect to the partition P using the database D,
suppresses each bin count that is < k (by setting the count to 0), and then releases
the resulting histogram.
Then, San is (k, 0)-crowd-blending private. To see this, we note that an indi-
vidual t in a database D is 0-indistinguishable by San from all the individuals in D
that belong to the same bin as t. If there are at least k such people, then individual
t blends with k people in D; otherwise, we have San(D) ≈0 San(D \ {t}) since
San suppresses each bin count that is < k.
It is easy to see that it is impossible to release the exact count of a bin while
satisfying differential privacy. Thus, crowd-blending privacy is indeed weaker than
differential privacy. For crowd-blending privacy, we can actually get better utility
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by adding a bit of noise to bins with low counts instead of completely suppressing
them.
Example 10 (Histogram with noise for small counts and no noise for large counts).
Let P be any partition of X. Fix  > 0 and k ∈ Z≥0. Let San be a mechanism
that, on input a database D, computes the histogram with respect to the partition
P using the database D. Then, San replaces each bin count i < k with A(i),
where A is any (randomized) algorithm that satisfies A(j) ≈ A(j − 1) for every
0 < j < k (A(i) is normally a noisy version of i). San then releases the noisy
histogram.
Then, San is (k, )-crowd-blending private. To see this, we note that an in-
dividual t in a database D is -indistinguishable (in fact, 0-indistinguishable) by
San from all the individuals in D that belong to the same bin as t. If there are at
least k such people, then individual t blends with k people in D, as required. If
not, then we have San(D) ≈ San(D \ {t}), since the histogram when using the
database D is the same as the histogram when using the database D \ {t} except
for individual t’s bin, which differs by one; however, San replaces the count i for
individual t’s bin with A(i), and the algorithm A satisfies A(i) ≈ A(i − 1), so
San(D) ≈ San(D \ {t}), as required.
We can choose the algorithm A to be A(j) = j + Lap(1

), where Lap(λ) is (a
random variable with) the Laplace distribution with probability density function
fλ(x) =
1
2λ
e|x|/λ. The proof that A(j) ≈ A(j − 1) for every 0 < j < k is simple
and can be implicitly found in [22].
The differentially private mechanism in [22] for computing histograms has to
add noise to every bin, while our mechanism here only adds noise to the bins that
have a count that is < k.
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Example 11 (Sanitizing a database by generalizing records safely). Many mech-
anisms for achieving k-anonymity involve “generalizing” the records in the input
table by replacing specific values with more general values, such as replacing a
specific age with an age range. If this is not done carefully, the privacy of indi-
viduals can be breached, as shown by many attacks in the past (e.g., see [78, 80]).
Most of these mechanisms do not satisfy crowd-blending privacy. However, if the
generalization of records is done carefully, achieving crowd-blending privacy may
be possible.
One example is the mechanism of [51]: Let Y be any set, and let f : X → Y
be any function. We think of Y as a set of possible “generalized records”, and f is
a function that maps a record to its generalized version. Let San be a mechanism
that, on input a database D, applies the function f to each individual in D; let
f(D) be the multi-set of images in Y . San then removes each record in f(D) that
appears fewer than k times in f(D), and then outputs the result. It is easy to see
that San is (k, 0)-crowd-blending private. To see this, we note that an individual
t in a database D is 0-indistinguishable by San from all the individuals in D that
also get mapped to f(t). If there are at least k such people, then individual t
blends with k people in D; otherwise, we have San(D) ≈0 San(D \ {t}) since San
removes each record in f(D) that appears fewer than k times in f(D).
3.3.2 Discussion of Composition
Unfortunately, crowd-blending private mechanisms do not necessarily compose, as
we now show:
Proposition 33. Let X = {1, 2, 3} be the data universe, and let k ∈ Z+ and
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 > 0. Let San1 and San2 be the histogram mechanism in the “Histogram with
noise for small counts and no noise for large counts” example with partitions P1 =
{{1, 2}, {3}} and P2 = {{1}, {2, 3}}, respectively. As shown in the example, San1
and San2 are both (k, )-crowd-blending private.
Let San be the composition of San1 and San2, i.e., San(D) =
(San1(D), San2(D)) for every database D. Then, for every k
′ > 1 and every
′ ≥ 0, San is not (k′, ′)-crowd-blending private.
Proof. Fix k′ > 1 and ′ ≥ 0. Let D be the database containing exactly k − 1
individuals with data value 1, exactly 1 individual with data value 2, and exactly
k − 1 individuals with data value 3. Let t be the individual in D with data value
2.
We claim that individual t is not ′-indistinguishable by San from any individ-
ual in D other than himself/herself. To see this, we note that if t changes his/her
data value to 1, then the number of individuals in the database that belong to the
block {2, 3} of the partition P2 decreases from k to k − 1; since San2 adds noise
to counts that are < k but does not add noise to counts that are ≥ k, the output
distribution of San2 changes completely and San(D) ≈′ San(D \ {t}, 1) clearly
does not hold. If t changes his/her data value to 3, then the number of individ-
uals in the database that belong to the block {1, 2} of the partition P1 decreases
from k to k − 1; since San1 adds noise to counts that are < k but does not add
noise to counts that are ≥ k, the output distribution of San1 changes completely
and San(D) ≈′ San(D \ {t}, 3) clearly does not hold. Thus, individual t is not
′-indistinguishable by San from any individual in D other than himself/herself,
so individual t does not ′-blend in a crowd of k′ people in the database D.
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We now claim that San(D) 6≈′ San(D \ {t}). To see this, we note that when
the database is D, San1 does not add noise to the bin {1, 2} of the histogram it
computes, since the count of the bin is k. However, when the database is D \ {t},
San1 does add noise to the bin {1, 2}, since the count of the bin is k − 1. Thus,
San(D) 6≈′ San(D \ {t}) clearly does not hold.
It follows that San is not (k′, ′)-crowd-blending private.
Although crowd-blending private mechanisms do not necessarily compose, one
can compose via concatenation a crowd-blending private mechanism with a differ-
entially private mechanism to obtain a crowd-blending private mechanism.
Proposition 34. Let San1 be any (k, 1)-crowd-blending private mechanism,
and let San2 be any 2-differentially private mechanism. Then, the mechanism
San(D) = (San1(D), San2(D)) is (k, 1 + 22)-crowd-blending private.
Proof. Let D be any database and t be any individual in D. Since San1 is (k, 1)-
crowd-blending private, either t 1-blends in a crowd of k people in D with respect
to San1, or San1(D) ≈1 San1(D \ {t}).
In the former case, we have |t′ ∈ D : t′ ≈1,San1 t| ≥ k; now, we note that if
t′ ∈ D satisfies t′ ≈,San1 t, then t′ also satisfies t′ ≈1+22,San t since for every
database D′, we have
San(D′, t′) = (San1(D′, t′), San2(D′, t′)) ≈1+22 (San1(D′, t), San2(D′, t)) = San(D′, t).
(The factor of 2 in 22 appears when we use a “hybrid/transitivity” argument:
Since San2 is 2-differentially private, we have San2(D
′, t′) ≈2 San2(D′) ≈2
San(D′, t), so San2(D′, t′) ≈22 San(D′, t).) Thus, individual t (1 + 22)-blends in
a crowd of k people in D with respect to San, as required.
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In the latter case, we have San1(D) ≈1 San1(D \ {t}), so
San(D) = (San1(D), San2(D)) ≈1+2 (San1(D \ {t}), San2(D \ {t})) = San(D \ {t}),
as required.
3.4 Privately Releasing Synthetic Data Points in Rd for
Computing Smooth Functions
Roughly speaking, a function g : (Rd)∗ → Rm is smooth if the value of g does
not change much when we perturb the data points of the input slightly. In this
section, we show that we can efficiently release synthetic data points in Rd for ap-
proximating all smooth functions simultaneously while satisfying crowd-blending
privacy. On the other hand, we show that there are smooth functions that cannot
even be approximated with non-trivial utility from synthetic data that has been
released with differential privacy (even if the differentially private mechanism is
inefficient).
In this section, the data universe X is any bounded subset of Rd for some
positive integer d, and the input databases of mechanisms are elements of X∗. We
consider mechanisms that always output a synthetic database where each row is a
data point in Rd. We loosely use the term “synthetic data/database” to mean that
the data/database was outputted by a mechanism but still has the same format as
the original input data/database. Given a database/vector D, let Di denote the
ith row/component of D. We now state the definition of smoothness of a function
g : (Rd)∗ → Rm.
Definition 35. Let M : Z≥0 → R+ and K : Z≥0 → R+ be functions. A function
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g : (Rd)∗ → Rm is said to be (M(·), K(·))-smooth if for every pair of databases
D,D′ ∈ X∗ of equal size n such that ||Di − D′i||1 ≤ M(n) for every i ∈ [n], we
have ||g(D)− g(D′)||1 ≤ K(n).
Roughly speaking, a function is (M(·), K(·))-smooth if the value of the func-
tion changes by at most a distance of K(n) when the data points in a database
of size n are perturbed by at most a distance of M(n). For example, the func-
tion that computes the mean of the data points is (M(·),M(·))-smooth for every
function M : Z≥0 → R+. In practice, outliers are often removed before computing
certain statistics on the data points, since outliers often cause the statistics to
be less meaningful. Thus, when we consider the utility of a mechanism, we will
consider how well the synthetic database released by the mechanism can be used
to accurately approximate smooth functions with an outlier removal preprocessing
step.
We now discuss how we decide whether a data point is an outlier or not. For
the rest of the section, we fix a bounded data universe X ⊆ Rd, a partition P of
X, and an integer k ≥ 1. Given a database D, an individual t in D is said to be an
outlier in D (with respect to the partition P and the threshold k) if the block of
P containing t contains fewer than k data points from D. We now describe what
it means for a mechanism to be useful for a class of functions with outlier removal
preprocessing.
Definition 36. Let San be any mechanism that always outputs a database
whose rows are data points in Rd. Let C be any class of functions of the form
g : (Rd)∗ → Rm. San is said to be (α(·), β(·))-useful for C with outlier re-
moval preprocessing if for every database D ∈ X∗, if we let D̂ be the database
D with all outliers removed and n̂ = |D̂|, then with probability at least 1− β(n̂),
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San(D) outputs a synthetic database D˜ such that
||g(D˜)− g(D̂)||1 ≤ α(n̂) for every g ∈ C.
We now give an example of a crowd-blending private mechanism that releases
synthetic data points in Rd for approximating all smooth functions with outlier
removal preprocessing. Given a subset A ⊆ Rd, let the diameter of A, denoted
diam(A), be defined by diam(A) = supx,y∈A ||x− y||1.
Example 12 (Releasing noisy data points in Rd for approximating all smooth
functions with outlier removal preprocessing). Let  > 0. Let San be a mechanism
that, on input a database D, looks at each data point ~x in D and does the following:
If ~x is an outlier in D, San simply deletes ~x. Otherwise, San replaces ~x with AB(~x),
where B is the block of the partition P that contains ~x, and AB is any (randomized)
algorithm that satisfies AB(~y) ≈ AB(~z) for every pair of vectors ~y, ~z ∈ B (AB(~x)
is normally a noisy version of ~x). San then releases all the noisy data points.
Then, San is (k, )-crowd-blending private. To see this, let D be any database
and let t be any individual in D. If t is an outlier in D, then we have San(D) =
San(D\{t}), since San simply deletes all outliers and the removal of t from D does
not change whether the other individuals are outliers or not; thus, San is (k, )-
crowd-blending private, as required. Thus, we now assume t is not an outlier in D.
Then, let B be the block of the partition P that contains t. We note that individual
t is -indistinguishable by San from each individual t′ ∈ D in the block B, since
for every database D′, we have San(D′, t) ≈ San(D′, t′) since AB(t) ≈ AB(t′).
Since t is not an outlier in D, there are at least k people in D that belong to the
block B, so t -blends in a crowd of k people in D, as required.
For each block B of the partition P , we can choose the algorithm AB to be
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AB(~y) = ~y + Lap(
diam(B)

)d, where Lap(diam(B)

)d is a random vector with d com-
ponents, each of which is independently distributed as Lap(diam(B)

). Using tech-
niques/results found in [22], it is easy to show that AB(~y) ≈ AB(~z) for every pair
of vectors ~y, ~z ∈ B.
Remark. Even though San essentially runs a differentially private mechanism
within each block (that does not contain too few data points), it is not the case
that the only information that remains for a block is the number of data points
that belong to the block. This is because there can be many data points within
a block, and if San adds Laplacian noise to each data point as above, the general
distribution of data points and many statistics are preserved in expectation and
would also be reasonably accurate with high probability. Outputting just the
number of data points within a block does not tell us such distributional and
statistical information. Thus, we do not get the same result if San simply outputs
the number of data points within each block like a histogram.
We now show that the above crowd-blending private mechanism with AB(~y) =
~y + Lap(diam(B)

)d is useful for all smooth functions with outlier removal prepro-
cessing.
Proposition 37. Let  > 0 and L > 0, and let M : Z≥0 → R+ and K : Z≥0 → R+
be arbitrary functions. Suppose diam(B) ≤ L for every block B of the partition P .
Let San be the mechanism in the above example with AB(~y) = ~y + Lap(
diam(B)

)d.
Then, San is (K(·), β(·))-useful for the class C of all (M(·), K(·))-smooth functions
with outlier removal preprocessing, where β(n̂) = dn̂e−
M(n̂)
dL .
Proof. Let D ∈ X∗, let D̂ be the database D with all outliers removed, and let
n̂ = |D̂|. Let D˜ = San(D). Since San(D) simply removes all outliers in D, we
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have D˜ = San(D̂). Now, we note that |D˜| = n̂ and for every i ∈ [n̂], we have
D˜i = D̂i + Lap(
diam(Bi)

)d, where Bi is the block of P that contains D̂i. Let λ =
L

so that diam(Bi)

≤ λ for every i ∈ [n̂]. From the p.d.f. or c.d.f. of Lap(λ), it is
easy to verify that for every δ ≥ 0, we have PrX∼Lap(λ)[|X| ≤ δ] = 1 − e− δλ , so
PrX∼Lap(λ)d [||X||1 ≤ δ] ≥ 1− de− δdλ by a union bound. Then, for every i ∈ [n̂], we
have
Pr
[
||D˜i − D̂i||1 ≤M(n̂)
]
= Pr
X∼Lap( diam(Bi)

)d
[||X||1 ≤M(n̂)]
≥ Pr
X∼Lap(λ)d
[||X||1 ≤M(n̂)]
≥ 1− de− M(n̂)dL .
Then, by a union bound, with probability at least 1 − n̂de− M(n̂)dL , we have ||D˜i −
D̂i||1 ≤ M(n̂) for every i ∈ [n̂]. Then, with probability at least 1− n̂de− M(n̂)dL , we
have ||g(D˜)− g(D̂)||1 ≤ K(n̂) for every (M(·), K(·))-smooth function g : (Rd)∗ →
Rm by definition of (M(·), K(·))-smooth. Thus, San is (K(·), β(·))-useful for the
class C of all (M(·), K(·))-smooth functions with outlier removal preprocessing.
We note that β(n̂) = dn̂e−
M(n̂)
dL can be made to be negligible by choosing
M(n̂) = Ω(n̂κ) for any κ > 0. We also note that the mechanism in the proposition
can clearly be implemented efficiently. We now show that there exist (M(·), K(·))-
smooth functions that cannot be computed with non-trivial utility from synthetic
data released by a differentially private mechanism, regardless of the running time
of the mechanism.
Proposition 38. Let g : (Rd)∗ → Rd be the function defined by g(D) = D1, which
is clearly (M(·),M(·))-smooth for every function M : Z≥0 → R+. Let  ≥ 0, and
let San be any (possibly inefficient) -differentially private mechanism that always
outputs a database where each row is a data point in Rd. Then, for every δ > 0,
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San is not even (diam(X)
4
, 1
1+e
− δ)-useful for the function g with outlier removal
preprocessing.
Proof. Let ~x and ~y be any pair of data points in X such that ||~x−~y||1 ≥ 34diam(X).
Let D be the database consisting of exactly k+ 1 copies of ~x followed by exactly k
copies of ~y, and let D′ be the same as D except that the first row is changed from
~x to ~y. Then, both D and D′ do not contain any outliers.
Let δ > 0. To obtain a contradiction, suppose San is (diam(X)
4
, 1
1+e
− δ)-
useful for the function g with outlier removal preprocessing. Then, San is also
(diam(X)
4
, 1
1+e
)-useful for g with outlier removal preprocessing. Then, we have
Pr[||San(D)1 − ~x||1 ≤ diam(X)/4] ≥ 1− 1
1 + e
=
e
1 + e
.
Since San is -differentially private and D and D′ differ by only one row, we have
San(D) ≈ San(D′), so
Pr[||San(D′)1 − ~x||1 ≤ diam(X)/4] ≥ e− · Pr[||San(D)1 − ~x||1 ≤ diam(X)/4]
≥ 1
1 + e
.
Since ||~x − ~y||1 ≥ 34diam(X), if ||San(D′)1 − ~x||1 ≤ diam(X)/4 holds, then
||San(D′)1 − ~y||1 ≤ diam(X)/4 does not hold. It follows that
Pr[||g(San(D′))− g(D′)||1 ≤ diam(X)/4] = Pr[||San(D′)1 − ~y||1 ≤ diam(X)/4]
≤ 1− Pr[||San(D′)1 − ~x||1 ≤ diam(X)/4]
≤ 1− 1
1 + e
< 1−
(
1
1 + e
− δ
)
.
This contradicts our assumption that San is (diam(X)
4
, 1
1+e
− δ)-useful for g with
outlier removal preprocessing.
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In Proposition 38, we note that the image of X∗ under g is X (recall that the
databases that we run mechanisms on are elements of X∗) and 1
1+e
≈ 1
2
when  is
small, and so requiring San to be (diam(X)
4
, 1
1+e
− δ)-useful for g is only requiring
San to possibly provide non-trivial utility; however, the proposition says that
San cannot even satisfy this non-triviality requirement. If we apply Proposition
37 to the same function g, we see that for every function M : Z≥0 → R+, the
crowd-blending private mechanism is (M(·), β(·))-useful for g with outlier removal
preprocessing, where β(n̂) = dn̂e−
M(n̂)
dL and L is a bound on the diameter of every
block of the partition P . The utility guarantee of this result is non-trivial in many
situations. Thus, it is possible to release synthetic data points for approximating
smooth functions while satisfying crowd-blending privacy, but doing this while
satisfying differential privacy is impossible in general.
3.5 Our Main Theorem
In this section, we prove our main theorem that says that when we combine a
crowd-blending private mechanism with a natural pre-sampling step, the combined
algorithm is zero-knowledge private (and thus differentially private as well). The
pre-sampling step should be thought of as being part of the data collection process,
where individuals in some population are sampled and asked for their data. A
crowd-blending private mechanism is then run on the samples to release useful
information while preserving privacy.
We first prove our main theorem for the case where the pre-sampling step
samples each individual in the population with probability p independently. In re-
ality, the sampling performed during data collection may be slightly biased or done
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slightly incorrectly, and an adversary may know whether certain individuals were
sampled or not. Thus, we later extend our main theorem to the case where the
sampling probability is not necessarily the same for everybody, but the sampling
is still robust in the sense that most individuals are sampled independently with
probability in between p and p′ (this probability can even depend on the individ-
ual’s data), where p and p′ are relatively close to one another, while the remaining
individuals are sampled independently with arbitrary probability.
We begin with some necessary terminology and notation. A population is a
collection of individuals, where an individual is simply represented by a data value
in the data universe X. Thus, a population is actually a multiset of data values,
which is the same as a database. (If we want individuals to have unique data
values, we can easily modify X to include personal/unique identifiers.) Given
a population P and a real number p ∈ [0, 1], let Sam(P , p) be the outcome of
sampling each individual in P with probability p independently.
Although zero-knowledge privacy was originally defined for mechanisms oper-
ating on databases, one can also consider mechanisms operating on populations,
since there is essentially no difference between the way we model populations
and databases. (In the definition of zero-knowledge privacy, we simply change
“database” to “population” and D to P .) We now describe a class of (random-
ized) aggregation functions that we will use in the definition of zero-knowledge
privacy.
• iidRS(p) = i.i.d. random sampling with probability p : the class of algorithms
T such that on input a population P , T chooses each individual in P with
probability p independently, and then performs any computation on the data
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of the chosen individuals.4
We now state and prove the basic version of our main theorem.
Theorem 39 (Sampling + Crowd-Blending Privacy⇒ Zero-Knowledge Privacy).
Let San be any (k, )-crowd-blending private mechanism with k ≥ 2, and let p ∈
(0, 1). Then, the algorithm Sanzk defined by Sanzk(P) = San(Sam(P , p)) for any
population P is (zk, δzk)-zero-knowledge private5 with respect to iidRS(p), where
zk = ln
(
p ·
(
2− p
1− pe

)
+ (1− p)
)
and δzk = e
−Ω(k·(1−p)2).
To prove Theorem 39, we will first prove two supporting lemmas. The first
lemma essentially says that if an individual t blends with (i.e., is indistinguishable
by San from) many people in the population, then t’s privacy is protected when
we sample from the population and run San on the samples:
Lemma 40 (Protection of individuals that blend with many people in the popu-
lation). Let San be any mechanism, P be any population, p ∈ (0, 1), and  ≥ 0.
Let t be any individual in P, and let A be any non-empty subset of P \ {t} such
that t′ ≈,San t for every individual t′ ∈ A. Let n = |A|. Then, we have
San(Sam(P , p)) ≈final,δfinal San(Sam(P \ {t}, p)),
where final = ln(p · (2−p1−pe) + (1− p)) and δfinal = e−Ω((n+1)p(1−p)
2).
In the lemma, A is any non-empty set of individuals in P \{t} that blend with
individual t. (We could set A to be the set of all individuals in P \ {t} that blend
4To make zero-knowledge privacy compose naturally for this type of aggregate information,
we can extend iidRS(p) to iidRS(p, r), where T is now allowed to perform r rounds of sampling
before performing any computation on the sampled data. It is not hard to see that zero-knowledge
privacy with respect to iidRS(p, r) composes in a natural way.
5The constant hidden by the Ω(·) in δzk can be easily computed; however, we did not try to
optimize the constant in any way.
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with individual t, but leaving A more general allows us to more easily extend the
lemma to the case of “robust” sampling later.) We note that δfinal is smaller when
n = |A| is larger, i.e., when t blends with more people. Intuitively, if an individual
t is indistinguishable by San from many other people in the population, then t’s
presence or absence in the population does not affect the output of San(Sam(·, p))
much, since the people indistinguishable from t can essentially take the place of
t in almost any situation (and the output of San would essentially be the same).
Since it does not matter much whether individual t is in the population or not, it
follows that t’s privacy is protected.
The proof of the lemma roughly works as follows: Consider two scenarios, one
where individual t is in the population (i.e., San(Sam(P , p)) in the lemma), and
one where individual t has been removed from the population (i.e., San(Sam(P \
{t}, p)) in the lemma). Our goal is to show that the output of San is essentially
the same in the two scenarios, i.e., San(Sam(P , p)) ≈final,δfinal San(Sam(P \
{t}, p)). Conditional on individual t not being sampled in the first scenario, the
two scenarios are exactly the same, as desired. Thus, we now always condition
on individual t being sampled in the first scenario. In the lemma, A is a set of
individuals in the population (excluding t) that are indistinguishable from t by
San. Let m˜ denote the number of people in A that are sampled. The proof
involves showing the following two properties:
1. m˜ is relatively smooth near its expectation: For every integer m near the
expectation of m˜, Pr[m˜ = m] is relatively close to Pr[m˜ = m+ 1].
2. For every integer m ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}, the output of San in the first scenario
conditioned on m˜ = m (and t being sampled) is essentially the same as the
output of San in the second scenario conditioned on m˜ = m+ 1.
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For the first property, we note that m˜ follows a binomial distribution, which
can be shown to be relatively smooth near its expectation. To show the second
property, we note that when we condition on m˜ = m (and t being sampled)
in the first scenario, m random samples are drawn uniformly from A (one at a
time) without replacement, and also t /∈ A is sampled for sure (and the remaining
individuals are sampled independently with probability p). This is very similar to
the second scenario conditioned on m˜ = m+ 1, where m+ 1 random samples are
drawn uniformly from A without replacement, since if we replace the (m + 1)th
sample by t, we get back the first scenario conditioned on m˜ = m (and t being
sampled). Since the (m+1)th sample is indistinguishable from t by San, the output
of San is essentially the same in both scenarios.
Using the two properties above, one can show that when m˜ is close to its
expectation, the output of San is essentially the same in both scenarios. δfinal in
the lemma captures the probability of the bad event where m˜ is not close to its
expectation, which we bound by essentially using a Chernoff bound. We now give
the formal proof of Lemma 40.
Proof of Lemma 40. Let Sam > 0, D̂ = Sam(P , p), D˜ = Sam(P \ {t}, p), m˜ =
|D˜ ∩A|, and Y ⊆ {0, 1}∗. Let E be the event that t is sampled when D̂ is chosen.
We first observe that
Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y ] = Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y | E] · Pr[E] + Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y | E] · Pr[E]
= Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y ] · p+ Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ] · (1− p). (1)
We will now show that for every m ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}, we have∣∣∣∣∣ln
(
Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y | m˜ = m]
Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y | m˜ = m+ 1]
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ . (2)
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Fix m ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. Let P−t,−A = (P \ {t}) \ A. We note that for
j ∈ {0, . . . , n}, the conditional distribution of D˜ given m˜ = j is equal to
Sam(P−t,−A, p) ∪Aj, where Aj is the outcome of choosing j random samples uni-
formly without replacement from A. Then, using the fact that t′ ≈,San t for every
individual t′ ∈ A, we have
Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y | m˜ = m] = Pr[San(Sam(P−t,−A, p) ∪ Am ∪ {t}) ∈ Y ]
≤ e Pr[San(Sam(P−t,−A, p) ∪ Am+1) ∈ Y ] = e Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y | m˜ = m+ 1].
Similarly, we also have
Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y | m˜ = m+ 1] = Pr[San(Sam(P−t,−A, p) ∪ Am+1) ∈ Y ]
≤ e Pr[San(Sam(P−t,−A, p) ∪ Am ∪ {t}) ∈ Y ] = e Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y | m˜ = m].
Thus, we have shown (2).
Now, we observe that for every m ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, if m + 1 ≤ (n + 1)p ·
eSam
peSam+(1−p) , then
Pr[m˜ = m]
Pr[m˜ = m+ 1]
=
(
n
m
)
pm(1− p)n−m(
n
m+1
)
pm+1(1− p)n−(m+1) =
m+ 1
n−m
1− p
p
≤ eSam . (3)
Let α = e
Sam
peSam+(1−p) and δSam = Pr[m˜+ 1 > (n+ 1)p · α]. Now, using (3) and (2)
(and the fact that m = n does not satisfy m+ 1 ≤ (n+ 1)p · α), we have
Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y ]
≤
∑
m∈{0,...,n}
m+1≤(n+1)p·α
Pr[m˜ = m] Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y | m˜ = m] + Pr[m˜+ 1 > (n+ 1)p · α]
≤
∑
m∈{0,...,n}
m+1≤(n+1)p·α
eSam Pr[m˜ = m+ 1] · e Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y | m˜ = m+ 1] + δSam
≤ e+Sam Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ] + δSam. (4)
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Let total = max{ln(pe+Sam + (1− p)), ln( 11−p)}. Combining (1) and (4), we have
Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y ] ≤ (e+Sam Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ] + δSam) · p+ Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ] · (1− p)
≤ etotal Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ] + p · δSam.
By (1), we also have
Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y ] ≥ (1− p) Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ] ≥ e−total Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ].
Thus, we have San(D̂) ≈total,p·δSam San(D˜).
Now, we set Sam = ln(
2−p
1−p). Then, we have
total = max{ln(pe+Sam + (1− p)), ln( 1
1− p)}
= max{ln(p · (2− p
1− pe
) + (1− p)), ln( 1
1− p)}
= ln(p · (2− p
1− pe
) + (1− p))
and
p · δSam = p · Pr[m˜+ 1 > (n+ 1)p · (2− p)]
≤ Pr[m˜+Bin(1, p) > (n+ 1)p · (2− p)]
≤ e−Ω((n+1)p(1−p)2),
where Bin(1, p) is a binomial random variable with 1 trial and success probability
p, and the last inequality follows from a multiplicative Chernoff bound.
We now show how pre-sampling combined with a crowd-blending private mech-
anism can protect the privacy of individuals who blend with (i.e., are indistinguish-
able by San from) few people in the population.
Lemma 41 (Protection of individuals that blend with few people in the popu-
lation). Let San be any (k, )-crowd-blending private mechanism with k ≥ 2, let
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P be any population, and let p ∈ (0, 1). Let t be any individual in P, and let
n = |{t′ ∈ P \ {t} : t′ ≈,San t}|. Then, if n ≤ k−1p(2−p) , we have
San(Sam(P , p)) ≈final,δfinal San(Sam(P \ {t}, p)),
where final = ln(pe
 + (1− p)) and δfinal = pe−Ω(k·(1−p)2).
The proof of the lemma roughly works as follows: In the lemma, n is the number
of people in the population that individual t blends with, and is assumed to be
small. We will show that when we remove individual t from the population, the
output of San does not change much.
Consider two scenarios, one where individual t is in the population, and one
where individual t has been removed from the population. Conditional on individ-
ual t not being sampled in the first scenario, the two scenarios are exactly the same,
as desired. Thus, we now always condition on individual t being sampled in the
first scenario. Since individual t blends with few people in the population, we have
that with very high probability, the database obtained from sampling from the
population would contain fewer than k people that blend with individual t; since
San is (k, )-crowd-blending private and individual t does not blend in a crowd
of k people in the database, San must essentially ignore individual t’s data; thus,
the first scenario is essentially the same as the second scenario, since individual
t’s data is essentially ignored anyway. δfinal in the lemma captures the probability
of the bad event where the database obtained from sampling actually contains k
people that blend with individual t. We now give the formal proof of Lemma 41.
Proof of Lemma 41. Suppose n ≤ k−1
p(2−p) . Let D̂ = Sam(P , p), D˜ = Sam(P \
{t}, p), and Y ⊆ {0, 1}∗. Let A = {t′ ∈ P \ {t} : t′ ≈,San t}, so n = |A|. Let
m˜ = |D˜ ∩ A|, and let E be the event that individual t is in D̂ when D̂ is chosen.
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We first note that
Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y ] = Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y | E] · Pr[E] + Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y | E] · Pr[E]
= Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ] · (1− p) + Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y ] · p. (1)
Since San is (k, )-crowd-blending private, we have
Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y | m˜ < k − 1] ≤ e Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y | m˜ < k − 1]
and
Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y | m˜ < k − 1] ≥ e− Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y | m˜ < k − 1].
Then, we have
Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y ]
≤ Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y | m˜ < k − 1] Pr[m˜ < k − 1] + Pr[m˜ ≥ k − 1]
≤ e Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y | m˜ < k − 1] Pr[m˜ < k − 1] + Pr[m˜ ≥ k − 1]
≤ e Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ] + Pr[m˜ ≥ k − 1], (2)
and
Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y ] ≥ Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y | m˜ < k − 1] Pr[m˜ < k − 1]
≥ e− Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y | m˜ < k − 1] Pr[m˜ < k − 1]
≥ e−(Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ]− Pr[m˜ ≥ k − 1])
= e− Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ]− e− Pr[m˜ ≥ k − 1]. (3)
Now, combining (1) and (2), we have
Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y ] ≤ (pe + (1− p)) Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ] + pPr[m˜ ≥ k − 1]. (4)
Also, combining (1) and (3), we have
Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y ] ≥ (pe− + (1− p)) Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ]− e−pPr[m˜ ≥ k − 1].
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Rearranging this inequality, we get
Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ] ≤ 1
pe− + (1− p) Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y ] +
e−
pe− + (1− p)pPr[m˜ ≥ k − 1]
≤ (pe + (1− p)) Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y ] + pPr[m˜ ≥ k − 1], (5)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the function f(x) = 1
x
is convex
for x > 0, so 1
pe−+(1−p) ≤ pe + (1− p).
Let τ = k−1
p(2−p) . Then, we have n ≤ τ . The lemma now follows from (4), (5),
and the inequality
pPr[m˜ ≥ k − 1] = pPr[m˜ ≥ τp · (2− p)]
≤ pPr[m˜+Bin(bτc − n, p) +Bin(1, (τ − bτc)p) ≥ τp · (2− p)]
≤ pe−Ω(τp(1−p)2)
≤ pe−Ω(k·(1−p)2),
where Bin(j, p) denotes a binomial random variable with j trials and success prob-
ability p, and the second inequality follows from a multiplicative chernoff bound
(note that the expectation of m˜+Bin(bτc − n, p) +Bin(1, (τ − bτc)p) is τp).
We are now ready to prove Theorem 39. The proof roughly works as follows:
By definition of iidRS(p), a simulator in the definition of zero-knowledge privacy
is able to obtain the aggregate information Sam(P \{t}, p). With Sam(P \{t}, p),
the simulator can easily compute San(Sam(P \ {t}, p)), which it can then use to
simulate the computation of the given adversary. It is not hard to see that the
simulation works if San(Sam(P , p)) ≈zk,δzk San(Sam(P \ {t}, p)) holds. Thus,
consider any population P and any individual t ∈ P . Recall that Lemma 40
protects the privacy of individuals that blend with many people in P , while Lemma
41 protects the privacy of individuals that blend with few people in P . Thus, if
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individual t blends with many people in P , we use Lemma 40; otherwise, we use
Lemma 41. It then follows that San(Sam(P , p)) ≈zk,δzk San(Sam(P \ {t}, p)), as
required. We now give the formal proof of Theorem 39.
Proof of Theorem 39. We first note that Sam(·, p) ∈ iidRS(p). Thus, we can let
T = Sam(·, p) in the definition of zero-knowledge privacy with respect to iidRS(p).
Let A be any adversary. We will describe how to construct a simulator S for A.
Let P be any population, t be any individual in P , and z ∈ {0, 1}∗. Since the
simulator S is given T (P \ {t}) = Sam(P \ {t}, p) and z as part of its input, S
can easily compute Sanzk(P \ {t}) = San(Sam(P \ {t}, p)) and then simulate the
computation of the adversary A that is given Sanzk(P \ {t}) and the auxiliary
information z; the simulator S then outputs whatever A outputs.
Now, we note that if Sanzk(P) ≈zk,δzk Sanzk(P \ {t}), then OutA(A(z) ↔
Sanzk(P)) ≈zk,δzk S(z, T (P \ {t}), |P|). Thus, to show that Sanzk is (zk, δzk)-
zero-knowledge private with respect to iidRS(p), it suffices to show that
Sanzk(P) ≈zk,δzk Sanzk(P \ {t}), i.e.,
San(Sam(P , p)) ≈zk,δzk San(Sam(P \ {t}, p)).
To this end, let A = {t′ ∈ P \ {t} : t′ ≈,San t} and n = |A|. Let τ = k−1p(2−p) .
We will consider two cases: n > τ and n ≤ τ .
Suppose n > τ . By Lemma 40, we have
San(Sam(P , p)) ≈1,δ1 San(Sam(P \ {t}, p)),
where 1 = ln(p · (2−p1−pe) + (1−p)) = zk and δ1 = e−Ω((n+1)p(1−p)
2) ≤ e−Ω(k·(1−p)2) =
δzk.
103
Now, suppose n ≤ τ . By Lemma 41, we have
San(Sam(P , p)) ≈2,δ2 San(Sam(P \ {t}, p)),
where 2 = ln(pe
 + (1− p)) ≤ 1 = zk and δ2 = pe−Ω(k·(1−p)2) ≤ δzk.
It follows that
San(Sam(P , p)) ≈zk,δzk San(Sam(P \ {t}, p)),
as required.
3.5.1 Our Main Theorem Extended to Robust Sampling
We now extend our main theorem to the case where the sampling probability is
not necessarily the same for everybody, but the sampling is still “robust” in the
sense that most individuals are sampled independently with probability in between
p and p′ (this probability can even depend on the individual’s data), where p and
p′ are relatively close to one another (i.e., p
′
p
is not too large), while the remaining
individuals are sampled independently with arbitrary probability.
We begin with some more notation. Given a population P and a function
pi : X → [0, 1], let Sam(P , pi) be the outcome of sampling each individual t in P
with probability pi(t) independently. We note that for Sam(P , pi), two individuals
in P with the same data value in X will have the same probability of being sampled.
However, we can easily modify the data universe X to include personal/unique
identifiers so that we can represent an individual by a unique data value in X.
Thus, for convenience, we now define a population to be a subset of the data
universe X instead of being a multiset of data values in X. Then, each individual
in a population would have a unique data value in X, so pi does not have to assign
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the same sampling probability to two different individuals. We now describe a
class of aggregation functions that we will use in the definition of zero-knowledge
privacy.
• iRS(p, p′, `) = independent random sampling with probability in between p
and p′ except for ` individuals: the class of algorithms T such that on input
a population P , T independently chooses each individual t ∈ P with some
probability pt ∈ [0, 1] (possibly dependent on t’s data), but all except for at
most ` individuals in P must be chosen with probability in {0} ∪ [p, p′]; T
then performs any computation on the chosen individuals’ data.
We now state the extended version of our main theorem.
Theorem 42 (Robust Sampling + Crowd-Blending Privacy ⇒ Zero-Knowledge
Privacy). Let San be any (k, )-crowd-blending private mechanism with k ≥ 2, let
0 < p ≤ p′ < 1, let pi : X → [0, 1] be any function, let ` = |{x ∈ X : pi(x) /∈
{0} ∪ [p, p′]}|, and let pmax = supx∈X pi(x). Suppose ` < k − 1.
Then, the algorithm Sanzk defined by Sanzk(P) = San(Sam(P , pi)) for any
population P is (zk, δzk)-zero-knowledge private with respect to iRS(p, p′, `), where
zk = ln
(
pmax ·
(
p′
p
(1− p)(2− p)
(1− p′)2 e

)
+ (1− pmax)
)
and
δzk = max
{
pmax
p
,
pmax
1− p′
}
e−Ω((k−`)·(1−p
′)2).
In the theorem, ` represents the number of individuals that are sampled with
probability outside of {0} ∪ [p, p′]. We prove the theorem by extending Lemmas
40 and 41 to the case of “robust” sampling. We first describe some of the main
changes to the lemmas and their proofs, and then we give the formal proof of
Theorem 42.
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Let us first consider Lemma 40, which protects the privacy of individuals that
blend with many people in the population. Like before, consider two scenarios,
one where individual t is in the population, and one where individual t has been
removed. Let m˜ denote the number of people in A that are sampled (recall that
A is a set of individuals that blend with individual t). Recall that in the proof
of Lemma 40, we had to show two properties: (1) m˜ is relatively smooth near its
expectation, and (2) the output of San in the first scenario conditioned on m˜ = m
(and t being sampled) is essentially the same as the output of San in the second
scenario conditioned on m˜ = m+ 1.
For the first property, we used the fact that the binomial distribution is rela-
tively smooth near its expectation. Here, since the sampling is no longer i.i.d. but
is still robust, we need the Poisson binomial distribution (the sum of independent
Bernoulli trials, where the success probabilities are not necessarily the same) to be
relatively smooth near its expectation. This can be shown as long as the success
probabilities are all relatively close to one another; this is ensured by changing the
lemma so that everyone in the set A is required to have a sampling probability in
[p, p′].
For the second property, we used the fact that when we condition on m˜ = m+1
in the second scenario, we are drawing m + 1 random samples from A (one at a
time) uniformly without replacement, and if we replace the (m + 1)th sample by
t, we get the first scenario conditioned on m˜ = m and t being sampled. This idea
still works in the new setting where the sampling probabilities are no longer the
same, since there is still a “draw-by-draw” selection procedure for drawing samples
from A (one at a time) in a way so that right after drawing the jth sample, the
distribution of samples we currently have is the same as if we have conditioned on
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m˜ = j (e.g., see Section 3 in [14]).
We now consider Lemma 41, which protects the privacy of individuals that
blend with few people in the population. The extension of Lemma 41 to robust
sampling redefines what is meant by “few people”, since even if an individual
blends with few people, many of them could be sampled with probability 1. With
this modification, the proof of the extended lemma is similar to the proof of the
original lemma.
When we prove the extended theorem using the extended lemmas, when we
are trying to show that privacy holds for individual t, we look at how many people
blend with t that are sampled with probability in [p, p′] (in particular, we exclude
the ` people that are sampled with probability outside of {0} ∪ [p, p′]); similar to
before, if this number is large, we use the extended version of Lemma 40; otherwise,
we use the extended version of Lemma 41.
We now give the formal proof of Theorem 42. We begin by proving a lemma
about the smoothness of the Poisson binomial distribution6 near its expectation,
which will be used later in the proof of Lemma 44.
Lemma 43 (Smoothness of the Poisson binomial distribution near its expecta-
tion). Let P be any population, 0 < p ≤ p′ < 1, pi : X → [0, 1] be any function,
and Sam > 0. Let A be any non-empty subset of P such that pi(a) ∈ [p, p′] for
every a ∈ A. Let D˜ = Sam(P , pi), m˜ = |D˜ ∩ A|, n = |A|, and p¯ = 1
n
∑
a∈A pi(a).
Then, for every integer m ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}, we have the following:
• If m+1 ≤ (n+1)p¯· eSam
p¯eSam+(1−p¯) , then Pr[m˜ = m] ≤ p
′
p
1−p
1−p′ e
Sam Pr[m˜ = m+1].
6The Poisson binomial distribution is the distribution of the sum of independent Bernoulli
random variables, where the success probabilities in the Bernoulli random variables are not
necessarily the same.
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• If m + 1 ≥ (n + 1)p¯ · 1
p¯+(1−p¯)eSam , then Pr[m˜ = m] ≥ pp′ 1−p
′
1−p e
−Sam Pr[m˜ =
m+ 1].
Proof. Fix m ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. Given an individual i in P , let pi = pi(i), and
let wi =
pi
1−pi . Given any set A
′ of individuals in P and any integer m′, let
Q(A′,m′) =
∑
B⊆A′,|B|=m′
∏
i∈B wi. Then, we have
Pr[m˜ = m]
Pr[m˜ = m+ 1]
=
∑
B⊆A,|B|=m(
∏
i∈B pi)(
∏
i∈A\B(1− pi))∑
B⊆A,|B|=m+1(
∏
i∈B pi)(
∏
i∈A\B(1− pi))
=
Q(A,m)
Q(A,m+ 1)
. (1)
We will show that for every j ∈ A,
∂
∂wj
(
Q(A,m)
Q(A,m+ 1)
)
≤ 0. (2)
Fix j ∈ A. We note that for any integer m′, we have ∂
∂wj
Q(A,m′) = Q(A \
{j},m′ − 1) and Q(A,m′) = Q(A \ {j},m′) + wjQ(A \ {j},m′ − 1). Then, we
observe that
∂
∂wj
(
Q(A,m)
Q(A,m+ 1)
)
=
Q(A,m+ 1) ·Q(A \ {j},m− 1)−Q(A,m) ·Q(A \ {j},m)
Q(A,m+ 1)2
.
Now, using the equalities Q(A,m+ 1) = Q(A \ {j},m+ 1) +wjQ(A \ {j},m) and
Q(A,m) = Q(A \ {j},m) + wjQ(A \ {j},m− 1), we get
∂
∂wj
(
Q(A,m)
Q(A,m+ 1)
)
=
Q(A \ {j},m+ 1) ·Q(A \ {j},m− 1)−Q(A \ {j},m) ·Q(A \ {j},m)
Q(A,m+ 1)2
. (3)
We will show that this expression is at most 0 by showing that the numerator
Q(A \ {j},m+ 1) ·Q(A \ {j},m− 1)−Q(A \ {j},m) ·Q(A \ {j},m) is at most 0.
If m = 0, then Q(A \ {j},m− 1) = 0, so the numerator is clearly at most 0. Thus,
we now assume m ≥ 1. Consider the full expansion of Q(A \ {j},m + 1) · Q(A \
{j},m− 1) and Q(A \ {j},m) ·Q(A \ {j},m). Each term of both expansions is of
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the form w2i1 · · ·w2irwj1 · · ·wjs , where the indices i1, . . . , ir, j1, . . . , js are all distinct,
and 2r + s = 2m. For example, a term w2i1 · · ·w2irwj1 · · ·wjs that appears in the
expansion of Q(A\{j},m+1)·Q(A\{j},m−1) is obtained if both Q(A\{j},m+1)
and Q(A \ {j},m − 1) choose wi1 , . . . , wir , Q(A \ {j},m + 1) chooses m + 1 − r
of the factors wj1 , . . . , wjs , and Q(A \ {j},m− 1) chooses the remaining factors in
wj1 , . . . , wjs .
Now, consider a term of the form w2i1 · · ·w2irwj1 · · ·wjs , where the indices
i1, . . . , ir, j1, . . . , js are all distinct, and 2r + s = 2m. It suffices to show
that the number of times this term appears in (the full expansion of) Q(A \
{j},m + 1) · Q(A \ {j},m − 1) is at most the number of times it appears in
Q(A \ {j},m) · Q(A \ {j},m). If r > m − 1, then this term appears 0 times in
Q(A \ {j},m + 1) · Q(A \ {j},m − 1), since Q(A \ {j},m − 1) needs to choose
more than m − 1 factors in wi1 , . . . , wir but it can only choose at most m − 1;
thus, the numerator in (3) is at most 0, as required. If r ≤ m − 1, then this
term appears
(
s
m+1−r
)
times in Q(A \ {j},m + 1) · Q(A \ {j},m − 1) and ( s
m−r
)
times in Q(A \ {j},m) ·Q(A \ {j},m). Now, we note that ( s
m+1−r
) ≤ ( s
m−r
)
, since
s = 2(m− r) and (2(m−r)
m+1−r
) ≤ (2(m−r)
m−r
)
, as required.
Now, from (1),(2), and the fact that pi(a) ∈ [p, p′] for every a ∈ A, it follows
that
Pr[m˜ = m]
Pr[m˜ = m+ 1]
=
Q(A,m)
Q(A,m+ 1)
≤
∑
B⊆A,|B|=m
∏
i∈B
p
1−p∑
B⊆A,|B|=m+1
∏
i∈B
p
1−p
=
1− p
p
m+ 1
n−m (4)
and
Pr[m˜ = m]
Pr[m˜ = m+ 1]
=
Q(A,m)
Q(A,m+ 1)
≥
∑
B⊆A,|B|=m
∏
i∈B
p′
1−p′∑
B⊆A,|B|=m+1
∏
i∈B
p′
1−p′
=
1− p′
p′
m+ 1
n−m. (5)
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If m+ 1 ≤ (n+ 1)p¯ · eSam
p¯eSam+(1−p¯) , then from (4) we have
Pr[m˜ = m]
Pr[m˜ = m+ 1]
≤ 1− p
p
m+ 1
n−m =
1− p
p
p¯
1− p¯
(
1− p¯
p¯
m+ 1
n−m
)
≤ p¯
p
1− p
1− p¯e
Sam
≤ p
′
p
1− p
1− p′ e
Sam .
If m+ 1 ≥ (n+ 1)p¯ · 1
p¯+(1−p¯)eSam , then from (5) we have
Pr[m˜ = m]
Pr[m˜ = m+ 1]
≥ 1− p
′
p′
m+ 1
n−m =
1− p′
p′
p¯
1− p¯
(
1− p¯
p¯
m+ 1
n−m
)
≥ p¯
p′
1− p′
1− p¯ e
−Sam
≥ p
p′
1− p′
1− p e
−Sam .
We now prove a lemma that essentially says that if an individual blends with
many people in the population, then the individual’s privacy is protected when we
robustly sample from the population and run San on the samples. This lemma is
essentially the extension of Lemma 40 to robust sampling.
Lemma 44 (Protection of individuals that blend with many people in the popu-
lation that have a good sampling probability). Let San be any mechanism, P be
any population, 0 < p ≤ p′ < 1, pi : X → [0, 1] be any function, and  ≥ 0. Let
t be any individual in P, and let A be any non-empty subset of P \ {t} such that
for every individual t′ ∈ A, we have t′ ≈,San t and pi(t′) ∈ [p, p′]. Let n = |A|,
pt = pi(t), and p¯ =
1
n
∑
t′∈A pi(t
′). Then, we have
San(Sam(P , pi)) ≈final,δfinal San(Sam(P \ {t}, pi)),
where final = ln(pt · (p′p (1−p)(2−p)(1−p′)2 e) + (1 − pt)) and δfinal = max{ptp , pt1−p′} ·
e−Ω((n+1)p¯(1−p¯)
2).
Proof. Let Sam > 0, D̂ = Sam(P , pi), D˜ = Sam(P \ {t}, pi), m˜ = |D˜ ∩ A|, and
Y ⊆ {0, 1}∗. Let E be the event that t is sampled when D̂ is chosen.
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We first show that for every m ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}, we have∣∣∣∣∣ln
(
Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y | m˜ = m]
Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y | m˜ = m+ 1]
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ . (1)
It is known that there exists a “draw-by-draw” selection procedure for drawing
samples from A (one at a time) such that right after drawing the jth sample, the
samples chosen so far has the same distribution as the conditional distribution of
Sam(A, pi) given |Sam(A, pi)| = j (e.g., see Section 3 in [14]). More formally, there
exists a vector of random variables (X1, . . . , Xn) jointly distributed over A
n such
that for every j ∈ [n], {X1, . . . , Xj} has the same distribution as the conditional
distribution of Sam(A, pi) given |Sam(A, pi)| = j.
Now, fix m ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}. Let Dm = Sam(P \ (A∪{t}), pi)∪{X1, . . . , Xm}.
Then, for every D ⊆ P , we have Pr[D˜ ∪ {t} = D | m˜ = m] = Pr[Dm ∪ {t} = D]
and Pr[D˜ = D | m˜ = m + 1] = Pr[Dm ∪ {Xm+1} = D]. Then, using the fact that
t′ ≈,San t for every individual t′ ∈ A, we have
Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y | m˜ = m] = Pr[San(Dm ∪ {t}) ∈ Y ]
≤ e Pr[San(Dm ∪ {Xm+1}) ∈ Y ] = e Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y | m˜ = m+ 1].
Similarly, we also have
Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y | m˜ = m+ 1] = Pr[San(Dm ∪ {Xm+1}) ∈ Y ]
≤ e Pr[San(Dm ∪ {t}) ∈ Y ] = e Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y | m˜ = m].
Thus, we have shown (1).
Now, we observe that
Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y ] = Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y | E] · Pr[E] + Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y | E] · Pr[E]
= Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y ] · pt + Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ] · (1− pt). (2)
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Let α = e
Sam
p¯eSam+(1−p¯) and β =
1
p¯+(1−p¯)eSam , and let δSam = max{Pr[m˜ + 1 >
(n+1)p¯ ·α],Pr[m˜ < (n+1)p¯ ·β]}. By Lemma 43 and (1) (and the fact that m = n
does not satisfy m+ 1 ≤ (n+ 1)p¯ · α), we have
Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y ]
≤
∑
m∈{0,...,n}
m+1≤(n+1)p¯·α
Pr[m˜ = m] · Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y | m˜ = m] + Pr[m˜+ 1 > (n+ 1)p¯ · α]
≤
∑
m∈{0,...,n}
m+1≤(n+1)p¯·α
p′
p
1− p
1− p′ e
Sam Pr[m˜ = m+ 1] · e Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y | m˜ = m+ 1] + δSam
≤ p
′
p
1− p
1− p′ e
+Sam Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ] + δSam (3)
and
Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y ]
≥
∑
m∈{0,...,n−1}
m+1≥(n+1)p¯·β
Pr[m˜ = m] · Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y | m˜ = m]
≥
∑
m∈{0,...,n−1}
m+1≥(n+1)p¯·β
p
p′
1− p′
1− p e
−Sam Pr[m˜ = m+ 1] · e− Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y | m˜ = m+ 1]
≥ ( p
p′
1− p′
1− p e
−(+Sam)) · (Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ]− Pr[m˜ < (n+ 1)p¯ · β])
≥ ( p
p′
1− p′
1− p e
−(+Sam)) · Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ]− ( p
p′
1− p′
1− p e
−(+Sam)) · δSam. (4)
Let total = ln(pt · (p′p 1−p1−p′ e+Sam) + (1− pt)). Now, combining (2) and (3), we have
Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y ] ≤ (pt · (p
′
p
1− p
1− p′ e
+Sam) + (1− pt)) Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ] + pt · δSam
= etotal Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ] + pt · δSam.
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Combining (2) and (4), we also have
Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y ]
≥ (pt · ( p
p′
1− p′
1− p e
−(+Sam)) + (1− pt)) Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ]− pt · ( p
p′
1− p′
1− p e
−(+Sam)) · δSam
=⇒ Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ]
≤ 1
pt · ( pp′ 1−p
′
1−p e
−(+Sam)) + (1− pt)
Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y ] +
p
p′
1−p′
1−p e
−(+Sam)
pt · ( pp′ 1−p
′
1−p e
−(+Sam)) + (1− pt)
pt · δSam
≤ (pt · (p
′
p
· 1− p
1− p′ · e
+Sam) + (1− pt)) Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y ] + pt · δSam
= etotal Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y ] + pt · δSam,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the function f(x) = 1
x
is convex
for x > 0. Thus, we have San(D̂) ≈total,pt·δSam San(D˜).
Now, we set Sam = ln(
2−p¯
1−p¯). Then, we have
total = ln(pt · (p
′
p
(1− p)(2− p¯)
(1− p′)(1− p¯)e
) + (1− pt)) ≤ ln(pt · (p
′
p
(1− p)(2− p)
(1− p′)2 e
) + (1− pt))
= final
and
pt · δSam
= pt ·max{Pr[m˜+ 1 > (n+ 1)p¯ · e
Sam
p¯eSam + (1− p¯) ],Pr[m˜ < (n+ 1)p¯ ·
1
p¯+ (1− p¯)eSam ]}
= pt ·max{Pr[m˜+ 1 > (n+ 1)p¯ · (2− p¯)],Pr[m˜ < (n+ 1)p¯ · 1
2
]}
≤ pt ·max{1
p¯
Pr[m˜+Bin(1, p¯) > (n+ 1)p¯ · (2− p¯)], 1
1− p¯ Pr[m˜+Bin(1, p¯) < (n+ 1)p¯ ·
1
2
]}
≤ pt ·max{1
p¯
e−Ω((n+1)p¯(1−p¯)
2),
1
1− p¯ e
−Ω((n+1)p¯)}
≤ max{pt
p
,
pt
1− p′ } · e
−Ω((n+1)p¯(1−p¯)2)
= δfinal,
where Bin(1, p¯) is a binomial random variable with 1 trial and success probability
p¯, and the second last inequality follows from multiplicative Chernoff bounds.
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We now show how pre-sampling combined with a crowd-blending private mech-
anism can protect the privacy of individuals who blend with few people in the pop-
ulation. The following lemma is essentially the extension of Lemma 41 to robust
sampling. This lemma is stated in a somewhat more general form that allows us
to use it to prove Theorem 42 later.
Lemma 45 (Protection of individuals that blend with few people in the popula-
tion). Let San be any (k, )-crowd-blending private mechanism with k ≥ 2, let P
be any population, and let pi : X → [0, 1] be any function. Let t be any individual
in P, and let A be any non-empty subset of P \ {t} such that for every individual
t′ ∈ A, we have t′ ≈,San t. Let n = |A|, s = |{t′ ∈ P \{t} : t′ ≈,San t and t′ /∈ A}|,
pt = pi(t), and p¯ =
1
n
∑
t′∈A pi(t
′). Then, if s < k − 1, p¯ > 0, and n ≤ k−s−1
p¯(2−p¯) , then
we have
San(Sam(P , pi)) ≈final,δfinal San(Sam(P \ {t}, pi))
where final = ln(pte
 + (1− pt)) and δfinal = pte−Ω((k−s)·(1−p¯)2).
Proof. Suppose s < k − 1, p¯ > 0, and n ≤ k−s−1
p¯(2−p¯) . Let D̂ = Sam(P , pi), D˜ =
Sam(P \ {t}, pi), and Y ⊆ {0, 1}∗. Let m˜ = |D˜ ∩ A|, and let E be the event that
individual t is in D̂ when D̂ is chosen. We first note that
Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y ] = Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y | E] · Pr[E] + Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y | E] · Pr[E]
= Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ] · (1− pt) + Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y ] · pt. (1)
We note that if m˜ < k−s−1, then t -blends with fewer than k people in D˜∪{t},
and since San is (k, )-crowd-blending private, we have
Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y | m˜ < k − s− 1] ≤ e Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y | m˜ < k − s− 1]
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and
Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y | m˜ < k − s− 1] ≥ e− Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y | m˜ < k − s− 1].
Then, we have
Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y ]
≤ Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y | m˜ < k − s− 1] Pr[m˜ < k − s− 1] + Pr[m˜ ≥ k − s− 1]
≤ e Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y | m˜ < k − s− 1] Pr[m˜ < k − s− 1] + Pr[m˜ ≥ k − s− 1]
≤ e Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ] + Pr[m˜ ≥ k − s− 1], (2)
and
Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y ] ≥ Pr[San(D˜ ∪ {t}) ∈ Y | m˜ < k − s− 1] Pr[m˜ < k − s− 1]
≥ e− Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y | m˜ < k − s− 1] Pr[m˜ < k − s− 1]
≥ e−(Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ]− Pr[m˜ ≥ k − s− 1])
= e− Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ]− e− Pr[m˜ ≥ k − s− 1]. (3)
Now, combining (1) and (2), we have
Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y ] ≤ (pte + (1− pt)) Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ] + pt Pr[m˜ ≥ k − s− 1]. (4)
Also, combining (1) and (3), we have
Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y ] ≥ (pte− + (1− pt)) Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ]− e−pt Pr[m˜ ≥ k − s− 1].
Rearranging this inequality, we get
Pr[San(D˜) ∈ Y ]
≤ 1
pte− + (1− pt) Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y ] +
e−
pte− + (1− pt)pt Pr[m˜ ≥ k − s− 1]
≤ (pte + (1− pt)) Pr[San(D̂) ∈ Y ] + pt Pr[m˜ ≥ k − s− 1], (5)
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where the last inequality follows from the fact that the function f(x) = 1
x
is convex
for x > 0, so 1
pte−+(1−pt) ≤ pte + (1− pt).
Let τ = k−s−1
p¯(2−p¯) . Then, we have n ≤ τ . The lemma now follows from (4), (5),
and the inequality
pt Pr[m˜ ≥ k − s− 1] = pt Pr[m˜ ≥ τ p¯ · (2− p¯)]
≤ pt Pr[m˜+Bin(bτc − n, p¯) +Bin(1, (τ − bτc)p¯) ≥ τ p¯ · (2− p¯)]
≤ pte−Ω(τ p¯(1−p¯)2)
≤ pte−Ω((k−s)(1−p¯)2),
where Bin(j, q) denotes a binomial random variable with j trials and success prob-
ability q, and the second inequality follows from a multiplicative Chernoff bound
(note that the expectation of m˜+B(bτc − n, p¯) +B(1, (τ − bτc)p¯) is τ p¯).
Using the new lemmas (Lemmas 44 and 45), we can now prove Theorem 42 in
a way similar to Theorem 39.
Proof of Theorem 42. We first note that Sam(·, pi) ∈ iRS(p, p′, l). Thus, we can
let T = Sam(·, pi) in the definition of zero-knowledge privacy with respect to
iRS(p, p′, l). Let A be any adversary. We will describe how to construct a simulator
S for A. Let P be any population, t be any individual in P , and z ∈ {0, 1}∗. Since
the simulator S is given T (P \ {t}) = Sam(P \ {t}, pi) and z as part of its input,
S can easily compute Sanzk(P \ {t}) = San(Sam(P \ {t}, pi)) and then simulate
the computation of the adversary A that is given Sanzk(P \{t}) and the auxiliary
input z; the simulator S then outputs whatever A outputs.
Now, we note that if Sanzk(P) ≈zk,δzk Sanzk(P \ {t}), then OutA(A(z) ↔
Sanzk(P)) ≈zk,δzk S(z, T (P \ {t}), |P|). Thus, to show that Sanzk is (zk, δzk)-
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zero-knowledge private with respect to iRS(p, p′, l), it suffices to show that
Sanzk(P) ≈zk,δzk Sanzk(P \ {t}), i.e.,
San(Sam(P , pi)) ≈zk,δzk San(Sam(P \ {t}, pi)).
To this end, let A = {t′ ∈ P \ {t} : t′ ≈,San t and pi(t′) ∈ [p, p′]}, n = |A|,
pt = pi(t), p¯ =
1
n
∑
t′∈A pi(t
′), and s = |{t′ ∈ P \ {t} : t′ ≈,San t and t′ /∈ A}|. It
is easy to see that without loss of generality, we can assume that P satisfies the
property that pi(t′) 6= 0 for every t′ ∈ P . We note that s ≤ l, which we use later in
some of the inequalities below. Let τ = k−s−1
p¯(2−p¯) . We will consider two cases: n > τ
and n ≤ τ .
Suppose n > τ . By Lemma 44, we have
San(Sam(P , pi)) ≈1,δ1 San(Sam(P \ {t}, pi)),
where 1 = ln(pt ·(p′p (1−p)(2−p)(1−p′)2 e)+(1−pt)) ≤ ln(pmax ·(p
′
p
(1−p)(2−p)
(1−p′)2 e
)+(1−pmax)) =
zk and δ1 = max{ptp , pt1−p′} · e−Ω((n+1)p¯(1−p¯)
2) ≤ max{pmax
p
, pmax
1−p′ } · e−Ω((k−l)(1−p
′)2) =
δzk.
Now, suppose n ≤ τ . By Lemma 45, we have
San(Sam(P , pi)) ≈2,δ2 San(Sam(P \ {t}, pi)),
where 2 = ln(pte
 + (1 − pt)) ≤ 1 ≤ zk and δ2 = pte−Ω((k−s)·(1−p¯)2) ≤
pmaxe
−Ω((k−l)·(1−p′)2) ≤ δzk.
It follows that
San(Sam(P , pi)) ≈zk,δzk San(Sam(P \ {t}, pi)),
as required.
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CHAPTER 4
OUTLIER PRIVACY
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present our work on tailored differential privacy and outlier
privacy. Let us now turn to formalizing our notion of outlier privacy. Towards
doing this, we first need to provide a mathematical definition of what if means for
an individual to be an outlier.
A New Mathematical Definition of “Outliers”. As mentioned above, intu-
itively, outliers are data points or records that are “far away” or “vastly different”
from the rest of the data. There are many existing methods of identifying outliers
(see [9] for a survey); for example, for a set of data points, an outlier can be de-
fined as a data point that is not within a certain distance of any other data point.
However, such methods are often problematic for high-dimensional data (which is
quite common), since the data points tend to be sparsely spaced and thus every
data point may be an outlier (e.g., see [63]). As far as we know, all of the existing
methods for identifying an outlier only look at the data itself and do not explicitly
consider the algorithm that will be run on the data. In contrast, similar to the
notion of differential privacy, we provide a definition of an outlier that depends
on the algorithm that operates on the data set. (Additionally, existing methods
of identifying outliers are also designed for some specific type of data (e.g., data
points in Rd); in contrast, we seek a method that works for any type of data.)
We aim to capture the intuition that a data record t in a data set is an outlier
if, “from the perspective of the algorithm”, the data record is not “equivalent”
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to sufficiently many data records in the data set. More formally, we say that a
data record t is equivalent to another data record t′ w.r.t. an algorithm A if A can
never distinguish t and t′—that is, for every data set D containing t, the output
distribution of the algorithm A does not change if we replace t by t′ in D. (For
instance, for computing a histogram, two individuals t and t′ are equivalent if they
correspond to the same bin in the histogram.) We now call a data record t a
k-outlier w.r.t. the data set D and the algorithm A if t is equivalent (w.r.t. A) to
at most k records in the data set. The parameter k quantifies to what extent the
data record is an outlier.
Defining Outlier Privacy. We now turn to (informally) defining our notion
of outlier privacy. Roughly speaking, (·)-outlier privacy requires that for every
data set D, every k > 0, and every k-outlier t in the data set D, t is guaranteed
“(k)-differential privacy protection”—that is, if we remove t from the data set,
the output distribution of the algorithm changes by at most (k), where the metric
used is the same as that in differential privacy.
To address the privacy issues illustrated in Example 2, let us first consider
(·)-outlier privacy for a specific “threshold” function (·), which is specified by
two parameters k and ; we refer to the resulting notion as (k, )-simple outlier
privacy. Roughly speaking, (k, )-simple outlier privacy requires /k-differential
privacy for k-outliers, but does not have any privacy requirements for the other
individuals. By requiring /k-differential privacy for k-outliers, (k, )-simple outlier
privacy provides “(k, )-group differential privacy protection” for each group of k-
outliers where the group size is at most k—that is, if we simultaneously remove
k or fewer k-outliers from the data set, the output distribution of the algorithm
changes by at most . (This fact follows from the observation that we can remove
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the k-outliers in the group one at a time, each time causing the output distribution
to change by at most /k; since the group size is bounded by k, the total change
in the output distribution is at most .)
Note that (100, )-simple outlier privacy suffices to protect the privacy of the
managers in Example 2. However, it does not protect the privacy of any of the
other individuals. A minimal privacy guarantee would be to require that the
managers’ privacy is guaranteed (as a group) and everyone else gets the “individ-
ual” differential privacy guarantee; that is, we seek an algorithm that satisfies both
(100, )-simple outlier privacy, and -differential privacy. Again, this can be viewed
as an instance of (·)-outlier privacy for a slightly different threshold function (·).
More precisely, our notion of (k, )-simple outlier differential privacy requires /k-
differential privacy for k-outliers and -differential privacy for the other individuals.
(k, )-simple outlier differential privacy provides just two separate levels of pri-
vacy protection. We may also consider a more general instance of (·)-outlier
privacy, which we refer to as staircase outlier privacy. In staircase outlier privacy,
there are ` thresholds k1 > . . . > k`, and `+1 privacy parameters 0 > . . . > `, and
we require that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ `, every ki-outlier is protected by i-differential
privacy; also, it is required that all the individuals are protected by 0-differential
privacy by default.
4.1.1 Our Results
Our central results consist of demonstrating efficient algorithms for releasing ac-
curate histograms that satisfy (·)-outlier privacy for various natural choices of
(·)—in particular, we consider, simple outlier privacy, simple outlier differential
120
privacy, staircase outlier privacy, and finally (·)-outlier privacy for a relatively
general choice of (·), and provide various (different) algorithms for releasing his-
tograms that achieve these notions. Additionally, we show that the weakest notion
of just simple outlier privacy (recall that this notion only protects outliers, and
requires no privacy protection for the other individuals)—which we demonstrate
can be achieved using particularly simple algorithms—actually already implies a
“distributional” notion of differential privacy, and thus also a distributional notion
of simple outlier differential privacy. Roughly speaking, the distributional notion
of differential privacy only requires the differential privacy property to hold if the
data set is drawn from some class of distributions. The class of distributions can
represent a set of possible distributions that contains the supposed “true distribu-
tion”, or the class can represent a set of possible beliefs an adversary may have
about the data set. In our result, we consider a large and natural class of dis-
tributions obtained by sampling from any population. Our class of distributions
includes quite general distributions/beliefs based on biased and imperfect sam-
pling from a population, in a setting where the adversary may even know whether
certain individuals were sampled or not.
Algorithms for Simple, Simple Differentially Private, and Staircase Out-
lier Privacy. Let us start by giving an example of a (k, )-simple outlier private
algorithm for releasing a histogram (recall that (k, )-simple outlier privacy re-
quires /k-differential privacy for all k-outliers, and no privacy for everyone else).
Consider an algorithm that computes a histogram but suppresses the counts for
all bins that have a count ≤ k. A data record t is a k-outlier if and only if its bin
has a count ≤ k, so by suppressing the counts of those bins to 0, we ensure that
output of the algorithm does not change if t is removed from the database. Simple
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outlier privacy may seem like a weak privacy guarantee—after all, the privacy of
non-outliers is not explicitly protected. However, we will show that simple outlier
privacy in fact implies a certain distributional notion of differential privacy, which
might provide sufficient privacy protection in many settings. Thus, simple outlier
privacy already implies a distributional notion of simple outlier differential privacy.
Let us now turn to directly designing simple outlier differentially private algo-
rithms. We are able to design a histogram algorithm that achieves (k, )-simple
outlier differential privacy. Roughly speaking, the algorithm first adds sufficient
noise to each bin to achieve -differential privacy; then, the algorithm goes through
each bin of the histogram, and if the bin has a noisy count that is less than k, the
algorithm adds sufficient noise to the bin to achieve /k-differential privacy. The
algorithm then outputs the resulting noisy histogram.
Finally, by generalizing the above approach, we can design a histogram algo-
rithm that achieves staircase outlier privacy. Roughly speaking, the algorithm first
adds sufficient noise to each bin to achieve 0-differential privacy; then, the algo-
rithm goes through each of the “levels (i.e., steps) of the staircase” starting from
the top, and if a bin currently has a noisy count that is at most the threshold
for the current level i, the algorithm adds sufficient noise to the bin to achieve
i-differential privacy. The algorithm then outputs the resulting noisy histogram.
Outlier Private Algorithms for General (·). We also provide histogram
algorithms that satisfy (·)-outlier privacy for a relatively general (·). Let us
provide some intuition for how the outlier private histogram algorithms work. The
standard -differentially private algorithm for releasing a histogram simply adds
(Laplace) Lap(1/) noise to each bin count independently. By adding Lap(1/)
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noise to each bin, when a data record t is removed from the data set, the output
distribution over noisy histograms only changes by at most  (w.r.t. the metric used
in differential privacy). To achieve (·)-outlier privacy, the output distribution can
only change by at most (k), where k is the count of t’s bin (t is the data record
that is removed). Thus, one may try adding Lap(1/(k)) noise to each bin, where
k is the count of the bin. However, this does not work, since the amount of noise
added depends on the count k in a way that is too sensitive. In particular, when
we remove t from the data set and the count of t’s bin decreases from k to k − 1,
the magnitude of the noise changes from 1/(k) to 1/(k − 1), which changes the
output distribution by more than (k).
One way to fix this problem is to add noise to the (·) function, so that the
1/(k) and the 1/(k − 1) become noisy and would be “′-close” for some ′ > 0.
To allow for a variety of solutions, we will consider using any algorithm A that
approximates (·) in a “differentially private” way—that is, A(k) ≈ A(k − 1) for
every k > 0. Then, we will add ≈ Lap(1/A(kb)) noise to each bin b, where kb is the
count for bin b. This works as long as the noise magnitude 1/A(kb) is large enough;
the noise magnitude 1/(kb) is large enough, but since A(kb) only approximates
(kb), A(kb) might be too large. Thus, we will also require that A(kb) is at most
(kb) with very high probability.
Comparison to Related Work. There are some similarities between simple
outlier privacy and the notion of crowd-blending privacy in [31]. Crowd-blending
privacy uses a notion of “-blend”, where  > 0, whereas in our definition of an
outlier, we use a notion of equivalence w.r.t. the algorithm, which corresponds to
-blend with  = 0. Also, in (k, )-simple outlier privacy, when removing a k-
outlier, the output distribution is only allowed to change by at most /k, whereas
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in (k, )-crowd-blending privacy, the output distribution is allowed to change by
at most . Our result that simple outlier privacy implies distributional differential
privacy is somewhat similar to the result in [31] that states that if one combines a
crowd-blending private algorithm with a natural pre-sampling step, the combined
algorithm is zero-knowledge private (which implies differential privacy; see [32])
if we view the population as the input data set to the combined algorithm. In
contrast, our result achieves a distributional notion of differential privacy on the
data set as opposed to the population, which is a different model and definition.
Our result that simple outlier privacy implies distributional differential privacy
also has some similarities to a result in [4], where it is shown that a histogram
algorithm that suppresses small counts achieves a notion of distributional differ-
ential privacy (slightly weaker than ours, since their definition permits choosing
a simulator, but in our definition, the simulator has to be the algorithm itself),
but for a class of distributions incomparable to the class we consider (the classes
are somewhat similar, but neither is a subset of the other). However, our class
of distributions includes distributions/beliefs based on biased and imperfect sam-
pling (from a population) in a setting where the adversary may even know whether
certain individuals were sampled or not; the class of distributions considered in [4]
does not consider such an adversarial setting. Also, we consider the class of simple
outlier private algorithms, which includes but is more general than just histogram
algorithms that suppress small counts.
Some Remarks on Outlier Privacy. Our notion of (·)-outlier privacy usually
does not satisfy composition; that is, if an algorithm A is A(·)-outlier private and
an algorithm B is B(·)-outlier private, the composition of A and B is usually
not (A + B)(·)-outlier private. This is due to the fact that a k-outlier w.r.t. the
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composition of A and B might not be a k-outlier w.r.t. A or B.
In our definition of (·)-outlier privacy, a k-outlier t is guaranteed “(k)-
differential privacy protection”—that is, if we remove t from the data set, the
output distribution of the algorithm only changes by at most (k). Note, however,
that this does not mean that if we replace t with any other individual t′, the output
distribution of the algorithm only changes by at most (k). In particular, if we
replace t with a “non-outlier” t′, then the output distribution may change more
significantly. More precisely, the only thing we can say about the change in the
output distribution is that it is bounded by (k) + (k′) if t is an k-outlier and t′
is an k′-outlier—this follows since removing t changes the output distribution by
at most (k), and adding t′ changes the output distribution by at most (k′).
Possible Future Directions and Additional Applications. Our results in
this chapter have focused mostly on histograms. To some extent, this is because
our notion of an outlier is very liberal, due to the fact that our notion of equiva-
lence between individuals is very strict (and thus it is “easier” to be classified as
an outlier). One can consider generalizing our definition of a k-outlier to a (k, ′)-
outlier, where the definition is the same except that (k, ′)-outlier uses ′-blending
(as in [31]) to define equivalence between individuals. If we are using a notion of
outlier privacy that guarantees at least 0-differential privacy for every individual,
then every individual would 20-blend with every other individual (by “transitiv-
ity”), so we should choose the blending parameter ′ to be smaller than 20. Using
the definition of a (k, ′)-outlier in our various notions of outlier privacy, one can
perhaps construct useful algorithms that satisfy these new notions of outlier pri-
vacy. For example, the algorithm in [31] for releasing synthetic data points would
satisfy our generalized notion of (k, , ′)-simple outlier privacy where the notion
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of a (k, ′)-outlier is used. We leave the exploration of these generalized notions of
outlier privacy for future work.
In the area of robust statistics, one of the main goals is to design statistical
methods and estimators that are not significantly affected by outliers. A simple
approach would be to first remove the outliers from the data set, and then apply
non-robust statistical methods to the remaining data set. In order to use this
approach, one needs a method of identifying outliers. Our mathematical definition
of an outlier, or a variant of it, can be used to remove outliers before running non-
robust statistical methods or algorithms on the data. Also, our notions of outlier
privacy can be adapted to define a notion of “outlier robustness” for statistical
computations. We leave the exploration of such ideas for future work.
4.2 Outlier Privacy
A data set is a finite multiset of data records, where a data record is simply an
element of some fixed set X, which we refer to as the data universe. Let D be the
set of all data sets. Given a data set D and data records t and t′, let D−t = D\{t}
and (D, t′) = D unionmulti {t′}. Given , δ ≥ 0 and two random variables (or distributions)
Z and Z ′, we shall write Z ≈,δ Z ′ to mean that for every Y ⊆ Supp(Z)∪Supp(Z ′),
we have
Pr[Z ∈ Y ] ≤ e Pr[Z ′ ∈ Y ] + δ
and
Pr[Z ′ ∈ Y ] ≤ e Pr[Z ∈ Y ] + δ.
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We shall also write Z ≈ Z ′ to mean Z ≈,0 Z ′. Differential privacy ([22, 19]) can
now be defined in the following manner:
Definition 46 ((, δ)-differential privacy [22, 19]). An algorithm M is said to be
(, δ)-differentially private if for every pair of data sets D and D′ differing in only
one data record, we have M(D) ≈,δM(D′).
Intuitively, differential privacy protects the privacy of each individual by re-
quiring the output distribution of the algorithm to not change much when an
individual’s data is added or removed from the data set. Achieving differential pri-
vacy often involves adding noise drawn from some distribution, usually the Laplace
distribution. We will use Lap(λ) to denote the Laplace distribution with mean 0
and scale λ, whose associated pdf is fλ(x) =
1
2λ
exp(− |x|
λ
). For convenience, we
will sometimes abuse notation and use Lap(λ) to denote a random variable that
has the Laplace distribution Lap(λ).
We now define our notion of tailored differential privacy as described in the
introduction. Roughly speaking, ((·), δ(·))-tailored differential privacy requires
that each individual t in the data set D is protected by ((t,D), δ(t,D))-differential
privacy, where (·) and δ(·) are functions that, on input a data record t and a data
set D, outputs privacy parameters (t,D) and δ(t,D) for t. Recall that X is the
set of possible data records, and D is the set of all data sets.
Definition 47 (tailored differential privacy). Let (·), δ(·) : X ×D → R≥0 ∪{∞}.
An algorithm M is said to be ((·), δ(·))-tailored differentially private if for every
data set D and every data record t ∈ D, we have M(D) ≈(t,D),δ(t,D) M(D \ {t}).
In this chapter, we focus on a specific instance of tailored differential privacy,
which we call outlier privacy. Outlier privacy tailors an individual’s privacy pa-
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rameter to the “outlierness” of the individual. Let us first describe our definition
of an outlier. In the definitions below, let M be any algorithm that takes a data
set as input. Roughly speaking, we say that a pair of data records t, t′ ∈ X are
equivalent w.r.t. M (or M-equivalent), denoted t ≡M t′, if the algorithm M can
never distinguish the two data records, regardless of the input data set.
Definition 48 (equivalent w.r.t. M, or M-equivalent). Given a pair of data
records t, t′ ∈ X, we say that t is equivalent to t′ w.r.t. M, or t is M-
equivalent to t′, denoted t ≡M t′, if for every data set D′ containing t, we have
M(D′) =M(D′−t, t′) (in distribution).
Using the definition of a pair of data records being equivalent w.r.t. an algorithm
M, we now define the notion of a k-outlier. Roughly speaking, a k-outlier is a data
record that is M-equivalent to at most k data records in the data set (including
itself).
Definition 49 (k-outlier). Given a data set D, a data record t ∈ D is said to
be a k-outlier in D w.r.t. M if there are at most k data records in D that are
equivalent to t w.r.t. M.
As the parameter k increases, the property of being a k-outlier becomes weaker
(i.e., easier to satisfy), and the set of k-outliers becomes larger. Using the definition
of a k-outlier, we now define our new notion of privacy called ((·), δ(·))-outlier
privacy. Roughly speaking, ((·), δ(·))-outlier privacy requires that for every k > 0
and every k-outlier t in the data set, t is protected by ((k), δ(k))-differential
privacy—that is, if we remove t from the data set, the output distribution of the
algorithm changes by at most ((k), δ(k)), where the metric used is the same as
that in (, δ)-differential privacy.
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Definition 50 (((·), δ(·))-outlier privacy). Let (·), δ(·) : N → R≥0 ∪ {∞}. An
algorithm M is said to be ((·), δ(·))-outlier private if for every data set D, every
k > 0, and every k-outlier t in D, we have M(D) ≈(k),δ(k) M(D \ {t}).
We will often write (·)-outlier private to mean ((·), δ(·))-outlier private with
δ(k) = 0 for every k. ((·), δ(·))-outlier privacy generalizes differential privacy by
allowing one to specify different levels of privacy protection for different individuals
based on how much of an outlier the individuals are. Intuitively, one may want to
provide greater privacy protection to outliers, since their privacy may be more at
risk. By setting (·) and δ(·) to be constants  and δ respectively, one recovers the
definition of (, δ)-differential privacy.
4.2.1 Simple Outlier Privacy
Let us first consider (·)-outlier privacy with a specific (·) function, together which
we call (k, )-simple outlier privacy. Roughly speaking, (k, )-simple outlier pri-
vacy requires /k-differential privacy for k-outliers, but does not have any privacy
requirements for the other individuals.
Definition 51 ((k, )-simple outlier privacy). Let k,  > 0. An algorithm M is
said to be (k, )-simple outlier private if for every data set D and every k-outlier
t in D, we have M(D) ≈/kM(D \ {t}).
(k, )-simple outlier privacy is equivalent to (·)-outlier privacy with the func-
tion (·) defined by (k′) = /k if k′ ≤ k, and (k′) = ∞ otherwise. By requiring
/k-differential privacy for k-outliers, (k, )-simple outlier privacy provides “(k, )-
group differential privacy protection” for each group of k-outliers where the group
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size is at most k—that is, if we simultaneously remove k or fewer k-outliers from
the data set, the output distribution of the algorithm changes by at most . (This
fact follows from the observation that we can remove the k-outliers in the group
one at a time, each time causing the output distribution to change by at most /k;
since the group size is bounded by k, the total change in the output distribution
is at most .) This privacy protection for groups of k-outliers can be particularly
useful when one needs to protect the privacy of a group of outliers. In some cases,
in order to protect the privacy of a single outlier, one needs to protect the privacy
of an entire group of outliers simultaneously. In such cases, ordinary differential
privacy may not be sufficient, like in Example 2 in the introduction. For complete-
ness, let us now formalize what we mean when we say that (k, )-simple outlier
privacy provides “(k, )-group differential privacy protection” for each group of
k-outliers where the group size is at most k.
Proposition 52. Let M be any algorithm that is (k, )-simple outlier private.
Then, for every data set D and every A ⊆ D of size at most k and consisting of
only k-outliers in D, we have M(D) ≈M(D \ A).
Proof. Let D be any data set, and let A ⊆ D be of size at most k and consisting
of only k-outliers in D. Let A = {t1, . . . , tr}, where r ≤ k. Now, for i = 0, . . . , r,
let D(i) = D \ {t1, . . . , ti}. We note that D(0) = D and D(r) = D \ A. Since M
is (k, )-simple outlier private and A only consists of k-outliers in D, and since
k-outliers in D remain as k-outliers after removing data records from D, we have
M(D(i)) ≈/k M(D(i+1)) for every 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1. Thus, we have M(D) ≈
M(D \ A), as required.
Let us now give some examples of simple outlier private algorithms. Our first
example is an algorithm that computes a histogram but suppresses the small counts
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to 0. Intuitively, data records in the same bin are equivalent w.r.t. M, while a
pair of data records belonging to separate bins are not equivalent w.r.t.M. Thus,
a data record is a k-outlier if and only if its bin has a count ≤ k, so to achieve
(k, 0)-simple outlier privacy, the algorithm “suppresses” the counts ≤ k to 0.
Example 13 (Simple Outlier Private Histogram with Suppression of Small
Counts). Let k > 0. LetM be an algorithm that, on input a data set D, computes
a histogram from D, and then for every bin count that is ≤ k, M “suppresses”
(i.e., changes) the bin count to 0. M then outputs the modified histogram.
Theorem 53. The above algorithm M is (k, 0)-simple outlier private.
Proof. Let D be any data set, and let t be any k-outlier in D. We note that t is
M-equivalent to precisely those records that belong in the same bin as t. Since
t is a k-outlier, there are at most k records in t’s bin. Thus, M will suppress t’s
bin count to 0. We observe that removing t from the data set (and thus from t’s
bin) will still result inM suppressing t’s bin count to 0. Thus,M is (k, 0)-simple
outlier private.
Instead of suppressing small counts to 0, one can add noise to the small counts
to achieve (k, )-simple outlier privacy.
Example 14 (Simple Outlier Private Histogram with Noise Added to Small
Counts). Let k > 0. LetM be an algorithm that, on input a data set D, computes
a histogram from D, and then for each bin count that is ≤ k, M adds Lap(k/)
noise to the bin count independently. M then outputs the modified histogram.
Theorem 54. The above algorithm M is (k, )-simple outlier private.
Proof. Let D be any data set, and let t be any k-outlier in D. We note that t is
M-equivalent to precisely those records that belong in the same bin as t. Since t
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is a k-outlier, there are at most k records in t’s bin. Thus, M will add Lap(k/)
noise to t’s bin count. We observe that removing t from the data set (and thus
from t’s bin) will still result inM adding Lap(k/) noise to t’s bin count; using the
pdf of Lap(k/) and performing some standard calculations for proving differential
privacy (e.g., see [22]), one can easily show that the noisy count of t’s bin after
removing t is /k-close (i.e., ≈/k) to the noisy count of t’s bin before removing t.
Thus, M is (k, )-simple outlier private.
The simple outlier private algorithms above also satisfy a distributional notion
of differential privacy for a large and natural class of distributions, since simple
outlier privacy implies such a distributional notion of differential privacy, which
we show in Section 4.3.
Relationship of Simple Outlier Privacy to Other Privacy Definitions.
Since (k, )-simple outlier privacy requires /k-differential privacy for k-outliers
(and no privacy guarantee for the other individuals), we see that /k-differential
privacy implies (k, )-simple outlier privacy.
Proposition 55. Let k,  > 0. If an algorithm M is /k-differentially private,
then it is (k, )-simple outlier private.
Proof. This follows immediately from the definition of /k-differential privacy and
(k, )-simple outlier privacy.
Although (k, )-simple outlier privacy can be obtained by achieving /k-
differential privacy, achieving /k-differential privacy normally requires substan-
tially more “noise” to be added. As demonstrated in the above examples, one can
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achieve better accuracy/utility with (k, )-simple outlier privacy because only the
k-outliers require /k-differential privacy.
In [31], a notion of a pair of data records “-blending with each other” is
used (in their notion of crowd-blending privacy), where it is required that the
algorithm cannot distinguish the two records by more than . More precisely, a
data record t -blends with t′ w.r.t.M if for every data set D′ containing t, we have
M(D′) ≈M(D′−t, t′). In this chapter, in our definition of equivalence w.r.t. M
and in our definition of a k-outlier, we require the “blending” to be perfect (i.e.,
 = 0), since for an (/2)-differentially private algorithm, every record -blends
with every other record, and thus there would be no outliers. Furthermore, by
setting  = 0, the “blends with” relation is an equivalence relation on the set of
all possible data records. For an algorithm releasing histograms, the equivalence
classes are precisely the bins of the histogram. In other words, a pair of data records
blend with one another if and only if they belong to the same bin. There are also
some similarities between simple outlier privacy and the notion of crowd-blending
privacy in [31], which we now recall.
Definition 56 (Crowd-blending privacy [31]). An algorithm M is (k, )-crowd-
blending private if for every data set D and every data record t ∈ D, at least one
of the following conditions hold:
• There are at least k data records in D that -blend with t.
• M(D) ≈M(D \ {t})
The first condition in crowd-blending privacy is roughly saying that t is not a
(k−1)-outlier, except that in the definition of (k−1)-outlier, the weaker notion of
-blending is used instead of 0-blend. In the second condition, when t is removed
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from D, the output distribution of M changes by at most , but in (k, )-simple
outlier privacy, the output distribution ofM is only allowed to change by at most
/k (for reasons we have explained above). We now formally show that simple
outlier privacy implies crowd-blending privacy.
Proposition 57. If an algorithm M is (k, )-simple outlier private, then it is
(k + 1, /k)-crowd-blending private.
Proof. Suppose an algorithm M is (k, )-simple outlier private. We will show
that M is also (k + 1, /k)-crowd-blending private. Let D be any data set, let
t ∈ D, and let A be the multiset of all data records t′ in D such that t′ ≡M t.
If A is of size at least k + 1, then the first property in (k + 1, )-crowd-blending
privacy holds. Otherwise, t is a k-outlier in D, so by the definition of (k, )-simple
outlier privacy, we have M(D) ≈/kM(D \ {t}), which is the second property in
(k + 1, /k)-crowd-blending privacy.
4.2.2 Simultaneously Achieving Simple Outlier Privacy
and Differential Privacy
Although (k, )-simple outlier privacy protects the privacy of k-outliers, there is
no privacy guarantee for the other individuals. Thus, we now consider a stronger
notion of outlier privacy that provides /k-differential privacy for k-outliers and
-differential privacy for everyone else. In other words, the stronger notion of
outlier privacy provides both (k, )-simple outlier privacy and -differential privacy.
We call this notion of outlier privacy simple outlier differential privacy. We first
generalize (k, )-simple outlier privacy to (k, , δ)-simple outlier privacy so that we
can define (k, , δ)-simple outlier differential privacy.
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Definition 58 ((k, , δ)-simple outlier privacy). Let k,  > 0. An algorithm M is
said to be (k, , δ)-simple outlier private if for every data set D and every k-outlier
t in D, we have M(D) ≈/k,δM(D \ {t}).
We now define (k, , δ)-simple outlier differential privacy.
Definition 59 ((k, , δ)-simple outlier differential privacy). Let k,  > 0. An algo-
rithmM is said to be (k, , δ)-simple outlier differentially private ifM is (k, , δ)-
simple outlier private and (, δ)-differentially private.
We will write (k, )-simple outlier differentially private to mean (k, , δ)-simple
outlier differentially private with δ = 0. In the definition of (k, , δ)-simple outlier
differential privacy, the same parameters  and δ are used for both the simple
outlier privacy requirement and the differential privacy requirement; however, one
can easily consider a more general definition where separate parameters are used
for the two requirements. (k, )-simple outlier differential privacy is equivalent to
(·)-outlier privacy with the function (·) defined by (k′) = /k if k′ ≤ k, and
(k′) =  otherwise. We now describe an algorithm for releasing histograms that
achieves simple outlier differential privacy.
Example 15 (Simple Outlier Differentially Private Histogram with Suppression
of Small Counts). Let k, α,  > 0. Let M be an algorithm that, on input a data
set D, computes a histogram from D, and then adds Lap(1/) noise to each bin
count independently. Then, for every new (noisy) bin count that is ≤ k+ α/,M
“suppresses” the bin count to 0. M then outputs the modified histogram.
Theorem 60. The above algorithm M is (k, , e−α/2)-simple outlier differentially
private.
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Proof. We first show that M is -differentially private. We note that M first
computes a noisy histogram using the standard -differentially private algorithm
for releasing a noisy histogram. After that, M does not look at the input data
set anymore, so the output of M is simply a post-processing of the output of an
-differentially private algorithm. Thus, M itself is -differentially private.
We now show that M is (k, 0, e−α/2)-simple outlier private. Let D be any
data set, and let t be any k-outlier in D. We need to show that M(D) ≈0,e−α/2
M(D \ {t}). It suffices to show that regardless of whether the data set is D or
D \ {t}, we have that with probability at least 1− e−α/2, M will suppress t’s bin
count to 0. This event occurs precisely when the new (noisy) count for t’s bin is
≤ k + α/. Since t is a k-outlier, there are at most k records in t’s bin (before
any noise is added), so the probability of this event is at least the probability that
Lap(1/) ≤ α/. One can easily verify that this latter event occurs with probability
at least 1− e−α/2, as required.
In the above example, instead of suppressing the noisy bin count to 0, the
algorithm M can add Lap(k/) noise to the noisy bin count. Let us now describe
such an algorithm more formally.
Example 16 (Simple Outlier Differentially Private Histogram with Noise Added
to Small Counts). Let k, α,  > 0. LetM be an algorithm that, on input a data set
D, computes a histogram from D, and then adds Lap(1/) noise to each bin count
independently. Then, for every new (noisy) bin count that is ≤ k + α/, M adds
Lap(k/) noise to the noisy bin count. M then outputs the modified histogram.
Theorem 61. The above algorithm M is (k, , e−α)-simple outlier differentially
private.
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Proof. We first show that M is -differentially private. We note that M first
computes a noisy histogram using the standard -differentially private algorithm
for releasing a noisy histogram. After that, M does not look at the input data
set anymore, so the output of M is simply a post-processing of the output of an
-differentially private algorithm. Thus, M itself is -differentially private.
We now show thatM is (k, , e−α)-simple outlier private. LetD be any data set,
and let t be any k-outlier in D. We need to show thatM(D) ≈/k,e−α M(D \{t}).
We first show that regardless of whether the data set is D or D \{t}, we have that
with probability at least 1 − e−α/2, the first noisy count for t’s bin is ≤ k + α/
(this is the condition that determines whether Lap(k/) noise will be further added
to the noisy bin count). Since t is a k-outlier, there are at most k records in t’s
bin (before any noise is added), so the probability of this event is at least the
probability that Lap(1/) ≤ α/. One can easily verify that this latter event
occurs with probability at least 1− e−α/2, as required.
Now, letM′ be the same asM except that for t’s bin, instead of checking the
condition that the first noisy count for t’s bin is ≤ k + α/, M′ simply pretends
that the condition is true. Then, we have M(D) ≈0,e−α/2 M′(D) and M(D \
{t}) ≈0,e−α/2 M′(D \ {t}). Thus, to show that M(D) ≈/k,e−α M(D \ {t}), it
suffices to show that M′(D) ≈/k M′(D \ {t}). Since M′ adds Lap(k/) noise
to t’s bin count, it is easy to show using standard calculations that M′(D) ≈/k
M′(D \ {t}), as required.
Revisiting the “Salaries of a Company’s Employees” Example. The
above simple outlier differentially private histogram algorithms can be used to
protect the privacy of the managers and the other employees in the example de-
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scribed in the introduction. As mentioned previously, one can also protect the
privacy of the managers by using a group differentially private algorithm for re-
leasing a histogram. For comparison, let us now describe the standard group
differentially private algorithm for releasing a histogram.
Example 17 (The Standard Group Differentially Private Histogram). Let k,  > 0.
LetM be an algorithm that, on input a data set D, computes a histogram from D,
and then adds Lap(k/) noise to each bin count independently. M then outputs
the modified histogram.
It is known that the algorithmM is (k, )-group differentially private (e.g., see
[22]).
As we can see, the standard group differentially private histogram algorithm
adds Lap(k/) noise to all the bins, including the bins with many individuals
in them. Our simple outlier differentially private algorithms suppress or add
≈ Lap(k/) noise (depending on which variant we are using) to only the bins
that contain outliers, and for the other bins, our algorithms only add Lap(1/)
noise, which is substantially less than Lap(k/) noise. Thus, in the “Salaries of a
Company’s Employees” example, our algorithms have much better accuracy.
4.2.3 Staircase Outlier Privacy
In simple outlier differential privacy, there are only two separate levels of privacy
protection: /k-differential privacy for k-outliers, and -differential privacy for ev-
eryone else. We can generalize this notion of outlier privacy to have more than
two levels of privacy protection. We call this generalized notion staircase outlier
privacy. In staircase outlier privacy, there are ` thresholds k1 > . . . > k`, and `+ 1
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privacy parameters 0 > . . . > `, and we require that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ `, every
ki-outlier is protected by (i, δ)-differential privacy; also, it is required that all the
individuals are protected by (0, δ)-differential privacy by default.
Definition 62 (Staircase Outlier Privacy). Let ` > 0, let k1 > . . . > k` > 0,
let ∞ ≥ 0 > 1 > . . . > ` ≥ 0, and let δ ≥ 0. An algorithm M is said to
be ((k1, . . . , k`), (0, . . . , `), δ)-staircase outlier private if M is (0, δ)-differentially
private, and for every data set D, every 1 ≤ i ≤ `, and every ki-outlier t in D, we
have M(D) ≈i,δM(D \ {t}).
We will write ((k1, . . . , k`), (0, . . . , `))-staircase outlier private to mean
((k1, . . . , k`), (0, . . . , `), δ)-staircase outlier private with δ = 0. In the above defini-
tion, a single δ parameter is used, but one can easily generalize the above definition
to allow for `+ 1 different levels of δ: δ0 > δ1 > . . . > δ`. Staircase outlier privacy
generalizes simple outlier privacy and simple outlier differential privacy: (k, )-
simple outlier privacy is equivalent to (k, (∞, /k))-staircase outlier privacy, and
(k, , δ)-simple outlier differential privacy is equivalent to (k, (, /k), δ)-staircase
outlier privacy. ((k1, . . . , k`), (0, . . . , `), δ)-staircase outlier privacy is equivalent
to ((·), δ)-outlier privacy with a “staircase” (·) : N→ R≥0∪{∞} function, where
(k) = 0 if k > k1, (k) = 1 if k2 < k ≤ k1, (k) = 2 if k3 < k ≤ k2, and so
forth. More formally, (·) is defined by (k) = j, where j is the smallest integer
such that k ≤ kj, and j = 0 if no such integer exists.
For convenience and simplicity, we will define x/0 = ∞ and x/∞ = 0 for any
real x > 0. Also, “adding Lap(∞) noise” to some value means suppressing (i.e.,
changing) the value to 0, and “adding Lap(0) noise” to some value means adding
no noise at all to the value, i.e., the value is left unmodified. Let us now describe a
histogram algorithm that achieves staircase outlier privacy. Roughly speaking, the
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algorithm first adds noise to each bin to achieve 0-differential privacy; then, the
algorithm goes through each of the “levels of the staircase” starting from the top,
and if a bin currently has a noisy count that is at most the threshold for that level,
the algorithm adds sufficient noise to the bin to achieve i-differential privacy. The
algorithm then outputs the resulting noisy histogram.
Example 18 (Staircase Outlier Private Algorithm for Releasing a Histogram).
Let ` > 0, let k1 > . . . > k` > 0, and let ∞ ≥ 0 > 1 > . . . > ` ≥ 0. Let α > 0,
and let M be an algorithm that, on input a data set D, computes a histogram
from D, and then adds Lap(1/0) noise to each bin count independently. Then,
for i = 1, . . . , `, M does the following: For every current noisy bin count that is
≤ ki + (α/0 + · · · + α/i−1), M adds Lap(1/i) noise to the current noisy bin
count. M then outputs the modified histogram.
Theorem 63. The above algorithm M is ((k1, . . . , k`), (0, . . . , `), `e−α)-staircase
outlier private.
Proof. We first show that M is 0-differentially private. We note that M first
computes a noisy histogram using the standard 0-differentially private algorithm
for releasing a noisy histogram. After that, M does not look at the input data
set anymore, so the output of M is simply a post-processing of the output of an
0-differentially private algorithm. Thus, M itself is 0-differentially private.
We now show that for every data set D, every 1 ≤ i ≤ `, and every ki-outlier t
in D, we have M(D) ≈i,`e−α M(D \ {t}). Let D be any data set, let 1 ≤ i ≤ `,
and let t be any ki-outlier in D. We need to show thatM(D) ≈i,`e−α M(D \{t}).
We first show that regardless of whether the data set is D or D \ {t}, we have
that with probability at least 1 − `e−α/2, it holds that at every iteration i′ ≤ i
in the algorithm M, the condition that the current noisy count for t’s bin is
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≤ ki′ + (α/0 + · · ·+α/i′−1) is true. We note that this holds if for i′ = 0, . . . , i−1,
the noise Lap(1/i′) added by M is ≤ α/i′ (note that the original true count
of t’s bin is ≤ ki′ , since t is a ki-outlier and ki ≤ ki′). One can easily verify
that each of these latter events occurs with probability at least 1 − e−α/2. Thus,
by the union bound, with probability at least 1 − `e−α/2, it holds that at every
iteration i′ ≤ i in the algorithm M, the condition that the noisy count for t’s bin
is ≤ ki′ + (α/0 + · · ·+ α/i′−1) is true.
Let M′ be the same as M except that for every iteration i′ ≤ i, instead of
checking the condition that the current noisy bin count for t’s bin is ≤ ki′ +
(α/0 + · · · + α/i′−1), M′ simply pretends that the condition is true. Then, we
haveM(D) ≈0,`e−α/2 M′(D) andM(D\{t}) ≈0,`e−α/2 M′(D\{t}). Thus, to show
that M(D) ≈i,`e−α M(D \ {t}), it suffices to show that M′(D) ≈i M′(D \ {t}).
Since M′ adds Lap(1/i) noise to t’s bin during iteration i, and since all the
computation afterwards can be viewed as post-processing, it is easy to show using
standard calculations that M′(D) ≈i M′(D \ {t}), as required.
In the above example, the algorithmM can be modified to output bits for each
bin b indicating at which iterations i noise was added to bin b. The privacy guaran-
tee (Theorem 63) and its proof would still be exactly the same, but by outputting
such information, a data analyst would know exactly what noise distributions were
added to the true count of each bin.
Analyzing the Accuracy/Utility of the Above AlgorithmM. Let us now
investigate the utility/accuracy of the above algorithm M. We note that M
processes each bin separately and independently, so we can simply analyze the
accuracy of a single bin b. Suppose the count of a bin b is exactly k. Let j be the
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smallest integer such that k ≤ kj, and j = 0 if no such integer exists. From the
proof of Theorem 63, it is not hard to see that with probability at least 1− `e−α,
it holds that at every iteration i = 1, . . . , j, the algorithmM adds Lap(1/i) noise
to bin b. This means that with probability at least 1− `e−α, M will add at least∑j
i=0 Lap(1/i) noise to bin b.
Let us now try to derive a probabilistic upper bound on the noise added to
bin b. Let us investigate whether noise will be added to bin b on a particular
iteration i′. We note that for iteration i = 1, . . . , i′ − 1, M adds either Lap(1/i)
noise or no noise to bin b, and with probability at least 1− e−α, this noise will not
decrease the current noisy count by more than α/i. Thus, by the union bound,
with probability at least 1 − `e−α, the noisy count at iteration i′ will be at least
k−(α/0 + · · ·+α/i′−1), and if this number is > ki′+(α/0 + · · ·+α/i′−1),M will
not add any noise to bin b at iteration i′. Let I be the set of i′ ∈ {1, . . . , `} such
that this inequality does not hold, i.e., k − (α/0 + · · · + α/i′−1) ≤ ki′ + (α/0 +
· · ·+ α/i′−1), which is equivalent to k ≤ ki′ + 2(α/0 + · · ·+ α/i′−1). Then, with
probability at least 1 − `e−α, the noise distributions added to bin b is a subset of
{i ∈ I : Lap(1/i)} ∪ {Lap(1/0)} (recall that Lap(1/0) noise is added to bin b at
the beginning by default).
Suppose j < `. If the ki’s are “well-spaced” and the i’s are not “too small”,
then we can show that with probability at least 1 − `e−α, M will add at most∑j+1
i=0 Lap(1/i) noise to bin b. More formally, suppose that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ `−1,
we have ki > ki+1 +2(α/0 +· · ·+α/i). Then, by the definition of j above, we have
k > ki for i = j+1, . . . , `, so k > ki+1 +2(α/0 + · · ·+α/i) for i = j+1, . . . , `−1,
which is equivalent to k > ki+2(α/0+· · ·+α/i−1) for i = j+2, . . . , `. This means
that for every j + 2 ≤ i ≤ `, we have i /∈ I, so with probability at least 1− `e−α,
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M will add at most ∑j+1i=0 Lap(1/i) noise to bin b, as required. We note that∑j+1
i=0 Lap(1/i) noise can be substantially lower than the Lap(1/`) noise added
by the standard `-differentially private algorithm for releasing a histogram.
4.2.4 Examples of Outlier Private Histogram Algorithms
for General (·), δ(·)
In this section, we provide some examples of outlier private histogram algorithms
for general (·) and δ(·) functions. Let us first provide some intuition for how the
outlier private histogram algorithms work. The standard -differentially private
algorithm for releasing a histogram simply adds Lap(1/) noise to each bin count
independently. By adding Lap(1/) noise to each bin, when a data record t is
removed from the data set, the output distribution over noisy histograms only
changes by at most  (w.r.t. the metric used in differential privacy). To achieve
(·)-outlier privacy, the output distribution over noisy histograms can only change
by at most (k), where k is the count of t’s bin (t is the data record that is removed).
Thus, one may try adding Lap(1/(k)) noise to each bin, where k is the count of
the bin. However, this does not work, since the amount of noise added depends on
the count k in a way that is too sensitive. In particular, when we remove t from
the data set and the count of t’s bin decreases from k to k − 1, the magnitude of
the noise changes from 1/(k) to 1/(k−1), which changes the output distribution
over noisy histograms by more than (k).
One way to fix this problem is to add noise to the (·) function, so that the
1/(k) and the 1/(k − 1) become noisy and would be “′-close” for some ′ > 0.
To allow for a variety of solutions, we will consider using any algorithm A that
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approximates (·) in a “differentially private” way—that is, A(k) ≈ A(k − 1) for
every k > 0. Then, we will add ≈ Lap(1/A(kb)) noise to each bin b, where kb is the
count for bin b. This works as long as the noise magnitude 1/A(kb) is large enough;
the noise magnitude 1/(kb) is large enough, but since A(kb) only approximates
(kb), A(kb) might be too large. Thus, we will also require that A(k) is at most
(k) with very high probability. Below, instead of adding Laplace noise to each
bin, we consider a general algorithm B that outputs a noisy count, and satisfies
B(k, ′) ≈′ B(k − 1, ′) for every k > 0 and ′ ≥ 0, which is the property we
need; adding Laplace noise satisfies this property. For generality, we also add a
δ(·) parameter and consider ((·), δ(·))-outlier privacy. Let us now describe the
required properties for A.
Definition 64 (Differentially private lower bound for ((·), δ(·))). Let (·), δ(·) :
N → R≥0 ∪ {∞} be functions. An algorithm A is said to be an (A, δA, δ′A)-
differentially private lower bound for ((·), δ(·)) if A takes an integer k ≥ 0 as
input and satisfies the following properties:
• A(k) ≈A,δA A(k − 1) for every integer k > 0.
• For every k ∈ N, with probability at least 1−δ′A, A(k) outputs an (total, δtotal)
satisfying A ≤ total ≤ (k) and δA + δ′A ≤ δtotal ≤ δ(k).
We now describe our outlier private histogram algorithm for general (·) and
δ(·) functions.
Example 19 (Outlier Private Histogram Algorithm for General (·), δ(·)). Let
(·), δ(·) : N → R≥0 ∪ {∞} be monotone functions. Let A be any (A, δA, δ′A)-
differentially private lower bound for ((·), δ(·)), and suppose that (·) and δ(·) are
bounded from below by A and δA + δ′A respectively, i.e., (k) ≥ A and δ(k) ≥
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δA + δ′A for every k ∈ N. Let B be any algorithm that satisfies B(k, ′, δ′) ≈′,δ′
B(k − 1, ′, δ′) for every integer k > 0, every ′, δ′ ≥ 0.
Let M be an algorithm that, on input a data set D, computes a histogram
from D, and then does the following for each bin b independently: Let kb be
the count for bin b. M runs A(kb) to get its output (total, δtotal), and then runs
B(kb, total− A, δtotal− δA− δ′A) and uses its output to replace the count kb for bin
b. After going through all the bins, M outputs the modified histogram (and the
output (total, δtotal) of A(kb) for each bin b, if this is desired).
Theorem 65 (Outlier Private Histogram Algorithm for General (·), δ(·)). The
above algorithm M is ((·), δ(·))-outlier private.
Proof. Let D be any data set, let k > 0, and let t be any k-outlier in D. We
need to show that M(D) ≈(k),δ(k) M(D \ {t}). We note that t is equivalent to
(w.r.t. M) with precisely those records that belong to the same bin as t, so k is
an upper bound on the count for t’s bin. Since (·) and δ(·) are monotone, we can
assume without loss of generality that k is equal to the count for t’s bin. Now,
consider removing t from the data set D; the count for t’s bin decreases by 1,
but the counts of the other bins remain the same. Since M processes each bin
separately and independently, it suffices to show that
B(k, total,k − A, δtotal,k − δA − δ′A) ≈(k),δ(k) B(k − 1, total,k−1 − A, δtotal,k−1 − δA − δ′A),
(1)
where (total,k, δtotal,k) ∼ A(k) and (total,k−1, δtotal,k−1) ∼ A(k− 1). By definition of
A, we have A(k) ≈A,δA A(k − 1), so (total,k, δtotal,k) ≈A,δA (total,k−1, δtotal,k−1), so
B(k, total,k − A, δtotal,k − δA − δ′A) ≈A,δA B(k, total,k−1 − A, δtotal,k−1 − δA − δ′A).
(2)
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By definition of B, we have B(k, ′, δ′) ≈′,δ′ B(k − 1, ′, δ′) for every ′, δ′ ≥ 0,
and by definition of A, with probability at least 1 − δ′A, A(k − 1) outputs an
(total,k−1, δtotal,k−1) satisfying A ≤ total,k−1 ≤ (k − 1) and δA + δ′A ≤ δtotal,k−1 ≤
δ(k − 1), so
B(k, total,k−1 − A, δtotal,k−1 − δA − δ′A)
≈(k−1)−A,δ(k−1)−δA B(k − 1, total,k−1 − A, δtotal,k−1 − δA − δ′A). (3)
Now, combining (2) and (3) and noting that (k − 1) ≤ (k) and δ(k − 1) ≤ δ(k)
(since (·) and δ(·) are monotone), we get (1), as required.
A typical choice for the algorithm B in the above example is the algorithm that
adds Laplace noise: The algorithm B, on input k ≥ 0 and ′, δ′ ≥ 0, adds Lap(1/′)
noise to k and then outputs the modified (noisy) k. Let us now give some examples
of the algorithm A:
• Adding noise to k and then computing (·) on the noisy k: Let A, α > 0,
and suppose that (·) and δ(·) are bounded from below by A and e−α/2,
respectively. Let A be an algorithm that, on input k ≥ 0, samples λ ∼
Lap(1/A), lets k′ = max{bk+λ−α/Ac, 0}, and then outputs ((k′), e−α/2).
Then, A is an (A, 0, e−α/2)-differentially private lower bound for ((·), δ(·)).
• Adding noise to (k) calibrated to global sensitivity of (·): Let A, α > 0,
and suppose that (·) and δ(·) are bounded from below by A and e−α/2,
respectively. Let ∆() = supk′∈Z>0 |(k′)−(k′−1)|, and suppose that ∆() <
∞. Let A be an algorithm that, on input k ≥ 0, samples λ ∼ Lap(∆()/A),
and then outputs (max {(k) + λ− α∆()/A, A} , e−α/2). Then, A is an
(A, 0, e−α/2)-differentially private lower bound for ((·), δ(·)).
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• Adding noise to (k) calibrated to smooth sensitivity of (·): Let A, α > 0,
and suppose that (·) and δ(·) are bounded from below by A and δA+e−α/2,
respectively. Let δA ∈ (0, 1), and let 0 ≤ β ≤ A2 ln(2/δA) . Let S∗,β(k) =
supk′∈Z>0(|(k)− (k′)| · e−β|k−k
′|), and suppose that S∗,β(k) <∞ for every k.
Let A be an algorithm that, on input k ≥ 0, samples λ ∼ Lap(2S∗(k)/A),
and then outputs (max{(k)+λ−2αS∗,β(k)/A, A}, δA+e−α/2). Then, A is
an (A, δA, e−α/2)-differentially private lower bound for ((·), δ(·)) (see [65]).
• Adding noise to the “noise magnitude function” 1/(·), calibrated to global
sensitivity of 1/(·): Let A, α > 0, and suppose that (·) and δ(·) are bounded
from below by A and e−α/2, respectively. Let ∆(1/) = supk′∈Z>0 |1/(k′)−
1/(k′ − 1)|, and suppose that ∆(1/) < ∞. Let A be an algorithm
that, on input k ≥ 0, samples λ ∼ Lap(∆(1/)/A), and then outputs(
max
{
1
max{1/(k)+λ−α∆(1/)/A,0} , A
}
, e−α/2
)
. Then, A is an (A, 0, e−α/2)-
differentially private lower bound for ((·), δ(·)).
• Adding noise to the “noise magnitude function” 1/(·), calibrated to smooth
sensitivity of 1/(·): Let A, α > 0, and suppose that (·) and δ(·) are
bounded from below by A and δA + e−α/2, respectively. Let δA ∈ (0, 1),
and let 0 ≤ β ≤ A
2 ln(2/δA)
. Let S∗1/,β(k) = supk′∈Z>0(|1/(k) − 1/(k′)| ·
e−β|k−k
′|), and suppose that S∗1/,β(k) < ∞ for every k. Let A be an al-
gorithm that, on input k ≥ 0, samples λ ∼ Lap(2S∗(k)/A), and then
outputs
(
max
{
1
max{1/(k)+λ−2αS∗(k)/A,0} , A
}
, δA + e−α/2
)
. Then, A is an
(A, δA, e−α/2)-differentially private lower bound for ((·), δ(·)) (see [65]).
In the above example, the algorithmM can also release the output (total, δtotal)
of A(kb) for each bin b. By releasing this extra information, a data analyst would
know exactly what noise distribution was added to the true count of each bin.
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Analyzing the Accuracy/Utility of the Above AlgorithmM. Let us now
investigate the utility/accuracy of the above algorithm M. We note that M
processes each bin separately and independently, so we can simply analyze the
accuracy of a single bin b. Suppose the count of a bin b is exactly k. For simplicity,
we will assume that B is the algorithm described above that adds Laplace noise.
Let us now consider the various algorithms for A described above. All of the
algorithms involve adding Laplace noise to some value that is used in determining
the total outputted by A. By using the cdf of the Laplace distribution, one can
obtain a probabilistic upper bound on the amount of noise added, which gives a
probabilistic lower bound on total. Since the algorithm B adds Lap( 1total−A ) to
bin b, we can obtain a probabilistic upper bound on the amount of noise added to
bin b. If we apply this analysis to each of the above algorithms for A, we get the
following results:
• Adding noise to k and then computing (·) on the noisy k: With probability
at least 1 − e−α, the amount of noise added to bin b is at most Lap(1/′),
where ′ = (max{bk − 2α/Ac, 0})− A.
• Adding noise to (k) calibrated to global sensitivity of (·): With probability
at least 1 − e−α, the amount of noise added to bin b is at most Lap(1/′),
where ′ = max {(k)− 2α∆()/A − A, 0}.
• Adding noise to (k) calibrated to smooth sensitivity of (·): With probability
at least 1 − e−α, the amount of noise added to bin b is at most Lap(1/′),
where ′ = max{(k)− 4αS∗,β(k)/A − A, 0}.
• Adding noise to the “noise magnitude function” 1/(·), calibrated to
global sensitivity of 1/(·): With probability at least 1 − e−α, the
amount of noise added to bin b is at most Lap(1/′), where ′ =
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max
{
1
max{1/(k)−2α∆(1/)/A,0} − A, 0
}
.
• Adding noise to the “noise magnitude function” 1/(·), calibrated to
smooth sensitivity of 1/(·): With probability at least 1 − e−α, the
amount of noise added to bin b is at most Lap(1/′), where ′ =
max
{
1
max{1/(k)−4αS∗,β(k)/A,0}
− A, 0
}
.
We note that the amount of noise added in the above algorithms can be substan-
tially lower than the Lap(1/(1)) noise added by the standard (1)-differentially
private algorithm for releasing a histogram.
4.2.5 Comparing the Staircase Algorithm and the Algo-
rithms for General (·), δ(·)
Suppose we want to release a histogram while satisfying ((·), δ)-outlier privacy
for some monotone function (·) and some small δ > 0. If (·) only takes on a
small number of possible values, then (·) is a “staircase” (i.e., piecewise constant)
function, so we may want to use the staircase outlier private algorithm for releasing
a histogram. If (·) takes on infinitely many possible values, then the staircase
algorithm cannot even be used. If (·) takes on a large but finite number of possible
values, the staircase algorithm can still be used, but the amount of noise added to
each bin may be too large. This is because the staircase algorithm goes through
all the “levels of the staircase” starting from the top, each time adding noise if the
current noisy count is less than the top boundary of the level. For bins with a low
true count, a lot of noise is added.
For (·) functions that take on infinitely many or a large number of possible
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values, one would want to use our outlier private algorithm for a general (·). For
example, consider the function (k) = k0 for some small constant 0 > 0. Such a
function has global sensitivity ∆((·)) := supk′∈Z>0 |(k′) − (k′ − 1)| = 0, which
is small. Thus, we can use our general outlier private histogram algorithm and
choose A to be the algorithm described above that adds noise to (k) calibrated
to the global sensitivity of (·). If (·) has high global sensitivity but low “local
sensitivity” for most input values, then one can choose A to be the algorithm
described above that adds noise to (k) calibrated to the smooth sensitivity (see
[65]) of (·). Recall that we allow (·) to take on the value∞ (usually for sufficiently
high inputs k), meaning that there is no privacy requirement. If (·) does take on
the value ∞, then both the global sensitivity and the smooth sensitivity of (·)
would be ∞, which is not allowed. In such cases, we may want to choose A to
be one of the algorithms described above that add noise to the “noise magnitude
function” 1/(·) instead of (·). (Recall that we define 1/∞ to be equal to 0.)
Alternatively, we can choose A to be the algorithm that adds noise to k and then
computes (·) on the noisy k.
We note that for our outlier private algorithm for general (·), the function
(·) needs to be bounded from below by some constant A > 0. This is because
running the algorithm A results in “A-privacy loss”. Our staircase algorithm does
not have this restriction; the staircase algorithm works even if the lowest level has
an  requirement of 0, in which case the staircase algorithm suppresses counts in
the lowest level to 0 with very high probability.
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4.3 Simultaneously Achieving Simple Outlier Privacy and
Distributional Differential Privacy
In this section, we show that simple outlier privacy implies a certain notion of
distributional differential privacy, very similar to the one in [4]. Let us first state
the definition of distributional differential privacy w.r.t. a set of distributions over
data sets. Let Φ be any set of distributions over data sets.
Definition 66 (Distributional differential privacy w.r.t. Φ). An algorithm M is
said to be (, δ)-differentially private w.r.t. Φ if for every distribution φ ∈ Φ and
every t ∈ ⋃Supp(φ), if we let D ∼ φ, then
M(D)|t∈D ≈,δM(D \ {t})|t∈D.
The definition in [4] is slightly weaker than ours, since their definition permits
choosing a simulator that is used instead of M on the right hand side of the
≈,δ, but in our definition, the simulator has to be the algorithm M itself. The
set of distributions Φ can represent a set of possible distributions that contains
the supposed “true distribution”, or Φ can represent a set of possible beliefs an
adversary may have about the data set (see [4] for more information). We will
consider a very large and natural class of distributions that even includes relatively
“adversarial” beliefs. Let us now describe our class of distributions.
We begin with some necessary terminology and notation. A population is a col-
lection of individuals each holding a data record. For simplicity and convenience,
we will not distinguish between an individual and the data record the individual
holds; thus, an individual is simply a data record, and a population is simply a
multiset of data records. Given a population P and a function pi : P → [0, 1], let
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Sam(P , pi) be the distribution over data sets obtained by sampling each individ-
ual t in the population P with probability pi(t) independently. We note that for
Sam(P , pi), two individuals in P with the same data record will have the same
probability of being sampled. However, we can easily modify the data universe X
to include personal/unique identifiers so that we can represent an individual by a
unique data record in X.
Let RS(p, p′, `) be the convex hull of the set of all distributions Sam(P , pi),
where P is any population, and pi : P → [0, 1] is any function such that |{t ∈
P : pi(t) /∈ [p, p′] ∪ {0}}| ≤ `, i.e., for every individual t in P except for at most
` individuals, pi assigns to t some probability in [p, p′] ∪ {0}. Such distributions
Sam(P , pi) represent sampling from the population P in a very natural way, where
most/all individuals are sampled with probability in between p and p′ (inclusive) or
with probability 0. We allow at most ` individuals to be sampled with probability
outside this range, to model the fact that an adversary may know whether certain
individuals were sampled or not. The set RS(p, p′, `) includes all such natural ways
of sampling from a population, and also captures a large class of possible beliefs
an adversary may have about the data set. (In fact, RS(p, p′, `) is the convex hull
of such a large set of distributions.)
Let us now state our theorem that says that simple outlier privacy implies
distributional differential privacy w.r.t. RS(p, p′, `).
Theorem 67. Let M be any (k, )-simple outlier private algorithm with k ≥ 2,
let 0 < p ≤ p′ < 1, and let 0 ≤ ` < k − 1. Then, for every 0 < Sam ≤ ln 2, M is
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also (k, DP , δDP )-distributional differentially private w.r.t. RS(p, p
′, `), where
DP = max
{

k
, ln
(
p′
p
1− p
1− p′
)
+ Sam
}
and
δDP = max
{
1
p
,
1
1− p′
}
e−Ω((k−`)·(1−p
′)2·Sam2).
Remark. In Theorem 67, it suffices for M to be (k, , ′)-simple outlier pri-
vate, which is the same as (k, )-simple outlier private except that the notion
of equivalence is replaced by the notion of ′-blends. The proof would be al-
most exactly the same, but the DP parameter we achieve would be DP =
max
{

k
, ln
(
p′
p
1−p
1−p′
)
+ Sam + 
′
}
instead (the δDP parameter remains the same).
The reason we start off with a (k, )-simple outlier private algorithm is that, as mo-
tivated in the introduction, we want an algorithm that satisfies both (k, )-simple
outlier privacy and some notion of (distributional) differential privacy.
Before we prove Theorem 67, let us make some remarks. Our result (Theorem
67) is somewhat similar to the result in [31] that states that if one combines a
crowd-blending private algorithm with a natural pre-sampling step, the combined
algorithm is zero-knowledge private (which implies differential privacy) if we view
the population as the input data set to the combined algorithm. In contrast, our
result achieves a distributional notion of differential privacy on the data set as
opposed to the population, which is a different model and definition. For example,
one difference is that in distributional differential privacy, the individual t whose
privacy we need to protect is guaranteed to be sampled, but in the model of [31],
the individual t in the population might not even be sampled at all, in which case
t’s privacy is already protected. This leads to differences in the privacy parameters
we can achieve.
Our result also has some similarities to a result in [4], where it is shown that
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a histogram algorithm that suppresses small counts achieves a notion of distribu-
tional differential privacy (described above), but for a class of distributions incom-
parable to the class we consider (the classes are somewhat similar, but neither
is a subset of the other). However, our class of distributions includes distribu-
tions/beliefs based on biased and imperfect sampling in a setting where the adver-
sary may even know whether certain individuals were sampled or not; the class of
distributions considered in [4] does not consider such an adversarial setting. Also,
we consider the class of simple outlier private algorithms, which includes but is
more general than just histogram algorithms that suppress small counts.
Let us now prove Theorem 67. We begin by stating a lemma about the smooth-
ness of the Poisson binomial distribution1 near its expectation, which has appeared
in [31], and will be used later in the proof of Lemma 69.
Lemma 68 (Smoothness of the Poisson binomial distribution near its expecta-
tion). Let P be any population, 0 < p ≤ p′ < 1, pi : P → [0, 1] be any function, and
Sam > 0. Let A be any non-empty (multi)subset of P such that pi(a) ∈ [p, p′] for
every a ∈ A. Let D˜ = Sam(P , pi), m˜ = |D˜ ∩ A|, n = |A|, and p¯ = 1
n
∑
a∈A pi(a).
Then, for every integer m ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}, we have the following:
• If m+1 ≤ (n+1)p¯· eSam
p¯eSam+(1−p¯) , then Pr[m˜ = m] ≤ p
′
p
1−p
1−p′ e
Sam Pr[m˜ = m+1].
• If m + 1 ≥ (n + 1)p¯ · 1
p¯+(1−p¯)eSam , then Pr[m˜ = m] ≥ pp′ 1−p
′
1−p e
−Sam Pr[m˜ =
m+ 1].
The proof of Lemma 68 can be found in the full version of [31]. We now prove
a lemma that roughly says that if an individual is M-equivalent to many people
1The Poisson binomial distribution is the distribution of the sum of independent Bernoulli
random variables, where the success probabilities in the Bernoulli random variables are not
necessarily the same.
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in the population, then the individual’s privacy is protected.
Lemma 69. Let M be any algorithm, P be any population, 0 < p ≤ p′ < 1, and
pi : P → [0, 1] be any function. Let t ∈ P, and let A ⊆ P \{t} such that A 6= ∅ and
for every t′ ∈ A, t′ ≡M t and pi(t′) ∈ [p, p′]. Let n = |A| and p¯ = 1n
∑
t′∈A pi(t
′).
Then, for every 0 < Sam ≤ ln 2, we have
M(Sam(P \ {t}, pi) unionmulti {t}) ≈total,δtotal M(Sam(P \ {t}, pi)),
where total = ln
(
p′
p
1−p
1−p′
)
+ Sam and δtotal = max
{
1
p¯
, 1
1−p¯
}
· e−Ω((n+1)p¯·(1−p¯)2·Sam2).
Proof. Let 0 < Sam ≤ ln 2, D˜ = Sam(P \ {t}, pi), m˜ = |D˜ ∩ A|, and Y ⊆
Range(M). We first show that for every m ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}, we have
M(D˜ unionmulti {t})|m˜=m =M(D˜)|m˜=m+1. (1)
It is known that there exists a “draw-by-draw” selection procedure for drawing
samples from A (one at a time) such that right after drawing the jth sample, the
samples chosen so far has the same distribution as Sam(A, pi)||Sam(A,pi)|=j (e.g.,
see Section 3 in [14]). More formally, there exists a vector of random variables
(X1, . . . , Xn) jointly distributed over A
n such that for every j ∈ [n], {X1, . . . , Xj}
has the same distribution as Sam(A, pi)||Sam(A,pi)|=j. Now, fix m ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}.
Then, we have (D˜ unionmulti {t})|m˜=m = Sam(P \ (A unionmulti {t}), pi) unionmulti {X1, . . . , Xm} unionmulti {t}
and D˜|m˜=m+1 = Sam(P \ (A unionmulti {t}), pi) unionmulti {X1, . . . , Xm} unionmulti {Xm+1}. The condition
(1) then follows from the fact that t ≡M t′ for every individual t′ ∈ A, and
Supp(Xm+1) ⊆ A. Thus, we have shown (1).
Let α = e
Sam
p¯eSam+(1−p¯) and β =
1
p¯+(1−p¯)eSam . Let total = ln(
p′
p
1−p
1−p′ ) + Sam, and
let δtotal = max{Pr[m˜+ 1 > (n+ 1)p¯ ·α],Pr[m˜ < (n+ 1)p¯ · β]}. By Lemma 68 and
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(1) (and the fact that m = n does not satisfy m+ 1 ≤ (n+ 1)p¯ · α), we have
Pr[M(D˜ unionmulti {t}) ∈ Y ]
≤
∑
m∈{0,...,n}
m+1≤(n+1)p¯·α
Pr[m˜ = m] · Pr[M(D˜ unionmulti {t}) ∈ Y | m˜ = m] + Pr[m˜+ 1 > (n+ 1)p¯ · α]
≤
∑
m∈{0,...,n}
m+1≤(n+1)p¯·α
p′
p
1− p
1− p′ e
Sam Pr[m˜ = m+ 1] · Pr[M(D˜) ∈ Y | m˜ = m+ 1] + δtotal
≤ etotal Pr[M(D˜) ∈ Y ] + δtotal (3)
and
Pr[M(D˜ unionmulti {t}) ∈ Y ]
≥
∑
m∈{0,...,n−1}
m+1≥(n+1)p¯·β
Pr[m˜ = m] · Pr[M(D˜ unionmulti {t}) ∈ Y | m˜ = m]
≥
∑
m∈{0,...,n−1}
m+1≥(n+1)p¯·β
p
p′
1− p′
1− p e
−Sam Pr[m˜ = m+ 1] · Pr[M(D˜) ∈ Y | m˜ = m+ 1]
≥ p
p′
1− p′
1− p e
−Sam · (Pr[M(D˜) ∈ Y ]− Pr[m˜ < (n+ 1)p¯ · β])
≥ e−total · Pr[M(D˜) ∈ Y ]− δtotal. (4)
Thus, we have M(D˜ unionmulti {t}) ≈total,δtotal M(D˜). Now, we observe that
δtotal
= max {Pr[m˜+ 1 > (n+ 1)p¯ · α],Pr[m˜ < (n+ 1)p¯ · β]}
≤ max
{
1
p¯
Pr[m˜+Bin(1, p¯) > (n+ 1)p¯ · α], 1
1− p¯ Pr[m˜+Bin(1, p¯) < (n+ 1)p¯ · β]
}
≤ max
{
1
p¯
exp
(−Ω ((n+ 1)p¯ · (α− 1)2)) , 1
1− p¯ exp
(−Ω ((n+ 1)p¯ · (1− β)2))}
≤ max
{
1
p¯
,
1
1− p¯
}
· exp (−Ω ((n+ 1)p¯ · (1− p¯)2Sam2)) ,
where Bin(1, p¯) is a binomial random variable with 1 trial and success probability
p¯, and the second last inequality follows from multiplicative Chernoff bounds (and
the fact that α ≤ 2, since Sam ≤ ln 2).
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We now prove a lemma that roughly says that even if an individual is M-
equivalent to only a few people in the population, the individual’s privacy is still
protected.
Lemma 70. Let M be any (k, )-simple outlier private algorithm with k ≥ 2, let
P be any population, and let pi : P → [0, 1] be any function. Let t ∈ P, and let
A ⊆ P \ {t} such that t′ ≡M t for every t′ ∈ A. Let n = |A|, s = |{t′ ∈ P \ {t} :
t′ ≡M t and t′ /∈ A}|, and p¯ = 1n
∑
t′∈A pi(t
′). Then, if s < k − 1, p¯ > 0, and
np¯ ≤ k−s−1
2
, then we have
M(Sam(P \ {t}, pi) unionmulti {t}) ≈/k,δtotal M(Sam(P \ {t}, pi)),
where δtotal = e
−Ω(k−s).
Proof. Suppose s < k − 1, p¯ > 0, and np¯ ≤ k−s−1
2
. Let D˜ = Sam(P \ {t}, pi) and
m˜ = |D˜∩A|. We note that if m˜ < k− s− 1, then t isM-equivalent to fewer than
k people in D˜ unionmulti {t}, and since M is (k, )-simple outlier private, we have
M(D˜ unionmulti {t})|m˜<k−s−1 ≈M(D˜)|m˜<k−s−1
Let δ′ = Pr[m˜ ≥ k − s− 1]. Then, we have
M(D˜ unionmulti {t}) ≈,δ′ M(D˜). (1)
Let τ = k−s−1
2p¯
. Then, we have n ≤ τ . The lemma now follows from (1) and the
inequality
δ′ = Pr[m˜ ≥ 2τ p¯]
≤ Pr[m˜+Bin(bτc − n, p¯) +Bin(1, (τ − bτc)p¯) ≥ 2τ p¯]
≤ e−Ω(τ p¯)
≤ e−Ω(k−s),
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where Bin(j, q) denotes a binomial random variable with j trials and success prob-
ability q, and the second inequality follows from a multiplicative Chernoff bound
(note that the expectation of m˜+B(bτc − n, p¯) +B(1, (τ − bτc)p¯) is τ p¯).
We will now use the above lemmas to prove Theorem 67.
of Theorem 67. Recall that RS(p, p′, `) is the convex hull of a set of distributions,
which we denote by Φ′. From the definition of distributional differential privacy
w.r.t. RS(p, p′, `), it is easy to see that it suffices to show differential privacy
w.r.t. Φ′ instead. Let φ = Sam(P , pi) ∈ Φ′, where P is the population associated
with φ, and pi : P → [0, 1] is the sampling probability function associated with φ.
It is easy to see that without loss of generality, we can assume that pi(t′) > 0 for
every t′ ∈ P . Let t be any individual in P , and let D ∼ Sam(P , pi). We need to
show that
M(D)|t∈D ≈DP ,δDP M(D \ {t})|t∈D.
We note that M(D)|t∈D = M(Sam(P \ {t}, pi) unionmulti {t}) and M(D \ {t})|t∈D =
M(Sam(P \ {t}, pi)). Thus, it suffices to show
M(Sam(P \ {t}, pi) unionmulti {t}) ≈DP ,δDP M(Sam(P \ {t}, pi)). (1)
To this end, let A = {t′ ∈ P \ {t} : t′ ≡M t and pi(t′) ∈ [p, p′]}, n = |A|,
p¯ = 1
n
∑
t′∈A pi(t
′), and s = |{t′ ∈ P \ {t} : t′ ≡M t and t′ /∈ A}|. We note that
s ≤ l, which we use later in some of the inequalities below. Let τ = k−s−1
2p¯
. We
will consider two cases: n > τ and n ≤ τ .
Suppose n > τ . By Lemma 69, we have
M(Sam(P \ {t}, pi) unionmulti {t}) ≈DP ,δ1 M(Sam(P \ {t}, pi)),
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where
δ1 = max
{
1
p¯
,
1
1− p¯
}
· e−Ω((n+1)p¯·(1−p¯)2·Sam2)
≤ max
{
1
p
,
1
1− p′
}
· e−Ω((k−s−1)·(1−p′)2·Sam2)
≤ δDP .
Now, suppose n ≤ τ . By Lemma 70, we have
M(Sam(P \ {t}, pi) unionmulti {t}) ≈2,δ2 M(Sam(P \ {t}, pi)),
where 2 = /k ≤ DP and δ2 = e−Ω(k−s), so δ2 ≤ δDP .
Thus, we have shown (1), as required.
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CHAPTER 5
VOTING WITH COARSE BELIEFS
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present our work on voting. We here consider a new approach
to bounded-rationality in voting: we assume that voters have “coarse” beliefs.
Strategy-proof voting w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs. Several celebrated works
in the behavioral economics literature (e.g., see [60, 61]) indicate that humans
“think through categories” and that a more appropriate model of human behavior
is obtained by restricting players to have “coarse” beliefs, where the probabilities
are restricted to some coarse set (e.g., a discretization of [0, 1]) instead of a con-
tinuous interval. In this thesis, we focus on such “coarse” beliefs: we say that a
belief is α-coarse if the probabilities (the player assigns to states) are restricted to
lie on a uniform discretization of [0, 1] with “mesh size” at least α. Coarse beliefs
are very natural. For example, any belief with rational probabilities is an α-coarse
belief for some α > 0. Also, many natural methods for forming a belief from ob-
servations yield α-coarse beliefs where α is inversely proportional to the number of
observations; such methods include taking empirical frequencies, as well as using
a Dirichlet distribution and updating it when samples or data are observed. We
note that even if people form their beliefs using some complicated formula and
for instance obtain a belief of the form “event A happens with probability 1/
√
2”,
behavioral experiments (see, e.g., [55, 62]) suggest that people often “round” such
beliefs and interpret them using some coarse measure (e.g., event A happens with
“very high”/“high”/“medium”/“low”/“very low” probability).
160
In this thesis, we consider strategy-proofness w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs. We
focus on “large-scale” voting, where the number of voters n is sufficiently large but
is still polynomially-related to 1/α, where α is the coarseness parameter.
Definition 71 (Informal). A voting rule is large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse
i.i.d. beliefs if there exists a polynomial p(·) such that for every coarseness param-
eter α > 0, and every n ≥ p(1/α), no voter having an α-coarse i.i.d. belief can
improve her expected utility by lying about her preferences.
In this thesis, we construct “good” anonymous -Pareto efficient voting rules
that are large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where  is exponen-
tially small in the number of voters. For example, one of the voting rules we
construct is a modification of the plurality rule, and it chooses a candidate that is
guaranteed to be the best or close to the best candidate in terms of the number of
votes.
Theorem 72 (Informal). We construct “good” anonymous -Pareto efficient vot-
ing rules that are large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where  is
exponentially small in the number of voters.
Since we are interested in large-scale voting, where we envision the number
of voters to exceed 10000, we do not consider the fact that the voting rule only
achieves -Pareto efficiency (as opposed to “exact” Pareto efficiency) unappealing;
the probability of Pareto efficiency being violated is on the order of 2−100.
Relaxing the coarse i.i.d. belief assumption. So far we have assumed that
each voter has an α-coarse i.i.d. belief. It is well-known that the i.i.d. assumption
is seemingly strong in the context of voting. To illustrate this, let us recall an
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example from Chamberlain and Rothschild [8]: Consider a simple majority-rule
election with two candidates A and B. If a voter believes that each of the other
voters will vote for candidate A with probability exactly p = 0.51, then in a large-
scale election, the voter will be essentially certain that candidate A will win (the
probability of him casting the pivotal vote will be on the order of e−n, where n is the
number of voters). On the other hand, if a voter is uncertain about the probability
p that the other voters will vote for candidate A (e.g., p is drawn from some
distribution over [0.49, 0.53]), then this voter may believe that both candidates
have a significant chance of winning the election and that the probability of him
casting the pivotal vote will be on the order of 1/n. Note that in the latter case
(when the voter is uncertain about p), he no longer has an i.i.d. belief about the
preferences of the other voters (conditioned on p, the belief is indeed i.i.d., but
the combined process of first sampling p and then sampling n − 1 independent
preferences (according to p) for the other voters does not result in an i.i.d. belief;
see [8] for more discussion on this).
We note, however, that the belief considered above is a distribution over
i.i.d. beliefs: we first sample a belief, and then independently sample preferences
for the other voters according to this belief. Since our notion of large-scale strat-
egy proofness requires strategy-proofness w.r.t. all coarse i.i.d. beliefs, it directly
follows that our notion implies strategy-proofness w.r.t. to all distributions over
coarse i.i.d. beliefs (e.g., the uniform distribution over a discretization of [0.49, 0.53]
in the above example).
Another seemingly strong aspect of i.i.d. beliefs is that a voter believes that
each of the other voters’ preferences is drawn from the same distribution φ (e.g.,
the distribution determined by p in the above example). Again, this assumption
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can be relaxed by allowing the voter to have a distribution over possible φ’s, and
a new φ is sampled for each of the other voters when sampling their preferences.
Such a distribution over possible φ’s can be collapsed to a single distribution over
preferences. In the case of coarse i.i.d. beliefs, as long as the distribution over
possible φ’s has finite support and does not depend on the number of voters, the
collapsed distribution will be a coarse i.i.d. belief. Thus, our notion of large-scale
strategy proofness w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs also directly implies strategy-proofness
in this more complicated model. This more complicated model can be used to
model situations where a voter believes that the voting population is separated into
a constant number of communities, and each of the communities has a different
distribution φ that is used to generate the community’s preferences. For simplicity
of presentation, we will state our definitions and results in the more simple model.
5.1.1 Our Construction
Our construction proceeds in two steps. We first show how to construct voting
rules that satisfy exact Pareto efficiency but only a notion of large-scale -strategy-
proofness w.r.t coarse i.i.d. beliefs—that is, voters can gain at most  in expected
utility by lying—where  is exponentially small in the number of voters n. In
a second step, we then show how to transform these voting rules into ones that
satisfy actual strategy-proofness w.r.t coarse i.i.d. beliefs (this, however, comes at
the cost of achieving only -Pareto efficiency, where  is exponentially small).
Step 1: Achieving -strategy-proofness. We now explain (at a high level)
how we obtain voting rules that are large-scale -strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse
i.i.d. beliefs, where  is exponentially small. To provide some intuition, let us
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first consider the plurality rule, which simply chooses the candidate with the most
top-choice votes. The plurality rule is not large-scale -strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse
i.i.d. beliefs for an exponentially small . For example, suppose that a voter has
the preference ordering c > a > b, but she believes that each of the other voters
has either the preference ordering a > b > c, or the preference ordering b > a > c,
each with probability 1/2. Such a belief is α-coarse for every α ≤ 1/2. Now,
we observe that according to her belief, her top choice c will certainly not be the
winner, so she may want to lie and report her second top choice a as her top choice
instead; it can be shown that by doing so, she can increase her expected utility by
Ω(1/
√
n).1 In this example, the problem is that the voter believes her top choice
c will certainly not be the winner, and by lying, she can make it more likely that
the plurality rule will choose her second top choice a instead of her last choice b.
We now show how to modify the plurality rule in (what we consider) a natural
way to make it large-scale -strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where  is
exponentially small. Recall that each voter submits a preference ordering over the
entire set of candidates. Our Repeated Plurality Elimination voting rule proceeds as
follows. We first count the number of top-choice votes for each candidate. Then, we
eliminate the “non-great” candidates—these are the candidates whose number of
top-choice votes is not within some margin, say ≈ √n, of the number of top-choice
votes of the best candidate. Then, we restrict the voters’ preference orderings to the
remaining candidates and repeat the elimination process until no more candidates
can be eliminated—that is, all the remaining candidates are within the margin
of the best candidate. When no more candidates can be eliminated, we run the
traditional plurality rule (without a “margin”) on the remaining candidates.
1For example, this can be shown by using the analytical tools in [7] to establish that with
probability Ω(1/
√
n), the number of top-choice votes for a is equal to that of b, in which case the
voter can lie to make a the winner.
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Intuitively, these modifications solve the specific issue given above where the
voter lies and reports her second top choice a as her top choice, since by Chernoff
bounds, with extremely high probability w.r.t. her belief, the number of top-choice
votes for candidates a and b will be within the margin ≈ √n of each other, while
candidate c will be outside the margin; in this case, the voter’s lie has no effect,
since candidate c will be eliminated while candidates a and b will move onto the
next iteration. Thus, the voter might as well tell the truth and report candidate c
as her top choice, since candidate c will be eliminated anyway and her second top
choice a will become the top choice after restricting the voters’ preferences to the
remaining candidates. In our voting rule, the elimination process is repeated be-
cause after some candidates are eliminated and the top-choice votes are recounted,
the same issue may still be present among the remaining candidates.
More generally, to prove that our Repeated Plurality Elimination voting rule
is large-scale -strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, we consider a voter i with
a coarse belief, and we roughly proceed in two steps. In the first step, we show
that voter i believes that she only has an exponentially small chance of influencing
which candidates are outside the “margin of the best remaining candidate” and
thus will be eliminated. Roughly speaking, to show this, we note that a candidate
x’s expected count (w.r.t. to voter i’s belief) is either a) equal to the best remaining
candidate’s expected count, or b) different from the best remaining candidate’s ex-
pected count. In case a, by Chernoff bounds, the candidate x’s actual count will be
within the margin with overwhelming probability. In case b, we use the fact that
voter i’s belief is coarse to show that the candidate x’s expected count is separated
from the best remaining candidate’s expected count by a sufficiently large gap, and
thus by Chernoff bounds, the candidate x’s actual count will be outside the margin
with overwhelming probability. In the second step of our proof, we show that voter
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i believes that at the end of the elimination process (where all remaining candi-
dates are within the margin of the best candidate), all the remaining candidates
will have exactly the same expected count with overwhelming probability. In such
a situation where all the (remaining) candidates have the same expected count,
the plurality rule is actually strategy-proof, which is intuitively why it is okay
to run the plurality rule on the remaining candidates at the end. We note that
even though voter i only has an exponentially small chance of influencing which
candidates get eliminated, voter i does have a reasonable chance (i.e., Ω(1/
√
n)
probability) of influencing which remaining candidate gets chosen by the plurality
rule at the end. However, voter i wants to be truthful because of what we have
shown in the second step of our proof.
We also consider a variant of the above Repeated Plurality Elimination voting
rule, which we refer to as the approximate instant-runoff voting rule: at each
iteration, instead of eliminating all the candidates that are not “great”, we instead
eliminate all the candidates that are “close” to the worst candidate, with the
following exception: if elimination would cause all the candidates to be eliminated
(i.e., all the candidates are close to the worst one), we select the winner using the
plurality rule. This voting rule is very similar to the widely used instant-runoff
voting rule. Instant-runoff voting, as well as variations of it, are used in many
elections throughout the world (e.g., see [77]). Instant-runoff voting is identical
to our “approximate instant-runoff” voting rule with the exception that at each
iteration only the candidate with the actual least number of top-choice votes is
eliminated (as opposed to eliminating all the candidates that are close to it).
More generally, we develop a general framework for constructing voting rules
that are large-scale -strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where  is exponen-
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tially small, and show how both of the above voting rules (as well as several other
voting rules) are natural instances of our framework. All of these voting rules
satisfy exact Pareto efficiency.
Step 2: Achieving actual strategy-proofness. In the second step of our con-
struction, we provide a general technique for converting voting rules that are large-
scale -strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where  = o(1/n2), into voting rules
that are large-scale (actual) strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs. (Note that
the plurality rule is only -strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs for  = Ω(1/
√
n),
so this technique cannot be applied to the plurality rule.) In fact, such a technique
was already provided in [5] in the context of strategy-proofness without beliefs (and
a variant of it was also explored in [66] and [26] in more general mechanism design
contexts), and we here extend the analysis to the context of strategy-proofness with
beliefs. The idea (from [5]) is to combine in a randomized way an -strategy-proof
voting rule with a so-called “punishing” voting rule that is strictly strategy-proof
(i.e., voters are strictly better off by truthfully reporting their preferences). The
punishing voting rule may not be Pareto efficient, but the combination is done in
such a way that the punishing voting rule is only run with tiny probability; this
suffices for ensuring that the final voting rule satisfies actual strategy-proofness
w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs. Using this technique, we transform our voting rules into
ones that satisfy actual strategy-proofness w.r.t coarse i.i.d. beliefs while satisfying
-Pareto efficiency, where  is exponentially small. This technique actually requires
the utility functions of the voters to be coarse, so we will add this assumption to
our definition of large-scale strategy-proofness w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs; a utility
function is α-coarse if for every pair of candidates, the utility assigned to the two
candidates are either the same or separated by a gap of at least α.
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Discussion. Although the random dictatorship voting rule is already Pareto
efficient and strategy-proof, the voting rules we construct are arguably much better
than random dictatorship. For example, the random dictatorship voting rule is
“very random” and can possibly choose a candidate that all voters rank last except
for one voter. On the other hand, our Repeated Plurality Elimination voting rule
is deterministic, and the punishing voting rule is only run with exponentially small
probability; furthermore, our Repeated Plurality Elimination rule is guaranteed to
choose a candidate that is the best or close to the best in terms of the number of
top-choice votes.
If we ignore our use of the punishing voting rule (which is only run with expo-
nentially small probability), our voting rules (e.g., our approximate instant-runoff
voting rule) are all quite natural and very similar to what is used in elections
throughout the world. Thus, our results provide some intuition for why strategic
misreporting of preferences might not be occurring much in these elections.
We note that our voting rules are not monotone—that is, improving the ranking
of a candidate in some voter’s preference can decrease the chance of that candidate
winning. This is because improving the ranking of a candidate in some voter’s
preference can change which candidates get eliminated, which then changes the
number of top-choice votes each candidate has. This side effect can also occur in
the classic instant-runoff voting rule, which is also not monotone.
5.1.2 Other Related Work
In this chapter, we consider strategy-proofness with respect to a restricted class of
beliefs. There have been other papers that also consider strategy-proofness with
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respect to a restricted class of beliefs. In [54], Majumdar and Sen show that a large
class of voting rules are strategy-proof w.r.t. the uniform belief where the other
voters’ preferences are uniformly distributed. The authors also show that it is not
possible to construct a reasonable deterministic voting rule that is strategy-proof
w.r.t. any of a large set of beliefs where the voters’ preferences are independent of
each other; this further suggests that the consideration of independent preferences
is not sufficient and that it is appropriate to further assume that the preferences are
identically distributed. In [73], Shen used Beta distributions to model the beliefs
of voters (in a way that is different from how we model beliefs) in the context of
approval voting, and showed that voters may still have incentives to lie. In contrast
to the above two papers—which consider very specific types of beliefs—our focus
here is on defining a general class of natural beliefs for which strategy-proof voting
can be achieved.
5.2 Preliminaries
Given an integer k ∈ N, let [k] = {1, . . . , k}. Let C be any finite set of candidates
(or alternatives). A preference ordering on C is a strict total order on the set
of candidates C; let P denote the set of all preference orderings on C. Given a
subset A ⊆ C of candidates, let L(A) denote the set of preference orderings (i.e.,
strict total orders) on A. Given a preference ordering P and a pair of candidates
x, y ∈ C, we shall write xPy to mean that x is (strictly) preferred over y in P ,
i.e., x is ranked higher than y according to P . Given a preference ordering P ,
let top(P ) denote the highest-ranked candidate according to P , i.e., top(P ) is the
candidate x in C such that xPy for every y ∈ C \ {x}.
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Throughout this chapter, we will use n to denote the number of voters, and m
to denote the number of candidates in C; we will often treat m as a constant. A
preference profile is a vector of length n whose components are preference orderings
in P ; that is, a preference profile is simply an element of Pn which specifies the
(submitted) preference orderings of n voters. Let P∗ = ⋃n∈NPn.
Given a finite set S, let ∆(S) denote the set of all probability distributions over
S. A (randomized) voting rule is a function v : Pn → ∆(C) (or v : P∗ → ∆(C) if v
works for any number of voters) that maps preference profiles to probability distri-
butions over candidates; intuitively, v(~P ) is a distribution over C that specifies the
probability that each candidate is selected when the submitted votes form the pref-
erence profile ~P . A voting rule v is said to be deterministic if for every preference
profile ~P , the distribution v(~P ) assigns probability 1 to some candidate. A voting
rule v is said to be anonymous if v does not depend on the order in which the pref-
erence orderings appear in the input, i.e., v(P1, . . . , Pn) = v(Pσ(1), . . . , Pσ(n)) for
every preference profile (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ Pn and every permutation σ : [n]→ [n]. In
this chapter, we will only consider anonymous voting rules; most common voting
rules are indeed anonymous, and one can argue that anonymous voting rules are
more fair and democratic than non-anonymous ones.
Given a (randomized) voting rule v : Pn → ∆(C), a candidate x ∈ C, and
a preference profile ~P , let v(x, ~P ) be the probability mass assigned to x by the
distribution v(~P ); we also refer to v(x, ~P ) as the selection probability of x with
respect to v and ~P , since v(x, ~P ) is the probability that candidate x is selected by
the voting rule v when the input preference profile is ~P . A utility function is a
function u : C → [0, 1] that assigns a real number in [0, 1] to each candidate in C.2
2It is not important that the codomain of the utility function u is [0, 1]; as long as the codomain
is bounded, the results of this chapter still hold with minor modifications.
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Given a preference ordering P and a utility function u, we say that u is consistent
with P if for every pair of candidates x, y ∈ C, we have u(x) > u(y) if and only if
xPy.
A voting rule is Pareto efficient if it never chooses a Pareto dominated candi-
date, i.e., a candidate y such that all the voters prefer x over y for some candidate
x. A slight relaxation of Pareto efficiency is -Pareto efficiency, where we allow
the voting rule to choose a Pareto dominated candidate with probability at most
.
Definition 73 (-Pareto efficiency). A voting rule v : Pn → ∆(C) is -Pareto
efficient if for every pair of candidates x, y ∈ C and every preference profile ~P =
(P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ Pn such that xPiy for every i ∈ [n], we have v(y, ~P ) ≤ .
See Appendix B.1 for background information on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem [34, 71] and Gibbard’s generalization of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theo-
rem to randomized voting rules [35].
5.2.1 Strategy-Proofness with respect to a Set of Beliefs
Gibbard’s generalization [35] of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that
when there are at least three candidates, we cannot even construct good randomized
voting rules that are strategy-proof. Given this impossibility result, let us consider
relaxed notions of strategy-proofness. We observe that strategy-proofness requires
that no voter would want to lie about her true preference even if the voter knows the
submitted preferences of all the other voters. However, in many realistic scenarios,
a voter is uncertain about how other voters will vote, and she would only lie if she
believes that she can gain utility in expectation by lying. As a result, we consider
171
a relaxed notion of strategy-proofness where we consider the voter’s belief of how
the other voters will vote. The standard notion of strategy-proofness requires that
no voter would want to lie regardless of what her belief is. To weaken the notion of
strategy-proof, one can require that no voter would want to lie as long as her belief
belongs in a certain set of beliefs. Let us now move to formalizing these notions.
In this chapter, we will only consider beliefs that are i.i.d. (independent and
identically distributed), meaning that for each belief, the other voters’ preference
orderings are sampled independently from some distribution φ over preference
orderings. Thus, for simplicity, we define a belief to be a probability distribution
over the set P of preference orderings, representing a voter’s belief that each of
the other voters will have a preference ordering drawn independently from this
distribution. We now state the definition of strategy-proof with respect to a set of
beliefs.
Definition 74 (Strategy-proof w.r.t. a set Φ of beliefs). A voting rule v : Pn →
∆(C) is strategy-proof w.r.t. a set Φ of beliefs if for every i ∈ [n], every pair of
preference orderings Pi, P
′
i ∈ P , every belief φ ∈ Φ, and every utility function ui
that is consistent with Pi, we have
E [ui(v(~P−i, Pi))] ≥ E [ui(v(~P−i, P ′i ))],
where ~P−i ∼ φn−1.
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5.3 Large-Scale Strategy-Proof Voting w.r.t. Coarse
i.i.d. Beliefs
In this section, we first define the notion of “coarse” i.i.d. beliefs; then, we introduce
the notion of large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs. We then develop
a general framework for constructing voting rules that are large-scale -strategy-
proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, and we then use the general framework to obtain
many examples of good voting rules. We then show how to transform these voting
rules into ones that are actually large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs.
Let us begin by introducing the notion of a coarse i.i.d. belief. Roughly speak-
ing, an i.i.d. belief φ is α-coarse if the probability masses assigned by φ are restricted
to lie on a uniform discretization of [0, 1] with “mesh size” at least α. More pre-
cisely, an i.i.d. belief φ is said to be α-coarse if the probability masses assigned by
φ are multiples of some number β ≥ α, i.e., there exists a number β ≥ α such that
for every preference ordering P ∈ P , we have φ(P ) = iβ for some integer i. Coarse
i.i.d. beliefs are quite natural due to many reasons. For example, if a human were
to describe or represent her belief (as a distribution over preference orderings), the
probabilities would almost certainly be rational numbers (e.g., it is very strange to
believe that a certain preference ordering has probability 1/pi of occurring), and
an i.i.d. belief with rational probabilities is an α-coarse i.i.d. belief for some α > 0.
Also, many common and natural ways of forming a belief also result in a coarse
i.i.d. belief. For example, one can use empirical frequencies or a Dirichlet distribu-
tion to form a belief from observed samples of preferences. Both of these methods
yield α-coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where α is inversely proportional to the number of ob-
servations. See Appendix B.2 for more information. We can also consider α-coarse
utility functions. A utility function u : C → [0, 1] is said to be α-coarse if for every
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pair of candidates x, y ∈ C, we have u(x) = u(y) or |u(x) − u(y)| ≥ α. We only
need the utility functions to be coarse for the “punishing” voting rule that we will
use later.
Large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs. Let us now introduce
the notion of large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, which is a notion
of strategy-proof where the voters have coarse i.i.d. beliefs and there are sufficiently
(but still polynomially) many voters.
Definition 75 (Large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs). A voting
rule v : P∗ → ∆(C) is large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs if there
exists a polynomial p(·) such that for every α > 0, every n ≥ p( 1
α
), every i ∈ [n],
every pair of preference orderings Pi, P
′
i ∈ P , every α-coarse i.i.d. belief φi, and
every α-coarse utility function ui that is consistent with Pi, we have
E [ui(v(~P−i, Pi))] ≥ E [ui(v(~P−i, P ′i ))],
where ~P−i ∼ φin−1; when this holds, we may refer to the above polynomial p(·) as
the rate of the voting rule v.
In the above definition, α controls the coarseness of the belief, and p(1/α)
controls how many voters are required in order to achieve truthfulness; we need
n to be sufficiently large because as the i.i.d. beliefs become less and less coarse,
the set of beliefs considered becomes closer and closer to the set of all i.i.d. beliefs,
which we later show is impossible to construct good voting rules for. The rate p(·)
captures how many voters are needed relative to the coarseness of the beliefs.
As mentioned in the introduction, we can consider a slightly more realistic
model where each voter has a distribution over α-coarse i.i.d. beliefs, and when
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computing expected utility for a voter, a single α-coarse i.i.d. belief is sampled
from this distribution, and then this sampled belief is used to generate all the
other voters’ preferences in an i.i.d. manner. Our results still hold in this more
realistic model; this easily follows from the definition of large-scale strategy-proof
w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where it is required that strategy-proofness holds for
every α-coarse belief, so strategy-proofness also holds if we sample a random α-
coarse i.i.d. belief from a distribution.
We now define a relaxed version of large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse
i.i.d. beliefs, where we allow a voter to gain at most (n) in expected utility.
Definition 76 (Large-scale -strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs). A voting
rule v : P∗ → ∆(C) is large-scale -strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs if there
exists a polynomial p(·) such that for every α > 0, every n ≥ p( 1
α
), every i ∈ [n],
every pair of preference orderings Pi, P
′
i ∈ P , every α-coarse i.i.d. belief φi, and
every α-coarse utility function ui that is consistent with Pi, we have
E [ui(v(~P−i, Pi))] ≥ E [ui(v(~P−i, P ′i ))]− (n),
where ~P−i ∼ φin−1; when this holds, we may refer to the above polynomial p(·) as
the rate of the voting rule v.
5.3.1 Our General Framework
In this section, we develop a general framework for constructing large-scale -
strategy-proof voting rules w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs. Later, we will show that as
long as  = o(1/n2), we can transform such voting rules into ones that satisfy
actual large-scale strategy-proofness w.r.t coarse i.i.d. beliefs. Before we describe
the general framework in detail, let us describe an example for motivation.
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Recall that the plurality rule simply chooses the candidate with the most top-
choice votes. The plurality rule is simple, very commonly used, and intuitively has
good efficiency (e.g., it is Pareto efficient). Unfortunately, the plurality rule is not
large-scale -strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs for any exponentially small ,
only for  = Ω(1/
√
n). However, it is not hard to see that the plurality rule is actu-
ally strategy-proof w.r.t. beliefs where all the candidates have the same probability
of being the top choice of a voter’s preference ordering. Can one design an “elimi-
nation rule” that eliminates candidates in a way so that (1) a voter with a coarse
i.i.d. belief will believe that she only has an exponentially small chance of affecting
which candidates get eliminated, and (2) once these candidates are eliminated from
her belief, all the remaining candidates will have the same probability of being the
top choice? Intuitively, by running such an elimination rule and then running the
plurality rule on the remaining candidates, the combined voting rule is large-scale
-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where  is exponentially small. Such an
elimination rule exists; it repeatedly eliminates the candidates whose number of
top-choice votes is not “close” to the highest number of top-choice votes. We will
later show that this elimination rule satisfies the two required properties.
The above example can be viewed as an instantiation of a more general frame-
work for constructing voting rules that are large-scale -strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse
i.i.d. beliefs, which we now describe. The general framework consists of an “elim-
ination rule” and a “selection rule” satisfying certain properties. The elimination
rule will choose a subset of the candidates, and then the selection rule will select
a winner from this subset. As long as certain properties are satisfied, the elim-
ination rule combined with the selection rule will be large-scale -strategy-proof
w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs. Let us now informally describe the general procedure
and the requirements.
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On input a preference profile, we do the following:
Stage 1: Run an “elimination rule” that, on input a preference profile, eliminates
a subset of the candidates, leaving a subset A ⊆ C remaining. We require
the following: a single voter with a coarse i.i.d. belief φ has little influence on
the choice A of the elimination rule when the other voters’ preferences are
distributed according to φ; furthermore, with high probability, the restriction
of the belief φ to the remaining candidates A results in a belief in some set
Φ′A.
Stage 2: Run a “selection rule” on the preference profile restricted to the re-
maining candidates A. We require that the selection rule is strategy-proof
w.r.t. the set Φ′A of beliefs from Stage 1.
Intuitively, the above procedure is large-scale -strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse
i.i.d. beliefs because a voter i with a coarse i.i.d. belief φ will believe that she
has little influence on the choice A of the elimination rule, and since the restriction
of φ to A is a belief for which the selection rule is strategy-proof, voter i cannot
gain much by lying. We note that even though a voter has little influence on Stage
1, the voter can still have quite a lot of influence on Stage 2 (and thus on the
voting rule as a whole), but since the selection rule is strategy-proof w.r.t. the set
Φ′A of beliefs from Stage 1, the voter would want to be truthful.
We now describe the framework more formally. An elimination rule is a
function f : P∗ → ∆(2C) that, on input a preference profile ~P , outputs a non-
empty subset A ⊆ C representing the remaining candidates after elimination.
Recall that given a subset A ⊆ C of candidates, we use L(A) to denote the
set of preference orderings on A. A selection rule is a collection of functions
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{sA : (L(A))∗ → ∆(A)}A⊆C,A 6=∅, one for each non-empty subset A ⊆ C, such that
for every A ⊆ C, sA is a voting rule for the set of candidates A. Given a selection
rule s = {sA}A⊆C,A 6=∅ and a preference profile ~P whose components are preference
orderings over A, let s(~P ) = sA(~P ).
Given a preference profile ~P and a non-empty subset A ⊆ C of candidates,
let the restriction of ~P to A, denoted ~P |A, be the preference profile obtained by
removing all the candidates in ~P that are not in A, while preserving the ordering
of the remaining candidates. Given an i.i.d. belief φ and a non-empty subset
A ⊆ C of candidates, let the restriction of φ to A, denoted φ|A, be the belief (i.e.,
distribution over preference orderings on A) P |A, where P ∼ φ. We now state our
theorem that precisely describes our general framework.
Theorem 77 (Our general framework). Let f : P∗ → ∆(2C) be any elimination
rule, and let s = {sA}A⊆C,A 6=∅ be any selection rule. Let δ : N → R be any
function. Suppose there exists a polynomial p(·) such that for every α > 0 and
every n ≥ p( 1
α
), the following holds:
• For every i ∈ [n] and every α-coarse i.i.d. belief φi, there exists a non-empty
subset A ⊆ C of candidates such that the following conditions hold:
– For every Pi ∈ P, the elimination rule f(~P−i, Pi) chooses (to keep) A
with probability at least 1 − δ(n) over the randomness of ~P−i ∼ φin−1
and f .
– sA is strategy-proof w.r.t. the restricted belief φi|A.
Then, the voting rule v : P∗ → ∆(C) defined by v(~P ) = s(~P |f(~P )) is large-scale
2δ-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, and the rate of v is the polynomial p(·).
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See Appendix B.3 for the proof of Theorem 77.
5.3.2 Examples of our General Framework
In this section, we provide some examples of our general framework. Recall that
the plurality rule simply chooses the candidate with the most top-choice votes
(breaking ties in some way). We now describe a modified plurality rule in the
format of our general framework; this voting rule is the same as the repeated
plurality elimination voting rule described earlier and in the introduction of this
chapter.
Example 20 (Repeated Plurality Elimination + Plurality Selection). Let
0 < δ < 1/2, and let vpl : P∗ → ∆(C) be a voting rule defined as follows; on input
a preference profile ~P ∈ Pn, vpl does the following:
Stage 1: Repeatedly do the following until no more candidates are eliminated:
count the number of top-choice votes for each candidate, and eliminate all
the candidates that have a count that is not within n1/2+δ of the highest
count among the remaining candidates; restrict the preference profile to the
set of remaining candidates.
Stage 2: Run the plurality rule for the remaining candidates, i.e., on the prefer-
ence profile restricted to the set of remaining candidates.
Using our general framework, we now show that vpl is large-scale -strategy-
proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs (where  is exponentially small), and also satisfies
certain efficiency properties.
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Theorem 78. Let 0 < δ < 1/2, and let vpl be the voting rule defined above. Then,
vpl satisfies the following properties:
1. vpl is large-scale (e
−Ω(n2δ))-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, with rate
p(x) = O(xd1/(1/2−δ)e).
2. vpl is Pareto efficient.
3. vpl is n
1/2+δ-close to optimal in the sense that vpl always chooses a candidate
c ∈ C such that the number of top-choice votes for c is within n1/2+δ of the
highest number of top-choice votes among the candidates.
Let us explain at a high level how the voting rule vpl satisfies the required
conditions in our general framework to establish Property 1 in the above theorem.
The idea of the proof is essentially the same as that described in the introduction
of this chapter, but here we describe the proof idea in the context of our general
framework, whereas in the introduction we did not discuss our general framework
for simplicity.) To apply our general framework, we roughly proceed as follows.
Consider a voter i with a coarse belief. We need to show that there exists a set A
of candidates (dependent on voter i’s coarse belief) such that regardless of what
preference ordering voter i submits, the set of remaining candidates after Stage
1 (the elimination stage) is precisely A with overwhelming probability. Roughly
speaking, to show this, we consider any round in Stage 1, and we note that a
remaining candidate x’s expected count (w.r.t. to voter i’s belief) is either a)
equal to the best remaining candidate’s expected count, or b) different from the best
remaining candidate’s expected count. In case a, by Chernoff bounds, the candidate
x’s actual count will be within the n1/2+δ margin with overwhelming probability,
and thus will not be eliminated in this round. In case b, we use the fact that voter
i’s belief is coarse to show that the candidate x’s expected count is separated
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from the best remaining candidate’s expected count by a sufficiently large gap,
and thus by Chernoff bounds, the candidate x’s actual count will be outside the
n1/2+δ margin with overwhelming probability, and thus will be eliminated in this
round. Roughly speaking, the required set A of candidates is simply the set of
candidates that are expected (with overwhelming probability) to belong to case a
throughout all the rounds in Stage 1. Now, applying the union bound over the
constant number of rounds in Stage 1, we get our desired result.
To apply our general framework, we also need to show that the plurality rule run
in Stage 2 is strategy-proof w.r.t. voter i’s coarse belief restricted to the remaining
set A of candidates. From the above analysis, it is not hard to see that by definition
of A, if voter i’s belief is restricted to A, all the candidates (in A) have the same
expected count. Now, we note that the plurality rule is strategy-proof w.r.t. any
belief where all the candidates have the same expected count, which gives us our
desired result. We note that even though voter i only has an exponentially small
chance of influencing which candidates get eliminated in Stage 1, voter i does have
a reasonable chance (i.e., Ω(1/
√
n) probability) of influencing which remaining
candidate gets chosen by the plurality rule in Stage 2. However, voter i wants to
be truthful because the plurality rule is strategy-proof w.r.t. voter i’s coarse belief
restricted to A.
See Appendix B.3 for the full proof of Theorem 78. Recall that we will later
combine this voting rule with a “punishing” voting rule to obtain a voting rule
that is large-scale (actual) strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs.
Example 21 (Approximate Instant-Runoff Voting). The standard instant-
runoff voting rule repeats the following until a candidate has been chosen as the
winner: count the number of top-choice votes for each candidate, and eliminate the
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candidate with the least number of top-choice votes (breaking ties in some way);
restrict the preference profile to the set of remaining candidates, and if there is
only one candidate remaining, choose the candidate to be the winner.
It is not hard to see that the standard instant-runoff voting rule is not large-scale
-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where  is reasonably small. However,
we can slightly modify the standard instant-runoff voting rule to obtain an approx-
imate version that is large-scale -strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where
 is exponentially small. In each iteration, instead of eliminating only the can-
didate with the least number of top-choice votes, we eliminate all the candidates
that have a count that is close to the least number of top-choice votes; however,
we stop right before all the remaining candidates are about to be eliminated, and
then we choose the candidate with the most top-choice votes. Let us now put our
approximate instant-runoff voting rule in the format of our general framework.
Let 0 < δ < 1/2, and let virv : P∗ → ∆(C) be a voting rule defined as follows;
on input a preference profile ~P ∈ Pn, virv does the following:
Stage 1: Repeat the following: Count the number of top-choice votes for each
candidate, and eliminate all the candidates that have a count that is within
n1/2+δ of the least number of top-choice votes, unless doing so would eliminate
all the remaining candidates, in which case we simply stop and proceed to
Stage 2; restrict the preference profile to the set of remaining candidates.
Stage 2: Run the plurality rule for the remaining candidates, i.e., on the prefer-
ence profile restricted to the set of remaining candidates.
Using our general framework, we now show that virv is large-scale -strategy-proof
w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs (where  is exponentially small), and also satisfies certain
182
efficiency properties.
Theorem 79. Let 0 < δ < 1/2, and let virv be the voting rule defined above. Then,
virv satisfies the following properties:
1. virv is large-scale (e
−Ω(n2δ))-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, with rate
p(x) = O(xd1/(1/2−δ)e).
2. virv is Pareto efficient.
See Appendix B.3 for the proof of Theorem 79. Recall that we will later combine
this voting rule with a “punishing” voting rule to obtain a voting rule that is large-
scale (actual) strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs.
In Appendix B.4, we provide some more examples of our general framework.
5.3.3 Achieving Actual Strategy-Proofness via the Punish-
ing Voting Rule
In this section, we show how to transform our voting rules into ones that are
actually strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs. We do this by providing a
general technique for converting voting rules that are large-scale -strategy-proof
w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where  = o(1/n2), into voting rules that are large-scale
(actual) strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs. The idea is to combine in a ran-
domized way an -strategy-proof voting rule with a “punishing” voting rule that
is “strictly strategy-proof”. The punishing voting rule is defined as follows:
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• Let vpunish : Pn → ∆(C) be the voting rule that chooses a voter i ∈ [n]
uniformly at random and then chooses the jth top choice of voter i with
probability proportional to m−j, i.e., with probability (m−j)/∑m`=1(m−`).
We now show that vpunish is strictly strategy-proof in the sense that if a voter lies
about her preference ordering, her expected utility will be strictly less than what
it would be if she submitted her true preference ordering, and the difference in the
two expected utilities is at least Ω(α/n), where α is the coarseness of the utility
function.
Lemma 80. The voting rule vpunish is “strictly strategy-proof” in the following
sense: For every α > 0, every i ∈ [n], every pair of preference orderings Pi, P ′i ∈ P
with Pi 6= P ′i , every ~P−i ∈ Pn−1, and every α-coarse utility function ui that is
consistent with Pi, we have
E [ui(vpunish(~P−i, Pi))] ≥ E [ui(vpunish(~P−i, P ′i ))] + Ω(α/n).
See Appendix B.5 for the proof of Lemma 80. We now show that if we take a
voting rule v that is large-scale -strategy proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where
 = o(1/n2), and “mix” it with the punishing voting rule vpunish by running v
with probability 1− q and vpunish with probability q for some appropriately chosen
q = Ω(n2 · (n)), then the “mixed” voting rule is large-scale (actual) strategy-proof
w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs.
Lemma 81. Let v : P∗ → ∆(C) be any voting rule that is large-scale -strategy-
proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where (n) = o(1/n2), and let p(·) be the rate of v.
Let vmix be the voting rule that runs v with probability 1−q(n) and runs vpunish with
probability q(n), where q(n) = Ω(n2 · (n)). Then, vmix is large-scale strategy-proof
w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, with rate pnew(x) = max{x, p(x)}.
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See Appendix B.5 for the proof of Lemma 81. We now combine the punishing
voting rule with our general framework (Theorem 77) to obtain a new general
framework for obtaining voting rules that are large-scale (actual) strategy-proof
w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs.
Theorem 82. Let v : P∗ → ∆(C) be a voting rule as defined in Theorem 77 with
corresponding function δ(n) = o(1/n2) and polynomial p(·). Let vmix be the voting
rule that runs v with probability 1 − q(n) and runs vpunish with probability q(n),
where q(n) = Ω(n2 · δ(n)). Then, vmix is large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse
i.i.d. beliefs, with rate pnew(x) = max{x, p(x)}.
Proof. The theorem follows by combining Theorem 77 with Lemma 81.
Using the punishing voting rule, we can also transform our previous voting rules
into ones that are large-scale (actual) strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, and
-Pareto efficient, where  is exponentially small.
Theorem 83 (Repeated Plurality Elimination + Plurality Selection).
There exists a constant C > 0 such that the following holds. Let 0 < δ < 1/2,
and let vpl be the voting rule in Theorem 78. Let v
′
pl be the voting rule that runs
vpl with probability 1 − e−Cn2δ and runs vpunish with probability e−Cn2δ . Then, v′pl
satisfies the following properties:
1. v′pl is large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, with rate p(x) =
O(xd1/(1/2−δ)e).
2. v′pl is e
−Ω(n2δ)-Pareto efficient.
3. With probability at least 1 − e−Ω(n2δ), v′pl is n1/2+δ-close to optimal in the
sense that v′pl chooses a candidate c ∈ C such that the number of top-choice
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votes for c is within n1/2+δ of the highest number of top-choice votes among
the candidates.
Proof. The theorem immediately follows by combining Theorem 78 with Lemma
81.
Theorem 84 (Approximate Instant-Runoff Voting). There exists a constant
C > 0 such that the following holds. Let 0 < δ < 1/2, and let virv be the voting
rule in Theorem 79. Let v′irv be the voting rule that runs virv with probability
1−e−Cn2δ and runs vpunish with probability e−Cn2δ . Then, v′irv satisfies the following
properties:
1. v′irv is large-scale strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, with rate p(x) =
O(xd1/(1/2−δ)e).
2. v′irv is e
−Ω(n2δ)-Pareto efficient.
Proof. The theorem immediately follows by combining Theorem 79 with Lemma
81.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
Example 22 (A more detailed explanation and analysis of the Democrats vs.
Republicans example). Consider a a social network of n people that are grouped
into cliques of size c. (For simplicity, assume that c divides n.) In each clique,
either most people are Democrats, or most people are Republicans. To model
this situation, we first let α ∈ [0, 0.2]. For each clique, we choose a number p in
[0, α] ∪ [1 − α, 1] randomly and uniformly, and we decide that each person in the
clique is a Democrat with probability p, or a Republican with probability 1 − p.
This gives us a probability distribution over databases, each with a binary attribute
X = {0, 1} and n rows, where each row states the political preference of a single
person; a value of 1 represents Democrat, while a value of 0 represents Republican.
Now, let g : Xn → Rn/c be the function that computes the proportion of
Democrats in each clique. Let San be the mechanism that, on input a database
D ∈ Xn, first computes g(D) and then adds Lap( 1
c
) noise to each component
of g(D). San then releases this vector of noisy proportions. The L1-sensitivity
(see [22]) ∆(g) of the function g being computed is 1/c, since if a single person
changes his or her political preference, the value of g changes only by 1/c in one
of the components (cliques). Recall from [22] that a mechanism that computes
a function h(D) and then adds Lap(∆(h)

) noise to each component of h(D) is -
differentially private. Thus, San is -differentially private, so for small , one may
think that it is safe to release such information without violating the privacy of any
particular person. That is, the released data should not allow us to guess correctly
with probability significantly greater than 1/2 whether a particular person is a
Democrat or a Republican. However, this is not the case.
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To see this, suppose we know which clique some person i is in. We look at the
data released by San to obtain the noisy proportion pˆ for the clique person i is
in. If pˆ ≥ 0.5, we guess that person i’s clique mostly consists of Democrats, so
we guess that person i is a Democrat; otherwise, we guess that person i’s clique
mostly consists of Republicans, so we guess that person i is a Republican. Since
San adds Lap( 1
c
) noise to the true proportion p of person i’s clique, we have
Pr[pˆ − p ≥ 1
2
− α] = Pr[p − pˆ ≥ 1
2
− α] = F (−(1
2
− α)) = 1
2
e−(
1
2
−α)c, where
F (x) = 1
2
exc is the cumulative distribution function of the Laplace distribution
Lap( 1
c
) for x < 0.
We note that if p ∈ [0, α], then pˆ−p < 1
2
−α implies that our guess for person i’s
clique is correct, so this occurs with probability at least 1− 1
2
e−(
1
2
−α)c. Similarly, if
p ∈ [1−α, 1], then p−pˆ < 1
2
−α implies that our guess for person i’s clique is correct,
so this occurs with probability at least 1− 1
2
e−(
1
2
−α)c. In both cases, our guess for
person i’s clique is correct with probability at least 1− 1
2
e−(
1
2
−α)c. Therefore, our
guess for person i herself is correct with probability at least (1− 1
2
e−(
1
2
−α)c)(1−α).
With  = 0.1, α = 0.2, and c = 200, our guess for person i is correct with
probability at least (1 − 1
2
e−(
1
2
−α)c)(1 − α) ≈ 0.799. This is significantly higher
than 0.5 · e = 0.5 · e0.1 ≈ 0.553, which one might think is supposed to be an
upper bound on the probability that our guess is correct, since San satisfies -
differential privacy with  = 0.1 (see the appendix in [22]; the 0.5 comes from
guessing randomly).
With  = 0.01, α = 0.2, and c = 200, our guess for person i is correct with
probability at least (1− 1
2
e−(
1
2
−α)c)(1− α) ≈ 0.580. This is still a lot higher than
0.5 · e = 0.5 · e0.01 ≈ 0.505.
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APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 5
B.1 Background Information on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
Theorem
Roughly speaking, a voting rule is said to be strategy-proof if no voter can gain
utility in expectation by lying about her true preferences. We now give the formal
definition of strategy-proof.
Definition 85 (Strategy-proof). A voting rule v : Pn → ∆(C) is strategy-proof
if for every i ∈ [n], every preference profile ~P−i ∈ Pn−1, every pair of preference
orderings Pi, P
′
i ∈ P , and every utility function ui that is consistent with Pi, we
have
E [ui(v(~P−i, Pi))] ≥ E [ui(v(~P−i, P ′i ))].
It is desirable for a voting rule to be strategy-proof, since we can then expect
voters to honestly submit their true preferences, and thus the candidate chosen
by the voting rule will better reflect the voters’ true preferences. Unfortunately, if
there are at least three candidates, then it is not possible for a deterministic and
onto voting rule to be strategy-proof unless it is dictatorial, i.e., there exists some
voter i such that the voting rule simply always chooses voter i’s top choice. This
was shown independently by Gibbard [34] and Satterthwaite [71], and is known as
the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.
Theorem 86 (Gibbard-Satterthwaite [34, 71]). Suppose there are at least three
candidates, i.e., |C| ≥ 3. Let v : Pn → C be any deterministic voting rule that is
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onto and strategy-proof. Then, v is dictatorial, i.e., there exists an i ∈ [n] such
that v(P1, . . . , Pn) = top(Pi) for every preference profile (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ Pn.
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem considers voting rules that are deter-
ministic. However, several years later, Gibbard [35] generalized the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem to randomized voting rules. Before we state Gibbard’s
generalized impossibility result, let us state some required definitions. A (random-
ized) voting rule v : Pn → ∆(C) is said to be unilateral if it only depends on the
preference of a single voter, i.e., there exists an i ∈ [n] such that v(~P ) = v( ~P ′)
for every ~P = (P1, . . . , Pn), ~P ′ = (P ′1, . . . , P
′
n) ∈ Pn such that Pi = P ′i . A (ran-
domized) voting rule v : Pn → ∆(C) is said to be duple if v always chooses some
candidate from a fixed set of two candidates, i.e., there exist candidates x, y ∈ C
such that v(z, ~P ) = 0 for every z ∈ C \ {x, y} and ~P ∈ Pn.
Intuitively, when there are at least three candidates, both unilateral rules and
duple rules are undesirable, since the former only consider a single voter’s prefer-
ence, and the latter essentially ignore all but two candidates. Gibbard’s generalized
impossibility result [35] states that any randomized strategy-proof voting rule is a
probability distribution over unilateral rules and duple rules.
Theorem 87 (Gibbard [35]). Let v : Pn → ∆(C) be any randomized voting rule
that is strategy-proof. Then, v is a distribution over unilateral rules and duple
rules, i.e., there exist randomized voting rules v1, . . . , vt and weights α1, . . . , αt ∈
(0, 1] with
∑t
i=1 αi = 1, such that each vi is unilateral or duple, and v(x,
~P ) =
α1v1(x, ~P ) + · · ·+ αtvt(x, ~P ) for every ~P ∈ Pn and x ∈ C.
A corollary of Gibbard’s impossibility result is that if a randomized voting
rule is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient, then it is a probability distribution over
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dictatorial voting rules.
Corollary 88 (Gibbard [35]). Let v : Pn → ∆(C) be any randomized voting rule
that is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. Then, v is a distribution over dictato-
rial voting rules, i.e., there exist dictatorial voting rules v1, . . . , vt and weights
α1, . . . , αt ∈ (0, 1] with
∑t
i=1 αi = 1, such that v(x,
~P ) = α1v1(x, ~P ) + · · · +
αtvt(x, ~P ) for every ~P ∈ Pn and x ∈ C.
B.2 Forming a Belief from Observations
We now describe how forming a belief from observations using empirical frequencies
or a Dirichlet distribution yields α-coarse beliefs, where α is inversely proportional
to the number of observations.
Forming a belief using empirical frequencies. Consider a voter that forms
a belief φ based on ` observations P1, . . . , P` by simply setting φ(P ) to be the
relative frequency of P in P1, . . . , P`, i.e., φ(P ) =
|{j∈[`]:Pj=P}|
`
. We see that the
resulting belief φ is (1/`)-coarse.
Forming a belief using a Dirichlet distribution. Let us first describe a
common method of forming a belief based on observations of preferences. We
begin with some initial distribution (e.g., the uniform distribution) over the set of
all beliefs, and as we make observations, we update this distribution using Bayes’
Rule. At any time, our distribution over beliefs can be used to form a single belief
by taking the expectation of the distribution over beliefs; equivalently, the single
belief is the resulting distribution over preferences obtained by first sampling a
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belief from the distribution over beliefs, and then sampling a preference from the
sampled belief.
At the beginning when no samples of preferences have been observed yet, we are
indifferent between different possible beliefs, so we start with the uniform distri-
bution over the set ∆(P) of all beliefs. Then, given an observation of a preference
ordering P1, we update the uniform distribution over ∆(P) by conditioning on the
event that the sample P1 is observed. Upon further observations P2, . . . , P`, we
update the current distribution over ∆(P) by conditioning on each of the observa-
tions P2, . . . , P` separately in sequence. The resulting distribution over beliefs can
be “collapsed” to give us a single belief as described above.
The distributions over beliefs that we obtain can be described by the Dirichlet
distribution. The Dirichlet distribution Dir(~α) of order K ≥ 2 with parameters
~α = (α1, . . . , αK) > 0 has a pdf given by f~α(x1, . . . , xK) ∼
∏K
i=1 x
αi−1
i for every
(x1, . . . , xK) ∈ RK such that
∑K
i=1 xi = 1, and is 0 elsewhere. In our context of
updating beliefs, we fix an arbitrary ordering of the preferences in P , and we let
K = |P|, so (x1, . . . , xK) (with
∑K
i=1 xi = 1) are the probability masses describing
a belief. The uniform distribution over the set of all beliefs is the Dirichlet dis-
tribution Dir(1, . . . , 1). It is known that if the current distribution over beliefs is
Dir(~α) and we observe P1, . . . , P`, then the resulting distribution over beliefs ob-
tained by conditioning on P1, . . . , P` is Dir(~α+~c), where ~c is the vector of counts
representing how many times each preference ordering appears in the observations
P1, . . . , P`. It is also known that for any ~α′ = (α′1, . . . , α
′
K), the expectation of
Dir(~α′) is 1∑K
i=1 α
′
i
· (α′1, . . . , α′K). Let ~α = (1, . . . , 1) (vector of K 1’s), and let
~α′ = ~α + ~c, where ~c is as described above. Noting that ||~c||1 = ` (since there are
` observations), the expectation of Dir(~α′) is 1
K+`
· (α′1, . . . , α′K). Since the belief
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formed from Dir(~α′) is the expectation of Dir(~α′), and since the α′i’s are integers,
we see that the obtained belief is 1
K+`
-coarse.
B.3 Proofs for Section 5.3.1 and 5.3.2
Theorem 77. Let f : P∗ → ∆(2C) be any elimination rule, and let s =
{sA}A⊆C,A 6=∅ be any selection rule. Let δ : N → R be any function. Suppose
there exists a polynomial p(·) such that for every α > 0 and every n ≥ p( 1
α
), the
following holds:
• For every i ∈ [n] and every α-coarse i.i.d. belief φi, there exists a non-empty
subset A ⊆ C of candidates such that the following conditions hold:
– For every Pi ∈ P, the elimination rule f(~P−i, Pi) chooses (to keep) A
with probability at least 1 − δ(n) over the randomness of ~P−i ∼ φin−1
and f .
– sA is strategy-proof w.r.t. the restricted belief φi|A.
Then, the voting rule v : P∗ → ∆(C) defined by v(~P ) = s(~P |f(~P )) is large-scale
2δ-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, and the rate of v is the polynomial p(·).
Proof. Let α > 0, let n ≥ p(1/α), let i ∈ [n], let Pi, P ′i ∈ P , let φi be any α-
coarse i.i.d. belief, and let ui be any utility function that is consistent with Pi. Let
~P−i ∼ φin−1. We will show that
E [ui(v(~P−i, Pi))] ≥ E [ui(v(~P−i, P ′i ))]− 2δ(n). (1)
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Let A be the set of candidates guaranteed by the assumptions of the theorem
statement. Consider an alternate voting rule v′ : P∗ → ∆(C) defined by v′(~P ) =
s(~P |A). Since the elimination rule f(~P−i, Pi) chooses A with probability at least
1−δ(n), it is easy to see that for every P ∈ P , we have ||v(~P−i, P )−v′(~P−i, P )||1 ≤
δ(n). Thus, we have
|E [ui(v(~P−i, Pi))]− E [ui(v′(~P−i, Pi))]|
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑
c∈C
Pr[v(~P−i, Pi) = c] · ui(c)−
∑
c∈C
Pr[v′(~P−i, Pi) = c] · ui(c)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
c∈C
|Pr[v(~P−i, Pi) = c]− Pr[v′(~P−i, Pi) = c]| · |ui(c)|
≤ δ(n). (2)
Similarly, we also have
|E [ui(v(~P−i, P ′i ))]− E [ui(v′(~P−i, P ′i ))]| ≤ δ(n). (3)
Since sA is strategy-proof w.r.t. φi|A, we have E [ui(v′(~P−i, Pi))] ≥ E [ui(v′(~P−i, P ′i ))].
Combining this with (2) and (3) yields (1), as required.
Theorem 78. Let 0 < δ < 1/2, and let vpl be the voting rule defined above Theorem
78 in the body of the paper. Then, vpl satisfies the following properties:
1. vpl is large-scale (e
−Ω(n2δ))-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, with rate
p(x) = O(xd1/(1/2−δ)e).
2. vpl is Pareto efficient.
3. vpl is n
1/2+δ-close to optimal in the sense that vpl always chooses a candidate
c ∈ C such that the number of top-choice votes for c is within n1/2+δ of the
highest number of top-choice votes among the candidates.
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Proof. Property 3 clearly follows from the definition of vpl. We will now show
Property 2. Let ~P ∈ Pn be a preference profile such that every voter in ~P prefers
candidate x over candidate y. We note that in order for candidate y to be chosen
as the winner, candidate y must be in the set of remaining candidates in Stage
2. However, when this occurs, candidate x would also be in the set of remaining
candidates in Stage 2, since candidate x always has a count that is higher than
that of candidate y. Thus, candidate y would have no top-choice votes in Stage
2, so it cannot be chosen as the winner by the plurality rule in Stage 2. We have
now shown Property 2.
We will now show Property 1. We will use our general framework, i.e., Theorem
77. The elimination rule f : P∗ → ∆(2C) corresponds to Stage 1, i.e., it chooses to
keep the candidates that are remaining at the end of Stage 1. The selection rule
s = {sA}A⊆C,A 6=∅ runs the plurality rule on the remaining candidates with respect
to the restricted preference profile. For each non-empty A ⊆ C, let Φ′A be the set
of beliefs φ (over the set of all preference orderings on A) where every candidate
in A has the same probability of being the top choice. It is not hard to verify
that the plurality rule, and thus the selection rule, is strategy-proof with respect
to each Φ′A. Let p(x) = (3x + 1)
d1/(1/2−δ)e, let α > 0, let n ≥ p(1/α), let i ∈ [n],
and let φi be any α-coarse i.i.d. belief.
Given a preference ordering P and a candidate x ∈ C, let points(x, P ) be 1 if x
is the top choice in P , and 0 otherwise. Let A be the set of candidates remaining
after the following procedure:
• Let S = C, and repeatedly do the following until no more candidates are elim-
inated: Eliminate all the candidates a ∈ S such that EP∼φi [points(a, P |S)] <
maxa′∈S EP∼φi [points(a′, P |S)], and let S be the set of remaining candidates.
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We will show that the following conditions hold:
• For every Pi ∈ P , the elimination rule f(~P−i, Pi) chooses (to keep) A with
probability at least 1− e−Ω(n2δ) over the randomness of ~P−i ∼ φin−1 and f .
• The restriction of φi to A results in a belief in Φ′A.
The second condition holds because from the definition of A, we see that
for every a ∈ A, we have PrP∼φi [top(P |A) = a] = EP∼φi [points(a, P |A)] =
maxa′∈A EP∼φi [points(a′, P |A)]. Thus, we now show the first condition.
Let Pi ∈ P . Consider the execution of one iteration of the loop in Stage
1. Suppose the current set of remaining candidates is S and we are currently at
Stage 1. Let M = maxa′∈S EP∼φi [points(a′, P |S)]. Let E be the set of candidates
a ∈ S such that EP∼φi [points(a, P |S)] = M . We first show that for each candidate
y ∈ S \ E, we have
EP∼φi [points(y, P |S)] ≤M − α. (1)
It suffices to show that for every x, y ∈ S, we have |EP∼φi [points(x, P |S)] −
EP∼φi [points(y, P |S)]| = 0 or |EP∼φi [points(x, P |S)] − EP∼φi [points(y, P |S)]| ≥ α.
To see this, let x, y ∈ S, and observe that
|EP∼φi [points(x, P |S)]− EP∼φi [points(y, P |S)]|
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑
P∈P
φi(P ) · points(x, P |S)−
∑
P∈P
φi(P ) · points(y, P |S)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑
P∈P
φi(P ) · (points(x, P |S)− points(y, P |S))
∣∣∣∣∣ . (2)
Since φi is α-coarse, there exists a β ≥ α such that for every P ∈ P , φi(P ) is a
multiple of β. Thus, each term of the sum in (2) is a multiple of β, and so the
196
sum is also a multiple of β. Thus, the entire expression in (2) is either 0 or at least
β ≥ α, as required. Thus, we have shown (1).
Let Pi′ ∼ φi independently for every i′ ∈ [n] \ {i}, and let score−i(x) =∑
i′∈[n]\{i} points(x, Pi′|S) for every x ∈ S. By a Chernoff bound, for each x ∈ S,
we have
Pr[|score−i(x)− E [score−i(x)]| ≥ n1/2+δ/4] ≤ e−Ω(n2δ).
Now, by the union bound, we have
Pr[∃x ∈ S : |score−i(x)− E [score−i(x)]| ≥ n1/2+δ/4] ≤ m · e−Ω(n2δ) = e−Ω(n2δ).
(3)
Since E [score−i(x)] = (n− 1) ·M for every x ∈ E, it follows from (3) that
Pr[∃x, y ∈ E : |score−i(x)− score−i(y)| ≥ n1/2+δ/2] ≤ e−Ω(n2δ). (4)
From (1), we have EP∼φi [points(y, P |S)] ≤ M − α for every y ∈ S \ E. Thus,
E [score−i(y)] = (n−1) ·EP∼φi [points(y, P |S)] ≤ (n−1)M− (n−1)α < (n−1)M−
2n1/2+δ for every y ∈ S \ E, so it also follows from (3) that
Pr[∃x ∈ S \ E, y ∈ E : score−i(x) ≥ score−i(y)− n1/2+δ − 1] ≤ e−Ω(n2δ). (5)
Since the elimination rule f eliminates precisely the candidates that have a score
(i.e., count) that is not within n1/2+δ of the maximum score among the candidates,
and since voter i’s preference ordering Pi adds at most 1 to the score of a candidate,
we see (from (4), (5), and the union bound) that with probability at least 1 −
e−Ω(n
2δ), precisely the candidates in S\E will be eliminated in the current iteration
of Stage 1. Thus, at each iteration, with probability at least 1 − e−Ω(n2δ), the set
of candidates that get eliminated in the iteration precisely matches the set of
candidates that would be eliminated in the procedure used to define A. Thus, by
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the union bound, we have that with probability at least 1−m·e−Ω(n2δ) = 1−e−Ω(n2δ),
the elimination rule f(~P−i, Pi) chooses (to keep) A.
Now, by Theorem 77, vpl is large-scale e
−Ω(n2δ)-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse
i.i.d. beliefs, with rate p(x) = O(xd1/(1/2−δ)e).
Theorem 79. Let 0 < δ < 1/2, and let virv be the voting rule defined above
Theorem 79 in the body of the paper. Then, virv satisfies the following properties:
1. virv is large-scale (e
−Ω(n2δ))-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, with rate
p(x) = O(xd1/(1/2−δ)e).
2. virv is Pareto efficient.
Proof. We first show Property 2. Let ~P ∈ Pn be a preference profile such that
every voter in ~P prefers candidate x over candidate y. We note that in order for
candidate y to be chosen as the winner, candidate y must be in the set of remaining
candidates in Stage 2. However, when this occurs, candidate x would also be in the
set of remaining candidates in Stage 2, since candidate x always has a count that
is higher than that of candidate y. Thus, candidate y would have no top-choice
votes in Stage 2, so it cannot be chosen as the winner by the plurality rule in Stage
2. We have now shown Property 2.
We will now show Property 1. We will use our general framework, i.e., Theorem
77. The elimination rule f : P∗ → ∆(2C) corresponds to Stage 1, i.e., it chooses to
keep the candidates that are remaining at the end of Stage 1. The selection rule
s = {sA}A⊆C,A 6=∅ runs the plurality rule on the remaining candidates with respect
to the restricted preference profile. For each non-empty A ⊆ C, let Φ′A be the set
of beliefs φ (over the set of all preference orderings on A) where every candidate
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in A has the same probability of being the top choice. It is not hard to verify
that the plurality rule, and thus the selection rule, is strategy-proof with respect
to each Φ′A. Let p(x) = (3x + 1)
d1/(1/2−δ)e, let α > 0, let n ≥ p(1/α), let i ∈ [n],
and let φi be any α-coarse i.i.d. belief.
Given a preference ordering P and a candidate x ∈ C, let points(x, P ) be 1 if x
is the top choice in P , and 0 otherwise. Let A be the set of candidates remaining
after the following procedure:
• Initialize S := C, and repeat the following: Eliminate all the candidates a ∈ S
such that EP∼φi [points(a, P |S)] = mina′∈S EP∼φi [points(a′, P |S)], unless this
would eliminate all the remaining candidates, in which case we stop and exit
the repeat loop without eliminating any of the remaining candidates. Let S
be the new set of remaining candidates.
We will show that the following conditions hold:
• For every Pi ∈ P , the elimination rule f(~P−i, Pi) chooses (to keep) A with
probability at least 1− e−Ω(n2δ) over the randomness of ~P−i ∼ φin−1 and f .
• The restriction of φi to A results in a belief in Φ′A.
The second condition holds because from the definition of A, we see that
for every a ∈ A, we have PrP∼φi [top(P |A) = a] = EP∼φi [points(a, P |A)] =
maxa′∈A EP∼φi [points(a′, P |A)]. Thus, we now show the first condition.
Let Pi ∈ P . Consider the execution of one iteration of the loop in Stage
1. Suppose the current set of remaining candidates is S and we are currently at
Stage 1. Let M = mina′∈S EP∼φi [points(a′, P |S)]. Let E be the set of candidates
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a ∈ S such that EP∼φi [points(a, P |S)] = M . We first show that for each candidate
y ∈ S \ E, we have
EP∼φi [points(y, P |S)] ≥M + α. (1)
It suffices to show that for every x, y ∈ S, we have |EP∼φi [points(x, P |S)] −
EP∼φi [points(y, P |S)]| = 0 or |EP∼φi [points(x, P |S)] − EP∼φi [points(y, P |S)]| ≥ α.
To this end, let x, y ∈ S, and observe that
|EP∼φi [points(x, P |S)]− EP∼φi [points(y, P |S)]|
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑
P∈P
φi(P ) · points(x, P |S)−
∑
P∈P
φi(P ) · points(y, P |S)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑
P∈P
φi(P ) · (points(x, P |S)− points(y, P |S))
∣∣∣∣∣ . (2)
Since φi is α-coarse, there exists a β ≥ α such that for every P ∈ P , φi(P ) is a
multiple of β. Thus, each term of the sum in (2) is a multiple of β, and so the
sum is also a multiple of β. Thus, the entire expression in (2) is either 0 or at least
β ≥ α, as required. Thus, we have shown (1).
Let Pi′ ∼ φi independently for every i′ ∈ [n] \ {i}, and let score−i(x) =∑
i′∈[n]\{i} points(x, Pi′|S) for every x ∈ S. By a Chernoff bound, for each x ∈ S,
we have
Pr[|score−i(x)− E [score−i(x)]| ≥ n1/2+δ/4] ≤ e−Ω(n2δ).
Now, by the union bound, we have
Pr[∃x ∈ S : |score−i(x)− E [score−i(x)]| ≥ n1/2+δ/4] ≤ m · e−Ω(n2δ) = e−Ω(n2δ).
(3)
Since E [score−i(x)] = (n− 1) ·M for every x ∈ E, it follows from (3) that
Pr[∃x, y ∈ E : |score−i(x)− score−i(y)| ≥ n1/2+δ/2] ≤ e−Ω(n2δ). (4)
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From (1), we have EP∼φi [points(y, P |S)] ≥ M + α for every y ∈ S \ E. Thus,
E [score−i(y)] = (n−1) · EP∼φi [points(y, P |S)] ≥ (n−1)M+(n−1)α > (n−1)M+
2n1/2+δ for every y ∈ S \ E, so it also follows from (3) that
Pr[∃x ∈ S \ E, y ∈ E : score−i(x) ≤ score−i(y) + n1/2+δ + 1] ≤ e−Ω(n2δ). (5)
Since the elimination rule f eliminates precisely the candidates that have a score
(i.e., count) that is not within n1/2+δ of the minimum score among the candidates,
and since voter i’s preference ordering Pi adds at most 1 to the score of a candidate,
we see (from (4), (5), and the union bound) that with probability at least 1 −
e−Ω(n
2δ), precisely the candidates in E will be eliminated in the current iteration
of Stage 1. Thus, at each iteration, with probability at least 1 − e−Ω(n2δ), the
set of candidates that get eliminated in the iteration precisely matches the set of
candidates that would be eliminated in the procedure used to define A. Thus, by
the union bound, we have that with probability at least 1−m·e−Ω(n2δ) = 1−e−Ω(n2δ),
the elimination rule f(~P−i, Pi) chooses (to keep) A.
Now, by Theorem 77, virv is large-scale e
−Ω(n2δ)-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse
i.i.d. beliefs, with rate p(x) = O(xd1/(1/2−δ)e).
B.4 More Examples of our General Framework
A (positional) scoring rule is a voting rule where each candidate x receives a
certain number of points from each voter i depending on the position of x in
voter i’s preference ordering, and the candidate with the highest total score wins
(breaking ties in some way). A scoring rule has a points vector (p1, . . . , pm) ∈ Nm
associated with it; for each voter i with submitted preference ordering Pi, the j
th
top candidate in Pi receives pj points. There are many well-known examples of
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scoring rules, such as the following:
• Plurality: The plurality voting rule chooses the candidate with the most top-
choice votes (breaking ties in some way). This is simply a scoring rule with
the points vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Nm.
• Borda count: The Borda count voting rule is a scoring rule with the points
vector (m,m− 1, . . . , 1) ∈ Nm (recall that m is the number of candidates).
Example 23 (Scoring Rule Elimination + Input-Independent Selection).
Let 0 < δ < 1/2, and let vscore : P∗ → ∆(C) be any voting rule defined as follows;
on input a preference profile ~P ∈ Pn, vscore does the following:
Stage 1: Use a scoring rule to compute the scores of the candidates, and then
eliminate all the candidates with a score that is not within n1/2+δ of the
highest score among the candidates.
Stage 2: Choose a winner (deterministically or randomly) from the remaining
candidates in any way that does not depend on the input preference profile.
Using our general framework, we now show that vscore is large-scale -strategy-
proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs (where  is exponentially small), and also satisfies
certain efficiency properties.
Theorem 89. Let 0 < δ < 1/2, and let vscore be the voting rule defined above.
Then, vscore satisfies the following properties:
1. vscore is large-scale (e
−Ω(n2δ))-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, with
rate p(x) = O(xd1/(1/2−δ)e).
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2. vscore is Pareto efficient if the points vector of the scoring rule is strictly
decreasing, or if the scoring rule is the plurality rule and n is sufficiently
large.
3. vscore is n
1/2+δ-close to optimal in the sense that vscore always chooses a can-
didate c ∈ C such that the score of c is within n1/2+δ of the highest score
among the candidates.
Proof. Property 3 clearly follows from the definition of vscore. We will now show
Property 2. Let ~P ∈ Pn be a preference profile such that every voter in ~P prefers
candidate x over candidate y. It suffices to show that candidate y will be eliminated
by vscore, i.e., the score of y is not within n
1/2+δ of the maximum score among the
candidates. If the points vector of the scoring rule is strictly decreasing, then the
score of x is at least n more than the score of y (since the points in the points vector
are integers), as required. On the other hand, if the scoring rule is the plurality
rule, then the score of y is 0 while the maximum score among the candidates is at
least n/(|C| − 1); when n is sufficiently large, the score of y is not within n1/2+δ of
the maximum score among the candidates, as required. We have shown Property
2.
We will now show Property 1. We will use our general framework, i.e., Theorem
77. The elimination rule f : P∗ → ∆(2C) corresponds to Stage 1, i.e., f chooses
to keep the candidates that are within n1/2+δ of the maximum score among the
candidates. The selection rule s = {sA}A⊆C,A 6=∅ is the rule used in Stage 2. Clearly,
for every non-empty A ⊆ C, sA is strategy-proof with respect to the set of all beliefs.
Let p(x) = (3x + 1)d1/(1/2−δ)e, let α > 0, let n ≥ p(1/α), let i ∈ [n], and let φi be
any α-coarse i.i.d. belief.
Let (p1, . . . , pm) ∈ Nm be the points vector associated with vscore. Given a
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preference ordering P and a candidate x ∈ C, let points(x, P ) be the number of
points candidate x would receive from a voter with submitted preference ordering
P , i.e., points(x, P ) = pj, where j is the position of candidate x in P , with the
topmost position being position 1.
Let M = maxa′∈C EP∼φi [points(a′, P )]. Let A be the set of candidates a ∈ C
such that EP∼φi [points(a, P )] = M . We will show that the following holds:
• For every Pi ∈ P , the elimination rule f(~P−i, Pi) chooses (to keep) A with
probability at least 1− e−Ω(n2δ) over the randomness of ~P−i ∼ φin−1 and f .
Let Pi ∈ P . We first show that for each candidate y ∈ C \ A, we have
EP∼φi [points(y, P )] ≤M − α. (1)
It suffices to show that for every x, y ∈ C, we have |EP∼φi [points(x, P )] −
EP∼φi [points(y, P )]| = 0 or |EP∼φi [points(x, P )] − EP∼φi [points(y, P )]| ≥ α. To
see this, let x, y ∈ C, and observe that
|EP∼φi [points(x, P )]− EP∼φi [points(y, P )]|
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑
P∈P
φi(P ) · points(x, P )−
∑
P∈P
φi(P ) · points(y, P )
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑
P∈P
φi(P ) · (points(x, P )− points(y, P ))
∣∣∣∣∣ . (2)
Since φi is α-coarse, there exists a β ≥ α such that for every P ∈ P , φi(P ) is a
multiple of β. Thus, each term of the sum in (2) is a multiple of β, and so the
sum is also a multiple of β. Thus, the entire expression in (2) is either 0 or at least
β ≥ α, as required. Thus, we have shown (1).
Let Pi′ ∼ φi independently for every i′ ∈ [n] \ {i}, and let score−i(x) =∑
i′∈[n]\{i} points(x, Pi′) for every x ∈ C. By a Chernoff bound, for each y ∈ C,
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we have
Pr[|score−i(y)− E [score−i(y)]| ≥ n1/2+δ/4] ≤ e−Ω(n2δ).
Now, by the union bound, we have
Pr[∃x ∈ C : |score−i(x)− E [score−i(x)]| ≥ n1/2+δ/4] ≤ m · e−Ω(n2δ) = e−Ω(n2δ).
(3)
Since E [score−i(x)] = (n− 1) ·M for every x ∈ A, it follows from (3) that
Pr[∃x, y ∈ A : |score−i(x)− score−i(y)| ≥ n1/2+δ/2] ≤ e−Ω(n2δ). (4)
From (1), we have EP∼φi [points(y, P )] ≤ M − α for every y ∈ C \ A. Thus,
E [score−i(y)] = (n− 1) · EP∼φi [points(y, P )] ≤ (n− 1)M − (n− 1)α < (n− 1)M −
2n1/2+δ for every y ∈ C \ A, so it also follows from (3) that
Pr[∃x ∈ C \ A, y ∈ A : score−i(x) ≥ score−i(y)− n1/2+δ −max
j∈[m]
pj] ≤ e−Ω(n2δ).
(5)
Since the elimination rule f eliminates precisely the candidates that have a score
not within n1/2+δ of the maximum score among the candidates, and since voter i’s
preference ordering Pi adds at most maxj∈[m] pj to the score of any candidate, we
see (from (4), (5), and the union bound) that with probability at least 1−e−Ω(n2δ),
the elimination rule f(~P−i, Pi) chooses to keep A.
Now, by Theorem 77, vscore is large-scale e
−Ω(n2δ)-strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse
i.i.d. beliefs, with rate p(x) = O(xd1/(1/2−δ)e).
Using a strategy-proof voting rule in Stage 2 instead of input-
independent selection. In Stage 2, a winner is chosen in any way that does
not depend on the input preference profile. However, it is easy to see that one
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can run any strategy-proof (in the traditional sense) voting rule on the (preference
profile restricted to the) remaining candidates in Stage 2, since such a selection
rule clearly still satisfies the requirements of our general framework.
Using plurality in Stage 2 when there are only two candidates remain-
ing. Whenever Stage 1 eliminates all but two candidates, the voting rule vscore
can actually run the plurality rule on the two remaining candidates in Stage 2 in-
stead of choosing a winner in a way that does not depend on the input preference
profile. This is because the plurality rule is strategy-proof when there are only two
candidates, and so the selection rule clearly still satisfies the requirements of our
general framework. This improvement to the voting rule vscore can be especially
useful when it is widely believed that there are two “strong” candidates that are
much more preferred by the voters than the other candidates.
B.5 Proofs for Section 5.3.3
Lemma 80. The voting rule vpunish is “strictly strategy-proof” in the following
sense: For every α > 0, every i ∈ [n], every pair of preference orderings Pi, P ′i ∈ P
with Pi 6= P ′i , every ~P−i ∈ Pn−1, and every α-coarse utility function ui that is
consistent with Pi, we have
E [ui(vpunish(~P−i, Pi))] ≥ E [ui(vpunish(~P−i, P ′i ))] + Ω(α/n).
The proof of Lemma 80 roughly works as follows. If a voter lies about her
preference by swapping two adjacent candidates in her preference ordering, then
with probability 1/n, the voter will be chosen, and she will lose a constant amount
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of expected utility; this is because the less preferred candidate is now higher and
thus will be chosen with higher probability, while the more preferred candidate is
now lower and thus will be chosen with lower probability (and the utilities assigned
to the two swapped candidates have an α gap between them, since the utility
function is α-coarse). We show that we can obtain any (false) preference ordering
from the true preference ordering by performing a sequence of swaps of adjacent
candidates, where the less preferred candidate (according to the true preference)
is always swapped upwards; each of these swaps causes the voter to lose Ω(α/n)
expected utility, as described earlier. Thus, the lemma holds.
Proof. Let α > 0, let i ∈ [n], let Pi, P ′i ∈ P with Pi 6= P ′i , let ~P−i ∈ Pn−1, and let
ui : C → [0, 1] be any α-coarse utility function that is consistent with Pi. We will
show that
E [ui(vpunish(~P−i, Pi))] ≥ E [ui(vpunish(~P−i, P ′i ))] + Ω(α/n). (1)
Let ~P = (~P−i, Pi) and ~P ′ = (~P−i, P ′i ). Let a1, . . . , am be the ordering of the
candidates in the preference ordering P ′i , with a1 being the top (highest-ranked)
candidate in P ′i . We observe that ~P ′ can be obtained from ~P by performing the
following sequence of swaps of adjacent candidates in voter i’s preference ordering
(similar to how bubble sort works): We first take the candidate a1 in the preference
ordering Pi and move a1 to the top position by repeatedly swapping a1 with the
candidate directly above; this makes the top candidate of the resulting preference
ordering coincide with the top candidate of P ′i . We then take the candidate a2
in the resulting preference ordering and move a2 to the second top position by
repeatedly swapping the candidate with the candidate directly above; this makes
the top two candidates of the resulting preference ordering coincide with the top
two candidates of P ′. We then take the candidate a3 in the resulting preference
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ordering and move the candidate to the third top position by repeatedly swapping
the candidate with the candidate directly above. It is easy to see that by continuing
this process in the natural way, we will eventually get the preference ordering P ′i .
We now analyze how the expected utility E [ui(vpunish(~P−i, ·))] changes as we
perform the swaps to get from Pi to P
′
i for voter i’s preference ordering. We note
that for each swap, we are swapping a pair of adjacent candidates, say x and y
with x on top of y (before the swap), such that the preference ordering Pi ranks
x higher than y. Let Qi and Q
′
i denote the two preference orderings for voter i
before and after such a swap, respectively. Now, we observe that
E [ui(vpunish(~P−i, Q′i))]− E [ui(vpunish(~P−i, Qi))]
=
1
n
[ui(x) · vpunish(x, (~P−i, Q′i)) + ui(y) · vpunish(y, (~P−i, Q′i))]
− 1
n
[ui(x) · vpunish(x, (~P−i, Qi)) + ui(y) · vpunish(y, (~P−i, Qi))]
=
1
n
ui(x) · [vpunish(x, (~P−i, Q′i))− vpunish(x, (~P−i, Qi))]
+
1
n
ui(y) · [vpunish(y, (~P−i, Q′i))− vpunish(y, (~P−i, Qi))]
=
1
n
ui(x) ·
(
− 1∑m
k=1(m− k)
)
+
1
n
ui(y) ·
(
1∑m
k=1(m− k)
)
=
1
n
(ui(y)− ui(x)) ·
(
2
m(m− 1)
)
.
Since the preference ordering Pi ranks x higher than y, and since the utility function
ui is consistent with Pi, we have ui(x) > ui(y), so ui(y)− ui(x) ≤ −α (since ui is
α-coarse). Thus, we have
E [ui(vpunish(~P−i, Q′i))]− E [ui(vpunish(~P−i, Qi))] ≤ −Ω(α/n).
Thus, the expected utility E [ui(vpunish(~P−i, ·))] goes down by at least Ω(α/n)
each time we perform a swap in the sequence of swaps to get from Pi to P
′
i
for voter i’s preference ordering. This implies that E [ui(vpunish(~P−i, Pi))] ≥
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E [ui(vpunish(~P−i, P ′i ))] + Ω(α/n), which shows (1), as required. This completes
the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 81. Let v : P∗ → ∆(C) be any voting rule that is large-scale -strategy-
proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, where (n) = o(1/n2), and let p(·) be the rate of v.
Let vmix be the voting rule that runs v with probability 1−q(n) and runs vpunish with
probability q(n), where q(n) = Ω(n2 · (n)). Then, vmix is large-scale strategy-proof
w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, with rate pnew(x) = max{x, p(x)}.
The proof of Lemma 81 roughly works as follows. By Lemma 80, if a voter
lies about her preference, she will gain at most  = o(1/n2) expected utility if
vmix runs the voting rule v, but she will lose at least Ω(α/n) expected utility if
vmix runs the voting rule vpunish, where α is the coarseness of her utility function.
The probability q that vmix runs vpunish is appropriately chosen so that overall, the
voter does not gain any expected utility from lying.
Proof. Let pnew(x) = max{x, p(x)}. Let α > 0, let n ≥ pnew(1/α), let i ∈ [n],
let Pi, P
′
i ∈ P with Pi 6= P ′i , let φi be any α-coarse i.i.d. belief, and let ui be any
α-coarse utility function that is consistent with Pi. Let ~P−i ∼ φin−1. Since v is
large-scale -strategy-proof w.r.t. coarse i.i.d. beliefs, we have
E [ui(v(~P−i, Pi))] ≥ E [ui(v(~P−i, P ′i ))]− (n).
By Lemma 80, we also have
E [ui(vpunish(~P−i, Pi))] ≥ E [ui(vpunish(~P−i, P ′i ))] + α/n.
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Now, we observe that
E [ui(vmix(~P−i, Pi))]
= (1− q(n)) · E [ui(v(~P−i, Pi))] + q(n) · E [ui(vpunish(~P−i, Pi))]
≥ (1− q(n)) · (E [ui(v(~P−i, P ′i ))]− (n)) + q(n) · (E [ui(vpunish(~P−i, P ′i ))] + α/n)
= (1− q(n)) · E [ui(v(~P−i, P ′i ))] + q(n) · E [ui(vpunish(~P−i, P ′i ))]− (1− q(n)) · (n) + q(n)α/n
= E [ui(vmix(~P−i, P ′i ))]− (1− q(n)) · (n) + q(n)α/n. (1)
Now, we observe that by choosing q(n) = Ω(n2 · (n)) appropriately, we have
−(1 − q(n)) · (n) + q(n)α/n ≥ −(n) + q(n)/(n2) ≥ 0 (since α ≥ 1/n), and the
lemma follows.
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